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This thesis consists of two parts. The first part, consisting of Chapters 2 to 4, deals with
microeconometric models of individual labour supply and restrictions on working hours. An
important feature of this part is that it uses subjective labour supply data. In particular, it
uses respondents' answers to question on how many hours they would like to work, if they
could choose their number of working hours freely. In economics, the use of this kind of
data  is  not  (yet) very common.  For this reason, Section 1.1 discusses some applications  of
subjective data, and the advantages and disadvantages of their use. In this thesis, I use the
subjective labour supply data to disentangle labour supply and restrictions on working hours.
A more common methodology would be to base inference solely on realized labour market
data, for example, the respondents' actual number of working hours. Section 1.2 discusses
some models based on these data, together with my approach using subjective data. The
second part of this thesis, which consists of Chapter 5, contains an empirical study on the
German Apprenticeship System. The economic literature claims that in Germany large firms
bear net costs for the investment in general skills of the apprentices. As this is in
contradiction to the prediction of the human capital theory, several alternative theories have
been  proposed to explain this behaviour. Section 1.3 discusses the German Apprenticeship
System, some of the alternative theories explaining its existence, and the way I test them in
Chapter 5. The summary and conclusions of this thesis can be found in Chapter 6.
1.1 Subjective Data
In the empirical economic literature, it is common to base statistical inference on 'objective'
data only. In this thesis, I define objective data as data which relate to objectively measurable
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facts. This means that they, in principle, can be observed without asking the respondents
themselves. Typical examples of objective data contained in surveys are the actual working
hours, incomes and expenditures  of the respondents.' A problem  is that economic models  are
often not identified on the basis of objective data only. The remainder of this section will
discuss some examples. The usual method to overcome the problem is to make additional
assumptions. But in practice, this solution does not seem to work in all cases. In several
empirical studies the additional assumptions seem arbitrary. And in the case that the
additional assumptions are testable, they are quite often rejected. An alternative method to
identify an economic model, which is attracting more attention in recent years, is to make
use of 'subjective' data. I define subjective data as data which are conceived in the minds of
the respondents, and which can only be provided by the respondents themselves. Examples of
these data are opinions and future plans of the respondents. Another type of subjective data,
which is also used in economics, are answers to questions what respondents would do under
certain hypothetical circumstances. To get some insight in the advantages and disadvantages
of the use of subjective data, some examples will be discussed in this section.
A clear example of the two different approaches to identify an economic model, can
be  found   in the empirical literature on labour supply.   In  the  year   1982, two studies  were
published which extended the traditional tobit type labour supply model of Heckman (1974).
Both studies allow for censoring at nonzero hours of work, incorporating the idea that
individuals might be restricted in their choice of working hours. Moffitt (1982) follows  the
methodology that inference should be based on objective data, and only uses the actual
working hours. He identifies the probability of being overemployed by exclusion restrictions.
In particular, he assumes that regional dummies affect the actual working hours only through
labour demand. Ham (1982) uses the same model, but he identifies the probability of being
underemployed by using subjective information on whether individuals feel restricted in their
choice of working hours. Both authors conclude that the incorporation of restrictions on
working hours is a significant improvement of the traditional tobit type model.
Another example of the use of subjective data in the empirical literature on labour
supply is Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990). They consider a game-theoretic model of family
labour supply in which the spouses have different preferences. This model is not identified
on the basis of the actual working hours of the spouses only. One method to identify the
1 In most surveys, these data are nevertheless obtained by asking the respondents themselves, and are, there-
fore, not that objective. As these data are still commonly referred to as objective data, I stick to this terminology.
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model is to estimate the individual utility functions on the basis of single individuals, and
impose these in the model of family labour supply, see, for instance McEIroy (1988). In
contrast to this approach, Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990) identify the model on the basis of
the number of working hours that the respondents want to work, given that their partners'
working hours do not change. They assume that these desired working hours are the optimum
of the individual optimization problem, and that the actual working hours are the result of a
Nash bargaining process between the two spouses.
The use of subjective data in economics is not restricted to the empirical literature on
labour supply. Several other fields even have a longer tradition. For instance, in the field of
equivalence scales it is known since Pollak and Wales (1979) that equivalence scales are not
identified on the basis of expenditure data only. A strategy for identification is to make
additional assumptions on the utility functions of the individuals. But, in practice, these
assumptions often turn out to be rejected by the data. An alternative strategy is to use
subjective data on income evaluations. For instance, Van Praag (1968, 1991) and Kapteyn
(1994) use respondents' answers  to the question which annual after-tax household income
they would consider, in their circumstances, to be: a) very bad; b) bad; c) insufficient; d)
sufficient; e) good; f) very good. Another type of subjective data, which can be used to
identify equivalent scales, is on satisfaction with household income. For instance, Melenberg
and Van Soest (1996) and Charlier (1997) Use the respondents' answers to the question how
satisfied they are with their household income, with possible answers ranging from 0 (not
satisfied at all) to 10 (very satisfied).
Another field in economics with a long history on the use of subjective data is the
literature on expectations. Expectations play a major role in economic theory, as they
determine the decisions of the individuals in intertemporal choice problems. A problem for
empirical implementation is that the expectations of the individuals are not observed. This
leads to underidentification in economic models using expectations. A common methodology
to overcome this problem, is to make assumptions on how expectations are formed. For
instance, an often used assumption is that individuals have rational expectations. An
alternative strategy is to make use of subjective data on income expectations. Already in the
1940s the U.S. Surveys of Consumer Finances contained subjective data on expectations. For
instance, respondents had to answer whether they expect an increase or decrease in their
income at about a year from the time of the survey. Ever since this survey, there are debates
on the value  of  this   kind  of  data.   In  an influential empirical study, Juster  ( 1964) found  that
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the subjective expectations data in the U.S Surveys on Consumer Finances have limited
predictive value. It is an open question whether this means that the subjective expectations
data  do  not make sense,  or  that the expectations  of the respondents  are not rational.  This  is
still a topic of economic research, and recent examples which investigate this are, for
instance, Dominitz and Manski (1997) and Das (1998).
As described by the examples above, in the case of underidentification of a model,
the use of subjective data is an attractive alternative to the approach of making additional
assumptions. Still, the use of subjective data is not (yet) accepted as a common methodology.
The most frequently used criticism is that the reliability of the respondents' answers to
subjective questions is unclear. An argument is that the answers might not reflect optimal
behaviour,   as the respondents   are not penalized   for   a 'non-optimal answer'. However,   for
most surveys this criticism also applies for the objective data, as there is often no mechanism
to check whether the answers of the respondents are correct. Still, an advantage of objective
data is that they, at least, can be compared with data from other sources. Another argument
against the use of subjective data is that subjective questions might give rise to mis-
interpretation. For instance, the objective question "how many hours did you work last
week?", seems easier to answer by the respondents, than the subjective question "how many
hours would you have liked to work last week, if you could have chosen freely?" Unclear is
whether the respondents will take the budget constraint into account. And if so, what does
this budget constraint look like? All together, it seems reasonable to state that objective data
are more reliable than subjective data. This does, however, not imply that subjective data
should not be used! The crucial issue is not the choice between objective and subjective data.
Subjective data are mostly used as a supplement to objective data. The crucial choice is,
therefore, between the method of making additional assumptions, and the method of using
subjective data to identify a model.
An advantage of the method of making additional assumptions, is that they can be
tested (in most cases). So, in order to make the method of using subjective data a serious
competitor, the assumptions on the subjective data should be tested too. However, the
empirical literature using subjective data often takes the data for granted. The problem is that
it is difficult to test the assumption that the subjective data reflect individual optimal
behaviour or expectations. One method is to formulate and estimate a structural model, using
or explaining the subjective data, and test the model extensively. If the tests do not reject,
then the hypothesis that the subjective data really reflect optimal behaviour or individual
Introduction                                                                  5
expectations, is not rejected. However, structural models often need auxiliary assumptions.
So, if the tests reject, it is not clear why. Another method to see whether the subjective data
contain useful information, is to test whether these data have predictive value on future
outcomes. In the case of expectations, this idea was followed by Juster (1964).
Chapter 2 of this thesis tests the subjective labour supply data contained in the Dutch
Socio Economic Panel. These  data are comparable  to  the  data on constraints on working
hours, as used by Ham ( 1982). Also Stratford et al. (1995) use these data, and extend the
analysis of Ham. By combining the tobit type labour supply model with frontier functions,
they do not require that the respondents are classified a priori. This allows them to test the
subjective labour supply data, which they refer to as Sample Separation Information. They
conclude that these data may not be accurate. But as in the case of the structural models,
they need auxiliary assumptions. So, it is not clear for what reason their test rejects. In
Chapter 2 we decide to follow the idea of Juster (1964): it tests whether the subjective labour
supply data have any predictive value on future outcomes of labour market behaviour. The
idea is that, if the hypothesis that the subjective labour supply data do not have predictive
value is rejected, then these data must contain at least some information on the labour supply
preferences of the respondents. The advantage of this way of testing over the method using
frontier functions, is that the testing problem is relatively simple. By using nonparametric
methods, we are able to avoid the need of functional or distributional assumptions. We test
the predictive value of the subjective labour supply data nonparametrically, correcting for the
actual working hours. In addition, we also use parametric tests, as nonparametric methods are
practically not very suitable to control for many additional variables.
1.2 Labour Supply and Labour Market Restrictions
All chapters of the first part of this thesis start by the notion that the empirical literature on
labour supply is often based on the assumption that individuals can freely and without cost
choose their working hours, taking their hourly wage rate as given. There are, however, both
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, that working hours cannot be freely varied
within jobs. Therefore, the assumption that the actual hours of work purely reflect a labour
supply decision seems questionable. As the introductions of Chapters 3 and 4 discuss this in
detail, the discussion in this section will be restricted to the way in which we study the
constraints on working hours in this thesis.
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Although several models have been developed to incorporate constraints on working
hours in labour supply models, there are only few studies on the nature of the restrictions. To
explain why individuals are not on their labour supply curve, there not only have to exist
hours constraints within jobs, but also substantial mobility costs between jobs. Otherwise
individuals should be able to attain their labour supply curve by changing to a job with their
optimal number of working hours. Altonji and Paxson (1986, 1992) study the constraints on
working hours within and between jobs. They do this by comparing the adjustment of
working hours over time for individuals who stay in the same job, and individuals who
change job. Based on the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they conclude that working
hours of married women are two to four times more variable between jobs than within jobs.
In the second article they relate the adjustment of working hours to changes in the labour
supply variables, such as the number of children, and they also take the potential endogeneity
of changing job into account. They still find that hours vary significantly more in case of job
mobility. Chapter 3 repeats the analysis of Altonji and Paxson (1992), using a sample of
employed women in the Dutch Socio Economic Panel.
In the analysis described above, the changes in the actual working hours are related to
the changes in the labour supply variables. This analysis only allows for testing whether the
degree of adjustment for individuals who stay in their job is different to the adjustment for
individuals who change job. The adjustments of working hours within and between jobs are
not identified. Chapter 3 identifies this by using the subjective labour supply data. I allow for
the fact that the subjective data on the respondents' desired working hours may not only
reflect preferences, but that they may also be affected by the number of working hours of the
current job.
As stated earlier, several models have been developed to incorporate hours constraints
in labour supply models. The first generation consists of the tobit type models of Ham (1982)
and Moffitt (1982), as already discussed in the previous section. The second generation
consists of structural labour supply models which include job offers concerning hours of
work. In these models, hours restrictions are characterized by the probabilities of job offers
with certain numbers of working hours. Van Soest et al. (1990) and Dickens and Lundberg
(1993) estimate such models on the basis of actual working hours only. An alternative is to
identify labour supply and hours restrictions independently of each other on the basis of
actual working hours and subjective data on desired working hours. This idea was followed
by Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990), who allowed for three labour market states: non-
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participation, part-time work and full-time work. Chapter 4 of this thesis extends their model
by using a structural labour supply model, explaining the desired working hours. Note that
we assume that the desired working hours purely reflect preferences. By using the deviations
between the actual and desired working hours, we identify the restrictions on working hours.
We estimate this model for unmarried men and women on the basis of a single cross-section
in the Dutch Socio Economic Panel.
1.3 The German Apprenticeship System
Chapter 5 of this thesis contains an empirical study on the German Apprenticeship System
(GAS). The GAS combines on-the-job-training in private firms with formal, state provided
education for one or two days per week at a postsecondary level. The duration of the training
varies from 24 to 42 months. At the end of the training the apprentices have to pass exams to
get a certificate. For many occupations this certificate is needed to get a job as a skilled
worker. Since more than 60 percent of a cohort go through this system, the GAS is an
important part of the German education system.
Although the apprentices are employed by different firms, within an occupation they
get similar state provided education and exams. And even the training in the firms is partly
controlled, as the firms need a state provided licence to hire apprentices. So the general view
on the GAS is that it provides general skills, rather than firm specific skills. See, for
instance, Winkelmann (1996), and the references there. The advantages to participate in the
system are equal for firms in the same sector. For instance, they hire the trainees at the same
fixed wage, which is substantially below the wage of an unskilled worker. But concerning the
costs, there is an important difference between the training firms: while small firms are
allowed to train apprentices during daily work, large firms must have special training
programs with skilled trainers. And according to, for instance, Soskice (1994), the net costs
are about zero for the small firms, but substantially positive for the large firms.
An intriguing open puzzle is why large firms in Germany invest in the general skills
of their apprentices. According to the human capital theory of Becker (1964) they should not
do so. The literature on the GAS proposes several alternative theories to explain this
behaviour. For instance, Franz and Soskice (1995) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1996) argue
that asymmetric information is the key to understanding this behaviour. Following the
literature on asymmetric information, see Gibbons and Katz (1991), they claim that firms use
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the apprenticeship training to get private information on the ability of the apprentices. After
the training period, the training firms offer jobs to the apprentices above a certain
(endogenously determined) ability level. As it is assumed that outside firms are not able to
distinguish between low ability apprentices who are laid off by their training firm, and high
ability apprentices who decide to reject the wage offer of the training firm, the market wage
of high ability apprentices is below their marginal productivity. Therefore training firms can
offer them wages just above their market wage, knowing that the high ability apI}rentices will
accept them anyway. A consequence of this theory is that apprentices who stay with the
training firm should have higher wages than apprentices who leave the training firm.
On the other hand, Harhoff and Kane (1997) argue that heterogeneity in tastes and
mobility costs are the key explanation for the behaviour of the large firms. According to their
theory, many apprentices face mobility costs. And apprentices with a strong preference for
not leaving the training firm, are willing to accept wages which are lower than they could
earn at other firms. The implication of this theory is opposite to that of the asymmetric
information theory: apprentices who stay with the training firm should have lower wages
than apprentices who leave the training firm. The opposite implications for the sign of the
wage differential, together with some other implications of the theories, are the basis for the
empirical study of Chapter 5.
Both theories discussed above have received some empirical support, based upon
wage differentials computed from cross-section data. Chapter 5 of this thesis tests these
theories, making use of data from the German Social Security records. As these data cover
the period from 1975 to 1990, we are able to follow the apprentices in their first few years of
their career. We focus on male apprentices who finish their apprenticeship in this period. We
have about 6,500 observation on wages shortly after graduation. About 60 percent stay with
their training firm, the others moved to another firm immediately or shortly after graduation.
Our aim is to use these new and rich data to analyse the empirical relevance of the theories
discussed above.
Chapter 2
Testing the Predictive Value of
Subjective Labour Supply Data
2.1 Introduction
The standard neoclassical theory of labour supply is built on the assumption of utility
maximization of individuals or households. Facing a certain choice set consisting of
attainable combinations of hours worked and earnings, the individuals choose their optimal
number of working hours. In this theory labour demand has an important role: it determines
the choice sets. Survey data on actual labour market behaviour, however, only reveal actual
employment status, earnings, and hours worked, while the individuals' choice sets are not
observed. Therefore, in structural empirical models of labour supply, rigorous assumptions
with respect to the demand side of the labour market usually have to be made. Traditionally,
it is assumed that the individuals can choose any number of working hours, Up to a
maximum equal to the time endowment. See, for instance, the seminal article of Heckman
(1974). This assumption excludes the existence of involuntary unemployment. It also
excludes a possible lack of part-time jobs, which forces individuals to choose between not
working or working full-time. A large part of the empirical labour supply literature is built
on this assumption.
Still, several authors have tested or relaxed this assumption of free choice. Two main
strategies can be distinguished. The most common strategy is to incorporate involuntary
unemployment or other hours restrictions in the structure of the model, but to use data on
actual labour supply behaviour only. For example, Blundell et al. (1987) incorporate involun-
tary unemployment explicitly, and find that this improves the empirical fit of the model
significantly. This type of model has been estimated for various countries. Altonji and
Paxson (1988) investigate why changes in preferences have a larger effect on hours for job-
changers than for job-stayers, and conclude that restrictions on working hours in the job play
a major role. Tummers and Woittiez (1991) and Dickens and Lundberg (1993) explicitly
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model the probability that jobs with a certain number of working hours are not available. The
drawback   of all these studies    is that actual hours   have to identi fy preferences    as    well    as
restrictions. Identification therefore requires auxiliary assumptions, and the question remains
to what extent the results are driven by the auxiliary assumptions.
An alternative strategy is to use subjective data on labour supply, representing the
desired labour market status. Many surveys at the household or individual level contain data
on restrictions on working hours or on the number of hours that an individual would like to
work. Biddle (1988) and Ball (1990) use the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics and
conclude that restrictions on working hours are important, as the dynamic model for labour
supply is rejected for the full sample of workers but accepted for the sample with
unrestricted workers only. Kahn and Lang (1991) estimate static models of labour supply on
the basis of actual and desired hours in the Canadian Labor Force Survey, and find that the
elasticity estimates based upon actual working hours are biased upward.
Subjective data can thus be used to test the traditional labour supply models. They
can also be used to identify restrictions in the labour market, by confronting desired with
actual hours. Using information on desired and actual working hours in the Finnish Labour
Force Survey, Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990) find that women experience a substantial lack
of part-time jobs. On the basis of the British Household Panel Survey, Stewart and Swaffield
(1995) find that male manual workers are often overemployed, and explain this from lower
bounds on working hours imposed by the firm. Similar findings for Sweden are given in
Sackldn ( 1996). Stratford et al. (1995), on the other hand, find that in the US,
overemployment among males is much less common than underemployment. Using the
Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, I conclude in Chapter 4 that there is a lack of part-time jobs
for unmarried men and women.
A common criticism to using subjective data is that the reliability of individuals'
answers to this type of questions is unclear. It is not guaranteed that the answers reflect
optimal behaviour, since the respondents are not penalized for a 'non-optimal answer.'
Stratford et al. (1995) and Sacklen (1996) allow explicitly for misclassification of over- and
underemployment and find significant misclassification probabilities. They need rather strong
assumptions to identify these probabilities, however.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether subjective data on labour supply
say anything about future labour market adjustment. The null hypothesis is that they do not.
We will test this hypothesis by confronting desired labour supply with future changes in job
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status and actual hours worked. We use the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, which contains
information on both actual and desired working hours for the same individuals in three
consecutive years. Under the null hypothesis, the answers to the desired hours questions in
year t do not significantly contribute to explaining actual working hours in year t+1. This
either means that desired hours contain no information on preferences additional to the
information contained in actual hours, or that hours worked are completely determined by
demand and individuals are unable to adjust them. The main novelty in this paper is that we
look at changes over time using panel data, while the existing studies comparing desired and
actual labour supply have focused on single cross-sections.
Non-workers with desired hours equal to zero do not participate in the labour market.
Non-workers with positive desired hours are sometimes discouraged, but will usually be
looking for a job. It is well-known that job searchers have a larger probability of working
twelve months later than other non-workers with similar characteristics. It therefore seems
obvious that for non-workers, the null hypothesis that deviations between desired and actual
hours of work say nothing about future changes, will be rejected. In the current paper, we do
not pursue this issue and focus on those who work in year t.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we first present
the subjective questions on desired labour supply and the methodology we employ to test
whether this desired labour status information can contribute to explaining the future labour
market status. In Section 2.3 we describe the data we use. Section 2.4 contains the results of
the tests. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes: subjective information could help to explain labour
supply behaviour for women. For men, the evidence is mixed.
2.2 Survey Questions, Hypotheses, and Tests
We first present the questions on the desired labour market status. Then we describe in
general terms the methodology we employ to test whether this information has any effect on
the future labour market status.
The questions on actual and desired hours of work which the individuals answer in
the October waves of 1987 and 1988, are as follows:
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Ia         How many hours per week do you work in your job, or jobs?
- Do not include  travelling time to and from your work.
- Include overtime only if it is paid.
Ib     Are you satisfied with this number of working hours, or would you prefer to work
more or fewer hours per week? Possible answers:
1) I am satisfied with the number of working hours.
2) I prefer to work more.
3) I prefer to work less.
Ic    If, in the previous question, you were not satisfied with your number of working
hours, how many hours would you like to work then?
The answers to questions Ia to Ic by individual i in year t are denoted by hail' Sit. and hd;t,
respectively. 'Actual hours' hai, and 'desired hours' hd ,are measured as hours per week. We
define 'satisfaction' sit as follows: si, 0 if individual i is satisfied with the number of working
hours in period t (answer   1),   4=-1   if  the individual wants  to  work less (answer   3)   and
Sit=+1 if the individual wants to work more (answer 2). Respondents only answer question Ic
when they are not satisfied with the number of working hours reported under Ia. We assume
that, for respondents who report to be satisfied with their number of working hours (si,-0),
desired hours equal actual hours, i.e., hd;,=hait. Thus the 'observed desired hours' hd„  are:
hdi, = I[sit=O]hait + I[sit#0]hd;, (2.1)
Here I[A] is the indicator function, with value 1 if A is true and 0 if it is false.
Let y represent the variable referring to future labour market status and let z present
information on desired labour supply. We want to find out whether the subjective information
in z has any effect on y. We distinguish three possibilities for y:
A.     y = I[hai,+1>0] ;
Thus, y equals 1 if individual i works in t+1 and 0 otherwise.
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B.     y = hait.1 - haiti
Here y represents the future adjustment of actual hours of work.
C.    In the third case y is a dummy indicating whether individual i has changed job
between dates t and t+1.
We also distinguish three cases for z, the present subjective information on the
desired labour market status:
a.      z=s 0
]1,
In this case we only check whether the answer to question Ib has an effect.
b.      z = hdit - hait;
In this case we restrict attention to the subsample of people who are over- or
underemployed (si,40, so hdi,=hdit) and investigate whether the answer to question Ic -
the size of over- or underemployment - has an effect in addition to the qualitative
information that people are under- or overemployed.
c.      z = hdi, -hait·
Here we want to check whether the difference between present desired hours (using
definition (2.1)) and present actual hours has some effect.
The reason for these distinctions is that in several surveys used in the literature, sit is
available, but the exact information on hdit is not. See, for example, Stratford et al. (1995)
and Sackldn (1996). In case a we analyse the value of sit, the information on over- and under-
employment, only. In case b, we analyse whether it is worthwhile to add information on the
size of over- and underemployment. Case c leads to a direct test of the value of the complete
information.
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In addition, let x be a vector of conditioning variables. x will include at least the
present number of working hours, ha since it is likely that the future status will depend onIt'
the present number of actual working hours. In case b we also include su in x.
Let P and Pyix denote the probability distributions of y conditional on (x,z) and
YIX.Z
on x. We are interested in testing the following hypothesis
Ho: Pyl...= Pyl. (2.2)
We shall consider two ways to test (2.2) for the three variables y (cases A, B and C),
and for the three variants a, b and c for the subjective information z. Instead of on (2.2), the
tests will be based on the weaker first moment hypothesis implied by (2.2):
E{ylx,z} =E{ylx} (2.3)
If y is a binary variable (cases A and C), (2.2) and (2.3) are equivalent. If y is not binary
(case B), then it is somewhat restrictive to consider conditional means only. For example, z
could affect the conditional variance of y (or other features of the conditional distribution)
without affecting the conditional mean. In our case, however, we see no economic arguments
for this. Moreover, the natural alternative hypothesis relates to the first moment: if the null is
violated, then E{y Ix,z}-E{y Ix} will have the same sign as z.
Restriction (2.3) can be tested parametrically and nonparametrically. Several non-
parametric tests are available in the literature. Most of these tests can be viewed as moment
tests (m-tests). For instance with
g(x,z)=E{ylx,z}, Rx)=E{ylx} (2.4)
the null hypothesis, g(x,z)=f(x) with probability one in x, implies
E{(y-g(x,z))2 - Cy-f(x))2} = 0 (2.5)
Whang and Andrews (1993) used this moment restriction to construct an m-test based upon
the sample analogue of (2.5). To avoid degeneracy of the test statistic under the null
hypothesis, they require the sample to be split up randomly into two parts. In order to apply
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their test, both g and f have to be estimated nonparametrically. Alternative tests, also based
on some comparison of the nonparametric estimates g and f, are, for instance, AYt-Sahalia,
Bickel and Stoker (1996), Lavergne and Vuong   ( 1995), and Wooldridge    (1992).    We
experimented with the Whang and Andrews test. In our case the outcomes of the test turned
out to be very sensitive to the way in which the sample is split. As a consequence, the results
are always inconclusive, and we therefore do not report them.
An alternative test for Ho is based upon nonparametric estimates of g only. For
instance, if z is continuous, the null hypothesis implies the following moment restrictions
E{ ag(x,z)/Dz}  = 0 (2.6)
The sample analogue of this moment restrictions can be used to construct m-tests, see
Rilstone (1991). We investigated this idea in a simulation study, following Rilstone in the
construction of the sample analogue. According to the simulations, the performance of the
test in our case would be poor: the actual size of the test can be much larger than the
nominal size, so that the test tends to overreject. We therefore do not apply this approach.
Third, there are nonparametric tests of Ho which make use of nonparametric estimates
of f only. We shall refer to this type of tests as nonparametric LM-type tests, since, just like
parametric LM-tests, one has to estimate under the null hypothesis. Examples are Bierens
(1990), Lewbel (1991), White and Hong (1993) and Fan and Li (1996). The type of test
which seems easiest to apply is based on the following moment restriction, implied by Ho
E{ (y  -f(x))b(z) }  = 0, (2.7)
where b can be any (suitable) function. In general we will choose b(z)=z. For the future
adjustment of actual hours (Case B) this should be a good choice, as one might expect a
nonnegative impact of satisfaction  si, and desired hours  hd„.'  For the probability of working
the next year (case A) and for having a new job the next year (case C) the impact of the
subjective data is less obvious, and we also try b(z)= Iz I.
' Our strategy therefore is to use tests with power in a relevant direction. We do not use consistent tests
which have some power in all directions, but possibly low power in the directions of interest.
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Simulation experiments with this test suggested that it performs reasonably well for
our purposes. Nominal and actual size were close and results were robust with respect to the
choice of bandwidths. The test statistic is obtained from (2.7) by replacing the expectation by
its sample analogue and f by a nonparametric estimate. We use a Kernel estimator with
Gaussian kernel for f. The test statistic and its limit distribution under the null are derived by
White and Hong (1993). We reproduce the results for the sake of convenience. Let 61 be the
sample analogue of the lefthand side of (2.7). Under the null,
/n m -#d N(0, V{(y - f(x))(b(z) - E{b(z)Ix})}) (2.8)
To   estimate the asymptotic variance, a nonparametric estimate   of  E{ b(z) I x}i s required.
Again, we use a kernel estimator with Gaussian kernel.
A common problem when applying nonparametric methods is the choice of the
bandwidths, which show up in the two kernel estimators. If one is interested in the results of
the nonparametric regressions themselves, cross-validation can be applied, for example, by
choosing the bandwidths such that they minimize the appropriate mean square errors. The
nonparametric regressions obtained in this way have certain optimality properties. In general
these optimality properties do not lead to corresponding optimality characteristics of the
nonpararnetric tests. According to Newey (1994), it is necessary to undersmooth in this type
of situation. It is well known that the results can be sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth.
We therefore calculate the test statistics for different choices of the bandwidths, using the
optimal bandwidths for the underlying nonparametric regressions as the benchmark. To allow
for undersmoothing, we will focus on bandwidths which are fractions of the optimal
bandwidths.   As  we   need two nonparametric regressions, namely   of  f(x)   and  of  E{z l x} ,w e
vary the bandwidths in two dimensions.
In case b above, when z = hait-hdit, we also include in x the variable si,· We restrict
attention to the subsample 440 to test for the effect of the desired hours hdl, conditional on
satisfaction sit. So hdi,=hd;, and si,=sign(hdit-hait)· The moment restriction (7) (with b(z)=z) is
then rewritten as
E{[y -E{ylx,sign(z)}]z} = 0 (2.9)
In this case the limit distribution under the null becomes
Testing the Predictive Value of Subjective Labour Supply Data                 11
/n  1;1  -*d  N(0,  V { \11}) (2.10)
9 - Cy - E{ylx,z>0})(z - E{zlx})I[z>0] +
(2.11)
(y - E{ylx,z<0})(z - E{zlx})I[z<0].
The major advantage of the nonparametric tests is that, at least theoretically, the
possibility of biased results as a consequence of misspecification is avoided. A drawback is
that, when the null hypothesis is rejected, it may still be unclear what the effect of z on y
actually might  be.  To  find this effect by estimating  E{ y Ix,z},  it is important to include  the
appropriate conditioning variables in x. However, already including only a few conditioning
variables   in x makes nonparametric estimation   of  E{y Ix,z} quite   hard,   if not impossible,
with the limited number of available observations. Therefore, our second way to test (2.3) is
a parametric approach. We postulate:
E{y Ix,z} = F(x,z;0), (2.12)
with F some known function and with 0 E R™ some finite dimensional unknown parameter
vector.  When  y is binary (cases  A  and  C) we model  (2.12) by means of Probit  with a single
index of the form:
x'0, + z'0*,  0 = (0:,0:)' (2.13)
Testing Ho then boils down to testing 0: = 0. This can be done, for instance, by applying a
Likelihood Ratio test. When y is continuous (case B) we model (2.12) by means of a linear
regression function similar  to  (2.13).  Next to actual hours hait, conditioning variables  x   will
include job characteristics, individual characteristics like age and education level, family
characteristics and region dummies.
2.3 Data
The Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) is a biannual panel on the household level. It is
representative for the Dutch population excluding those in nursing homes etc. It contains
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several questions on the labour market situation of the individuals. Employed persons answer
questions on the characteristics of their job and their employer. Included are also the
questions Ia, Ib and Ic of the previous section.
In this paper we will use those individuals who are employed and whose numbers of
actual and desired working hours are observed   in the October waves  of   1987 or 1988,2   As
we  want to analyse  the job status and working hours  in  the  next  year, we merge  both   1987
and   1988 to their  next  year.  We  will  use two samples: a first  one  with the individuals  who
work in year t and who are observed the next year (whether working or not), and a second
one only including the individuals who work in both years.
Table 2.1: sample statistics (working in year t and observed in year t+1)
Men Women
t=1987 t=1988 t=1987 t=1988
# observations 2824 2883 1638 1694
one job 96.8% 96.3% 96.5% 95.5%
salaried employment 92.3% 93.4% 91.4% 92.4%
actual hours hait
mean 41.15 40.95 26.70 26.77
stand. dev. 10.31 10.42 13.38 13.58
satisfaction sit
wants to work less 26.6% 24.0% 19.2% 19.5%
satisfied 68.8% 71.8% 71.6% 72.1%
wants to work more 4.5% 4.2% 9.2% 8.4%
desired hours hdit
mean 38.99 38.99 25.76 25.87
stand. dev. 9.19 9.61 12.04 12.05
iob status year t+1
not working 4.7% 4.3% 10.8% 9.0%
same job 87.5% 87.4% 81.5% 81.6%
other job 7.8% 8.3% 17% 9.4%
2 Due to various reasons like changing definitions and questioning strategy not all waves can be used. For
example, in early waves, the questions on desired and actual hours have only been answered by those who
changed job since the previous interview.
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Table  2.1   shows some statistics  of the first sample. Individuals  who   work   in   year  t,
but are no longer in the sample in year t+1 (t=1987, 1988), are not included. For each of the
subsamples (1987 and 1988, men and women), the attrition is between 8 and 10 percent. This
could lead to an attrition bias in the analysis if attrition would be related to job status or
hours worked. To get some insight into whether such a relationship exists or not, we
compared the sample characteristics in Table 2.1 with the characteristics of the complete
sample, including the respondents not included in Table 2.1, see Appendix 2.A. The sample
characteristics   in the complete sample (see Table   2.A. 1)   are very similar to those in Table
2.1. Cross tabulations (Table 2.A.2) of attrition and satisfaction with working hours do not
indicate any relation: Likelihood Ratio tests do not reject the null hypothesis of
independence. We also consider probit regressions explaining attrition from various variables
observed in year t (Table 2.A.3). Some of the included exogenous variables turn out to be
Significant, but the signs vary and the satisfaction with working hours variable remains
insignificant. It therefore seems reasonable to ignore attrition bias in the sequel.
Table 2.2: sample statistics (working in years t and t+1)
Men Women
t=1987 t=1988 t=1987 t=1988
# observations 2692 2759 1461 1542
one job 96.8% 96.2% 96.3% 95.6%
salaried employment 92.3% 93.3% 91.5% 92.7%
actual hours hait
mean 41.46 41.29 27.08 27.28
stand. dev. 10.00 10.09 13.34 13.49
satisfaction sit
wants to work less 27.0% 24.5% 19.0% 19.5%
satisfied 68.5% 71.5% 71.5% 72.6%
wants to work more 4.5% 4.0% 9.4% 7.8%
desired hours hdir
nnean 39.26 39.25 26.20 26.25
stand. dev. 8.81 9.32 12.03 12.03
actual hours year t+1
mean 41.44 41.46 27.53 27.59
stand. dev. 9.70 10.03 13.42 13.17
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As men and women behave very differently in terms of labour supply, we consider
them separately. Female labour force participation, at least in the Netherlands, is substantially
lower than male labour force participation. Table 2.1 shows that about 4 percent of both men
and women have more than one paid job. In that case actual and desired hours refer to the
total in all jobs. Only a minority of the employed are not salaried employees. For both men
and women, about 70 percent is satisfied with their number of working hours. Most men and
women stay in the same job. The fraction of individuals who stop working is substantially
higher for women than for men. There is a difference in realized behaviour between the two
years: From October   1988 to October   1989, less individuals became unemployed   and  more
found  a new job than from October  1987 to October  1988.'
Table 2.2 shows the sample statistics of the second sample, including only those
individuals who work in two consecutive years. A large part of our analysis will be based on
this sample, as we use the first sample only to analyse the probability of having no job in the
next year. Compared to Table 2.1, average actual working hours   in   year t increase slightly
for all four subsamples. This might be due to the fact that jobs with few working hours are
more likely to end. Still, hardly any systematic change is found in the other characteristics.
One might expect satisfaction with working hours to have some effect on the probability of
having no job the next year, but this effect is not obvious from the tables. We will analyse
this in more detail in the next section.
Figure 2.1 shows nonparametric regressions of hait+ 1 on ha,t and hd  for t=1987 andlt'
1988 and for men and women. The optimal bandwidths are determined by cross-validation.
For t=1987, the regressions are reasonably smooth. For t=1988, the optimal bandwidth for
men seems to lead to undersmoothing, while the optimal bandwidth for women seems to
oversmooth. For women there seems to be a positive relation between next year's actual
hours hait+i and desired hours h4. For men this is less clear.
Figure 2.2 presents nonparametric regressions of hait+I on hdi, for particular values of
ha,t. The plotted uniform confidence bands are projections of the uniform confidence bands of
the nonparametric regressions of Figure 2.1, which are not presented there to avoid messy
pictures. Taking the shape of the uniform confidence bands into account, the graphs of
Figure 2.2 seem to indicate that desired hours hd„ indeed might have an effect on actual
hours next year ha In the next section we shall test this formally.it+1·
3 This is in line with aggregate data for the Netherlands: unemployment fell and participation rose (SZW,
1991).
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Table 2.3: cross tabulation for employment status
Men t=1987 t=1988
wants to work: less satisfied more less satisfied more
work at t+1 96.5% 94.9% 94.5% 97.4% 95.4% 91.7%
no work at t+1 3.5% 11% 5.5% 2.6% 4.6% 8.3%
# observations 752 1944 128 693 2069 121
LR test 3.652 (prob.=0.161) 9.900 (prob=0.007)
Women t=1987 t=1988
wants to work: less satisfied more less satisfied nnore
work   at  t+ 1 88.2% 89.2% 91.4% 91.2% 91.7% 84.6%
no work at t+1 11.8% 10.8% 8.6% 8.8% 8.3% 15.4%
# observations 315 1172 151 330 1221 143
LR test 1.089 (prob=0.580) 6.813 (prob=0.033)
Note: The LR test is a Likelihood Ratio test on independence of row and column events. Under the null hypothesis
of independence they follow a ;d distribution
2.4 Results
In this section we present the results of our tests using the methodology of Section 2.2. For
each of the three cases A, B and C (the different future variables y) we first describe the data
further by cross tabulating of y and sit, testing at the same time the hypothesis of
independence between y and si,· Then we present for each of the cases A, B and C the results
of the nonparametric and parametric tests for the cases a, b and c (different subjective
information variables z), including also conditioning variables x.
Testing for an Effect on Employment Status (case A)
We first analyse the effect of the subjective information in z (in the form of a, b, or c) on
y=I[ha,it+1 >0], a dummy indicating whether an individual works in the next year or not.
First, we present a cross tabulation between y=I[hai,+1>0] and the subjective variable
sil, see Table 2.3. It turns out that men who want to work more have a lower probability to
work in the next year than other men. For women we find this same result for the transitions
between   1988  and   1989.   If the decision  to stop working is voluntary,  we would expect  that
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individuals who want to work less have a higher probability to stop than individuals who are
satisfied or want to work more. This result is only found for women in (t=)1988, and it is
insignificant, since the null of independence between satisfaction z=4 and employment status
in year t+1, cannot be rejected in this case. The reason for this finding may be that
individuals who want to work more, generally have jobs with a low number of actual
working hours. These jobs might be less stable and more likely to end. In other words, the
cross tabulation of Table 2.3 has the drawback that the possible effect of actual working
hours is not controlled for. For that purpose, we need to consider the nonparametric and
parametric tests.
Table 2.4: nonparametric LM-type test for staying employed
Men t=1987 t=1988
a. satisfaction sit
optimal bandwidth (2.4,1.9) (5.3,1.8)
range test-statistic [0.66,0.79] [-1.27 , -1.00]
b: desired hours hd,,, conditional
optimal bandwidth (5.3,2.4) (9.9,4.3)
range test-statistic [1.22 , 1.86] [-0.51 , 0.96]
c: desired hours hi, unconditional
optimal bandwidth (2.4,1.5) (1.2,1.6)
range test-statistic [0.64,2.37] [-0.67,0.50]
Women t=1987 t=1988
a. satisfaction s„
optimal bandwidth (11.2,2.3) (2.6,1.8)
range test-statistic [2.40,3.26] [0.64,0.88]
b: desired hours hd conditional..9
optimal bandwidth (=, 3.2) (8.5,4.7)
range test-statistic [0.53,0.54] [-1.33 , -0.32]
c: desired hours hd ., unconditional
optimal bandwidth (11.2,0.8) (2.6,2.0)
range test-statistic [3.01 , 3.87] [-0.67 , 0.02]
Note: the first optimal bandwidth concerns the nonparametric regression  f(x)=Elylx), the second concerns  the  non-
parametric regression  E{ b(z)1x }.  For an optimal bandwidth  of =, see footnote  4.  The test statistic refers  to the t-value
of the estimated moment.
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Table 2.4 shows the realizations of the nonparametric tests for the three possibilities
a, b and c for z. In each case, two nonparametric regressions are required (see Section 2.2).
The optimal bandwidths for these are determined by cross validation, based on minimizing
the sum of squared residuals. In order to undersmooth, the test statistics are then calculated
using fractions of the optimal bandwidths. The choice and range of these fractions are based
on a small simulation study.4 The table shows the minimum and maximum values of the test
statistics and the bandwidths for which these are attained.
Table 2.4 is based on the choice b(z)=z and shows that in most cases the hypothesis
that z has no effect on y=I[hai,+1>0], cannot be rejected. There are two exceptions for women
in   1987  (z=sit and z=hdi,-hai,).  In  one  case the result depends  on the bandwidth  (men  in   1987,
z=hdit-hai,) implying that the test is inconclusive. So from this test we can conclude that the
subjective data is not informative for men, while for women the result is unclear. From Table
2.4  we also learn  that the results  for  1988  are  a bit curious.  From the interpretation  of  the
subjective data as an indicator for preferences, one would expect that individuals who want
to work less (more) have a lower (higher) probability to be working the next year. This
should lead to a nonnegative test statistic. Still for several cases the test statistic is negative.
An possible explanation is that individuals who are dissatisfied with their working hours have
a larger probability  to stop working.  This  fits  more  to the choice  b(z)=  z for cases  a  and  b.
We   tested   this,   but  only   for the women   of   1988   this   lead to significant results. Another
explanation  for the opposite results  for the women  of  1987  and 1988 might be spurious
correlation. To get more insight on this, we turn to the parametric results.
Table 2.5 presents a summary of the parametric testing and estimation results based
on a probit model, containing conditioning variables like individual and job characteristics.
The results of the complete model for case c are given in Table 2.B.1 of Appendix 2.B. For
the  women the results  from the parametric tests  for  1987  are  in  line  with the interpretation  of
the subjective data. The women who want to work less drive the significance of the results.
For   1988  also, the probability of working  the  next  year is significantly lower  for the women
who  want  to  work  less.  But  for  both  men and women  in   1988, the signs  of the parameter
estimates  for the individuals  who want  to  work  more are opposite to those  in  1987.
4  In  case of f(x)=E{y Ix }  we  use as fractions  of the optimal  bandwidths  1.0.0.8,0.6,0.4.0.2,0.1,0.05  and
0.01.   As the test-statistic turns  out  to be insensitive  for the choice  of the bandwidth   of  E{b(z) Ix 1,   we  use  as
fractions   1.0,0.6  and  0.2.   In  case the optimal bandwidth   is very large (larger  than   100),   we   do  not   vary   the
bandwidth in that dimension, but take the average of the corresponding endogenous variable as the nonparametric
regression. We denote this by choosing = for the optimal bandwidth.
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Table 2.5: parametric test for staying employed
Men t=1987 t=1988
parameter stand.err. parameter stand.err.
a: satisfaction si,
dummy less 0.045 (0.121) 0.025 (0.133)
dummy more 0.238 (0.227) -0.069 (0.210)
test-statistic (critical value) 1.25 (5.99) 0.15 (5.99)
b: desired hours hd conditional.9
dummy less*Ihdit-ha,al -0.031 (0.023) -0.015 (0.027)
dummy more*Ihdi,-haiti -0.002 (0.039) -0.197 (0.098)
test statistic (critical value) 1.66 (5.99) 8.00 (5.99)
c: desired hours hd unconditional/9
dummy less 0.091 (0.191) 0.013 (0.213)
dummy less *Ihdit-haitI -0.005 (0.016) 0.001 (0.019)
dummy more 0.126 (0.364) 0.258 (0.350)
dummy more*lhdit-haitI 0.010 (0.026) -0.027 (0.021)
test statistic (critical value) 1.51 (9.49) 1.65 (9.49)
Women t=1987 t=1988
parameter stand.err. parameter stand.err.
a: satisfaction 4
dummy less -0.229 (0.124) -0.289 (0.127)
dummy more 0.294 (0.170) -0.153 (0.150)
test-statistic (critical value) 6.74 (5.99) 5.82 (5.99)
b: desired hours hd conditional/1
dummy less*lhdi,-haitI -0.044 (0.019) -0.055 (0.023)
dummy more*lhdi,-hai,1 0.001 (0.031) -0.024 (0.026)
test statistic (critical value) 5.14 (5.99) 6.78 (5.99)
c: desired hours hd unconditional..
dummy less 0.120 (0.194) 0.043 (0.208)
dummy less*lhd„-haiti -0.036 (0.015) -0.037 (0.018)
dummy more 0.486 (0.307) 0.209 (0.284)
dummy more*lhdu-hai,l -0.015 (0.022) -0.027 (0.018)
test statistic (critical value) 12.98 (9.49) 12.32 (9.49)
Note: the test-statistic refers to the Likelihood Ratio test for which the critical values at a five percent significance
level are id = 5.99 and ;d = 9.49. Estimates of the coefficients of the conditioning variables like individual and job
characteristics are not reported in the table.
Testing the Predictive Value of Subjective Labour Supply Data                  25
Table 2.6: cross tabulation for adjustment of working hours
Men t=1987 t=1988
wants to work: less satisfied more less satisfied more
ha(t+1)-ha(t)<0 32.9% 23.2% 14.1% 29.2% 22.6% 21.6%
ha(t+1)-ha(t)=0 49.5% 52.7% 43.0% 52.0% 53.1% 40.5%
ha(t+1)-ha(t)>0 17.6% 24.1% 43.0% 18.1% 24.3% 37.8%
# observations 726 1845 121 675 1973 111
LR test 56.121 (prob=0.000) 27.872 (prob=0.000)
Women t=1987 t=1988
wants to work: less satisfied more less satisfied more
ha(t+1)-ha(t)<0 34.9% 22.7% 13.8% 36.9% 21.0% 13.2%
ha(t+1)-ha(t)=0 44.6% 53.0% 34.8% 44.9% 53.6% 35.5%
ha(t+1)-ha(t)>0 20.5% 24.3% 51.5% 18.3% 25.5% 51.2%
# observations 278 1045 138 301 1120 121
LR test 61.920 (prob=0.000) 70.020 (prob=0.000)
Note: The LR test is a Likelihood Ratio test on independence of row and column events. Under the null hypothesis
of independence they follow a )d distribution.
And although only for case b of the men this parameter is significantly negative, this
opposite result seems remarkable. As the nonparametric test also indicated this result, it
might be that for this case we are not able to include all relevant characteristics.
For men,  we get one significant result, based on a sample of  110 men  who want  to
work more. Thus for men the subjective data does not contain information on the probability
that  they are still working  the  next  year. For women  we get significant results  for  both   1987
and   1988. In particular,  the  fact  that the women  who  want  to  work  less  have a significantly
lower probability to be working the next year is consistent with the interpretation of
subjective data as an indicator for preference.
Testing for an Effect on Future Actual Hours of Work (case B)
In this subsection we analyse the effect of the subjective information in z (in the form of
cases a, b, or c) on y=hai,*t-hait, the change in actual hours.
In Table 2.6 we cross tabulate satisfaction si, and the sign of the change in actual
hours y. This table shows that satisfaction with working hours has a clear impact in the
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expected direction on the adjustment of hours over time. This impact is also significant: for
all four subsamples, Likelihood Ratio tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of
independence. Again however, these results do not control for actual working hours in year t.
For example, part-time workers may more often want to increase their working hours than
full-time workers. If part-time workers also have a larger chance to increase their working
hours, this may lead to spurious correlation. Moreover, there is no reason why we should
only consider the direction of the adjustment, and not the actual size of the change in hours
worked. We observe how many hours individuals adjust, and using this will probably lead to
more powerful tests. For that reason we again turn to the nonparametric and parametric tests.
Table 2.7: nonparametric LM-type test for adjustment of actual hours
Men t=1987 t=1988
a. satisfaction sit
optimal bandwidth (3.9,1.8) (4.1,1.7)
range test-statistic [0.24,1.31] [0.54 , 1.27]
b: desired hours hd conditional.,
optimal bandwidth (9.2,3.5) (9.1,3.3)
range test-statistic [3.01,7.71] [3.16,6.18]
c: desired hours hd unconditional.,
optimal bandwidth (2.2,1.6) (2.2,1.6)
range test-statistic [1.43 , 3.05] [0.83,2.80]
Women t=1987 t=1988
a. satisfaction sit
optimal bandwidth (8.2,2.4) (8.0,2.2)
range test-statistic [3.03 , 4.06] [3.92 , 5.21]
b: desired hours hd„, conditional
optimal bandwidth (9.4,3.2) (7.7,4.7)
range test-statistic [3.82,4.29] [3.66,4.97]
c: desired hours hd unconditionallt'
optimal bandwidth (2.3,1.9) (2.9,2.0)
range test-statistic [2.22 , 4.19] [3.73,4.82]
Note: the first optimal bandwidth concerns the nonparametric regression  f(x)=E{ylx }, the second concerns  the  non-
parametric regression E{b(z)1x }.  For an optimal bandwidth  of =,  see  footnote  4. The  test statistic refers  to  the  t-value
of the estimated moment.
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Table 2.8: parametric test for adjustment of working hours
Men t=1987 t=1988
parameter stand.err. parameter stand.err.
a: satisfaction si,
dummy less 0.042 (0.328) 0.202 (0.298)
dummy more 0.640 (0.831) 0.870 (0.872)
test-statistic (critical value) 0.62 (5.99) 1.35 (5.99)
b: desired hours hd conditional.
dummy less*lhdit-hai,l -0.211 (0.068) -0.181 (0.075)
dummy more*Ihdi,-haitI 0.261 (0.118) 0.271 (0.120)
test statistic (critical value) 14.52 (5.99) 10.92 (5.99)
c: desired hours hd ,, unconditional
dummy less 0.684 (0.608) 1.128 (0.530)
dummy less*lhdi,-haitI -0.074 (0.068) -0.102 (0.066)
dummy more -0.061 (1.019) -1.322 (1.041)
dummy more*Ihd -haiti 0.081 (0.108) 0.234 (0.126)lE
test statistic (critical value) 2.65 (9.49) 8.76 (9.49)
Women t=1987 t=1988
parameter stand.err. parameter stand.err.
a: satisfaction sit
dummy less 0.012 (0.524) -0.246 (0.472)
dummy more 1.581 (0.676) 3.248 (0.667)
test-statistic (critical value) 5.48 (5.99) 24.26 (5.99)
b: desired hours hd„, conditional
dummy less*Ihdit-haiti -0.195 (0.094) -0.269 (0.093)
dummy more*lhdit-haitI 0.299 (0.106) 0.589 (0.126)
test statistic (critical value) 12.26 (5.99) 30.22 (5.99)
c: desired hours hd,. unconditional
dummy less 0.352 (0.844) 0.545 (0.729)
dummy less*lhd,t-ha„1 -0.041 (0.071) -0.101 (0.064)
dummy more -0.847 (1.214) -3.074 (1.185)
dummy more*lhdi,-haitI 0.230 (0.095) 0.568 (0.088)
test statistic (critical value) 11.65 (9.49) 68.66 (9.49)
Note: the test-statistic refers to the Wald test for which the critical values at a five percent significance level are %22 -
5.99 and )d = 9.49. Estimates of the coefficients of the conditioning variables like individual and job characteristics
are not reported in the table.
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Table 2.7 presents the nonparametric results for the choice b(z)=z, following the sarne
procedure as in the previous subsection. For women, we find that the null is rejected in all
three cases. Apparently, women tend to adjust their working hours if they deviate from their
optimum number. Both the satisfaction variable and the actual deviations between desired
and actual hours are helpful to predict changes in actual hours. For men, the results are not
so clear. For the subsamples of those men who want to work more or less (case b), we find
that desired hours contribute significantly to explaining changes in actual hours. But the
information on whether or not a man is satisfied with his actual number of working hours,
does not contribute (case a). If we look at the impact of desired hours for the sample as a
whole (case c), the test result depends on the bandwidths so that the test is inconclusive.
Table 2.8 presents the parametric analogues to Table 2.7. The results of the complete
model for case c are presented in Table 2.B.2 of Appendix 2.B. The conclusions are similar
to those in Table 2.7 and all significant parameters have the sign which is consistent with the
idea that the subjective data contains information on the preferences of the individuals. For
women, the significance levels  are much higher  in  1988  than  in  1987,  and  for z=sit  the  null  is
not rejected. For men, we find significant results only if we consider the impact of deviations
between desired and actual hours in the subsamples of those who want to work less or more.
The overall conclusion is that the evidence that subjective data on desired labour supply are
helpful to predict changes in actual hours is quite strong, and that the impact of the
subjective data is consistent with the idea that it contains information on the preferences of
the individuals.
Testing for an Effect on Change of Job (case C)
In this section y is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual changes his or
her main job between dates t and t+1. The question is again whether the subjective
information on desired hours of work has any effect on y.
Table 2.9 presents a cross tabulation of satisfaction si, and having a new job y. It
shows that men and women who want to work more, have a higher probability to have a new
job the next year. For men, the difference is insignificant. For women, the significance
probability is just over 5 percent. These tables, however, may be misleading since they do
not control for actual hours, which may be correlated with job changes as well as satisfaction
with hours. Therefore we turn again to the nonparametric tests.
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Table 2.9: cross tabulation for having a new job
Men t=1987 t=1988
wants to work: less satisfied more less satisfied more
new job at t+1 7.9% 8.0% 13.2% 8.5% 8.5% 13.8%
same iob at t+1 92.1% 92.0% 86.8% 91.5% 91.5% 86.2%
# observations 720 1834 121 674 1966 109
LR test 3.633 (prob=0.163) 3.190 (prob=0.203)
Women t=1987 t=1988
wants to work: less satisfied more less satisfied more
new job at t+1 7.3% 8.3% 14.4% 9.7% 9.8% 17.4%
same iob at t+1 92.7% 91.7% 85.6% 90.3% 90.2% 82.6%
# observations 275 1040 138 299 1113 121
LR test 5.932 (prob=0.052) 5.967 (prob=0.051)
Note: The LR test is a Likelihood Ratio test on independence of row and column events. Under the null hypothesis
of independence they follow a ;d distribution
Table 2.10 contains the results  of the nonparametric tests  for the choice   b(z)=z,
obtained in a similar way as in the previous subsections. In this case the choice of b(z) is
even less obvious as in the subsection dealing with case A, as there is not economic reason
why the probability of changing job should be monotonically increasing or decreasing in the
subjective data. Therefore  we also tried  b(z)= Iz I for cases  a  and  b.   As  this  gave  only
insignificant results, we concentrate on the results for b(z)=z. The differences between the
results for males and females are obvious: for men, the information on the desired labour
status does not contribute to explaining job changes at all. For women, on the contrary, we
always reject the null hypothesis of no effect.
As the significant results for the nonparametric test for women might be a result of
spurious correlation,  we  turn  to the parametric results.  Table 2.11 gives the probit estimates
and Table 2.B.3 of Appendix 2.B gives the complete results of case c. For males, the
parametric tests confirm the conclusion of no effect of the desired labour status. For women,
however, the parametric test results in all but one case lead to the opposite conclusion as in
case of their nonparametric analogues: the subjective variables are now jointly insignificant.
Thus the nonparametric tests which only condition on actual hours suggest that desired
labour supply information helps to explain females' job changes. The parametric test results,
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however, show that this effect disappears when additional conditioning variables are
included. Table 2.B.3 shows that particularly important are age and having more then one
job. For an individual who has more than one job, a change in job also occurs when the
individual gives up his or her most important job. Overall we conclude that the subjective
information does not have an effect on changing job.
Table 2.10: nonparametric LM-type test for changing job
Men t=1987 t=1988
a. satisfaction sit
optimal bandwidth (1.3,1.8) (3.8,1.7)
range test-statistic [-0.50, -0.41] [0.21 , 0.42]
b: desired hours hd.,. conditional
optimal bandwidth (1.2,3.4) (8.5,3.5)
range test-statistic [0.46,0.69] [-0.04,0.39]
c: desired hours  hd „ unconditional
optimal bandwidth (1.3,1.6) (3.8,1.6)
range test-statistic [-1.58 , -0.18] [-1.04,0.24]
Women t=1987 t=1988
a: satisfaction sit
optimal bandwidth (4.1,2.4) (3.0,2.2)
range test-statistic [2.66,2.97] [2.18 , 2.37]
b: desired hours hd., conditional
optimal bandwidth (- , 3.2) (=, 4.7)
range test-statistic [2.39,2.56] [3.65 , 3.68]
c: desired hours hde unconditional
optimal bandwidth (4.1,1.9) (2.2,2.0)
range test-statistic [2.77 , 4.31] [2.80 , 4.12]
Note: the first optimal bandwidth concerns the nonparametric regression  f(x)=E{ ylx 1, the second concerns  the  non-
parametric regression E{b(z)1x 1.  For an optimal bandwidth  of =, see footnote  4.  The test statistic refers  to the t-value
of the estimates moment.
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Table 2.11: parametric test for changing job
Men t=1987 t=1988
parameter stand.err. parameter stand.err.
a: satisfaction sit
dummy less 0.138 (0.091) 0.121 (0.089)
dummy more 0.123 (0.173) 0.087 (0.172)
test-statistic (critical value) 2.59 (5.99) 1.99 (5.99)
b: desired hours hd conditional/9
dummy less*Ihd,-hil 0.029 (0.018) 0.023 (0.014)
dummy more*Ihdit-haitI 0.032 (0.025) 0.057 (0.047)
test statistic (critical value) 4.14 (5.99) 3.88 (5.99)
c: desired hours hd unconditional.,
dummy less -0.009 (0.141) 0.023 (0.134)
dummy less*Ihd,t-haiti 0.018 (0.013) 0.011 (0.011)
dummy more -0.185 (0.281) -0.352 (0.308)
dummy more*lhdit-haitI 0.029 (0.020) 0.043 (0.024)
test statistic (critical value) 6.33 (9.49) 6.02 (9.49)
Women t=1987 t=1988
parameter stand.err. parameter stand.err.
a: satisfaction 4
dummy less 0.086 (0.156) 0.110 (0.132)
dummy more 0.188 (0.174) 0.282 (0.165)
test-statistic (critical value) 1.41 (5.99) 8.59 (5.99)
b: desired hours hd conditionalI.
dummy less*lhdit-haitI 0.015 (0.030) 0.001 (0.030)
dummy more*Ihdit-hai,1 0.013 (0.040) 0.064 (0.037)
test statistic (critical value) 0.34 (5.99) 3.18 (5.99)
c: desired hours hd,. unconditional
dummy less -0.053 (0.262) 0.254 (0.218)
dummy less*Ihdit-hai,l 0.014 (0.023) -0.020 (0.023)
dummy more -0.228 (0.317) -0.287 (0.331)
dummy more*Ihdit-hait' 0.037 (0.022) 0.046 (0.022)
test statistic (critical value) 4.44 (9.49) 8.59 (9.49)
Note: the test-statistic refers to the Likelihood Ratio test for which the critical values at a five percent significance
level are ;d = 5.99 and ;d = 9.49. Estimates of the coefficients of the conditioning variables like individual and job
characteristics are not reported in the table.
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2.5 Summary and Conclusions
In the empirical literature on labour supply, subjective data on the desired labour status are
used to test or avoid the traditional assumption that actual hours can be chosen freely. A
common criticism against the use of such data is that it is unclear how reliable individuals'
answer to these subjective questions are. If answers to subjective questions on the desired
labour status do not contain information on the preferences of the individuals, they should
not  have any predictive value  for next year's labour market status.  This is basically  the
hypothesis tested in this paper.
We use the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, which contains information on both actual
and desired working hours for the same individuals in three consecutive years. The first
question we consider refers to whether people are satisfied with their working hours, want to
work less, or want to work more. The second subjective question refers to desired hours, for
those who are not satisfied with their actual hours of work.
Simple cross tabulations provide a description of the data used. In a number of cases
they reveal significant correlations between actual changes in the labour market status and
the desired status. However, these tests do not take account of possible spurious correlation
due to, for example, current actual hours of work. To include conditioning variables, we turn
to alternative tests.
To avoid the possibility of bias as a consequence of misspecification, we use non-
parametric tests, based upon moment restrictions that should be satisfied under the null
hypothesis. A practical implementation of such tests only makes sense if the number of
included conditioning variables is small. Therefore, in addition to these nonparametric tests,
we perform parametric tests to include additional conditioning variables.
There are three future events we consider: A: employment status (working or not), B:
actual hours worked for those who continue working, and C: whether or not someone
changes job for those who continues to working. For men we get mixed results. For the
employment status and change of job, the null is not rejected. Only for the future actual
hours we get significant results for the subgroups of men who are dissatisfied with their
working hours. Our results suggest that more information is contained in the magnitude of
the deviations between desired and actual hours than in the mere fact whether someone is
over- or underemployed. This is surprising, since simulation studies in Sackltn (1996)
suggest that information on whether someone is over- or underemployed is helpful for
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estimating a labour supply model, but that the exact information on desired hours adds little
to this.
As there is not very much variation in the working hours of men, and a substantial
part of the dissatisfied wants a small reduction of working hours from 40 to 38 or 36 hours
per week, the power of the tests over the whole sample might be small. So we find only
weak evidence that the subjective data contains information on the preferences of men.
For women, the results are stronger. Both nonparametric and parametric tests give that
the subjective data has a significant impact on the employment status. Specially women who
want to work less have a smaller probability to be employed the next year. Furthermore the
results for future employment status are strongly significant and consistent with the
interpretation that the subjective data contain information on the preferences. Only for the
probability of changing job the impact of the subjective data turns out to be insignificant.
The existing literature comparing desired and actual hours is based on cross-section
information. Conclusions on the value of information on desired hours are drawn in the
framework of a structural labour supply model, and thus require additional assumptions.
Here, we have avoided relying on such a framework and have used panel data on actual
adjustments to replace the additional assumptions. Overall our nonparametric and parametric
tests provide evidence that for women the subjective data on preferred labour supply contains
valuable information on the preferences. This can be seen as evidence in favour of the
studies which have incorporated this type of information in structural labour supply models.
For men, however, the evidence is less convincing, and the value of desired hours
information for modelling labour supply is less clear.
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Figure 2.la: nonparametric regression for men, 1987 and 1988
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Figure 2.lb: nonparametric regression for women, 1987 and 1988
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Figure 2.2a: uniform confidence bands for men, 1987 and 1988
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Figure 2.2b: uniform confidence band for women, 1987 and 1988
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Appendix 2.A: Probability of Attrition
Table 2.A.1: sample statistics (working in year t)
Men Women
t=1987 t=1988 t=1987 t=1988
# observations 3110 3148 1797 1888
one job 96.8% 96.2% 96.5% 95.6%
salaried employment 92.4% 92.8% 92.6% 92.3%
actual hours hait
mean 41.32 40.88 26.82 27.05
stand. dev. 10.56 10.63 13.40 13.57
satisfaction sit
wants to work less 26.6% 23.8% 19.3% 19.1%
satisfied 68.9% 71.9% 71.4% 72.5%
wants to work more 4.5% 4.3% 9.4% 8.5%
desired hours hdit
mean 39.09 38.95 25.91 26.17
stand. dev. 9.36 9.70 12.07 12.03
Table 2.A.2: probability of being observed at year t+1 for those who work in year t
Men t=1987 t=1988
wants to work: less satisfied more less satisfied more
observed t+1 91.0% 90.7% 90.8% 92.5% 91.4% 89.0%
not observed t+1 9.0% 9.3% 9.2% 7.5% 8.6% 11.0%
# observations 826 2143 141 749 2263 136
LR test 0.077 (prob=0.962) 2.067 (prob=0.356)
Women t=1987 t=1988
wants to work: less satisfied more less satisfied more
observed t+1 91.0% 91.4% 89.8% 91.7% 89.3% 89.4%
not observed t+1 9.0% 8.6% 10.2% 8.3% 10.8% 10.6%
# observations 346 1283 168 360 1368 160
LR test 0.390 (prob=0.823) 1.909 (prob-0.385)
Note: The LR test is a likelihood ratio test on independence of row and column events. Under the null hypothesis of
independence they follow a )d distribution
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Table 2.A.3: probit for being observed at next year
Parameter estimate and standard error
1 Men t=1987 t=1988
param. st.err. param. st.err.
intercept 1.738 0.142 1.120 0.131
wants to work less 0.071 0.074 0.063 0.080
wants to work more -0.092 0.155 -0.050 0.155
more than one job 0.135 0.189 -0.152 0.162
not salaried empl. 0.080 0.130 -0.523 0.115
actual hours hait -0.010 0.003 0.007 0.003
Parameter estimate and standard error
Women t=1987 t=1988
param. st.err. param. st.err.
intercept 1.482 0.106 1.536 0.099
wants to work less 0.045 0.115 0.281 0.113
wants to work more -0.136 0.145 -0.114 0.145
I
more than one job -0.051 0.224 0.111 0.203
not salaried empl. 0.417 0.194 -0.016 0.146
actual hours hai, -0.006 0.003 -0.011 0.003
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Appendix 2.B: Parametric LM Tests
Table 2.B.1: probit for staying employed
Parameter Estimates (P.E.) and corresponding Standard Errors (S.E.)
MEN WOMEN
1987 1988 1987 1988
Variable P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E.
intercept -2.869 0.849 -2.091 0.918 -0.737 0.813 -1.603 0.790
4ob char.
#jobs>1 -0.457 0.266 -0.227 0.379 -0.185 0.299 0.157 0.215
not.salaried  -0.894* 0.282 -0.614* 0.293 -0.037 0.173 0.237 0.169
government 0.172 0.139 -0.042 0.122 0.361 0.189 0.110 0.138
ha 0.049* 0.013 0.027* 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.013
ha.sq/100 -0.049* 0.018 -0.019 0.019 0.009 0.025 0.020 0.025
ind. char.
age 0.253* 0.037 0.272* 0.038 0.096* 0.035 0.100* 0.035
age.sq/100 -0.344* 0.045 -0.366* 0.045 -0.117* 0.046 -0.119* 0.045
ed.level.2 -0.103 0.148 0.083 0.135 -0.111 0.135 0.026 0.130
ed.level.3 -0.070 0.140 0.318* 0.133 0.114 0.136 0.116 0.128
ed.level.4 0.109 0.198 0.145 0.175 -0.002 0.168 0.177 0.178
ed.level.5 -0.019 0.252 0.315 0.267 0.063 0.370 0.156 0.374
family char.
single -0.144 0.202 -0.480* 0.178 0.009 0.154 0.076 0.159
lone.parent -0.163 0.203 -0.850 0.434 -0.202 0.269 -0.307 0.217
other -0.519 0.472 -0.173 0.208 0.263 0.179 0.352 0.192
#children 0.028 0.072 -0.072 0.073 0.113 0.070 -0.012 0.063
child<6y -0.332 0.173 0.291 0.207 -0.505* 0.148 -0.082 0.153
region
north 0.011 0.198 0.036 0.206 0.117 0.189 0.283 0.180
east -0.045 0.145 0.249 0.132 -0.058 0.133 0.042 0.122
south 0.106 0.120 0.408* 0.143 -0.013 0.112 0.081 0.129
unemployment 0.009 0.031 0.039 0.041 -0.002 0.029 -0.032 0.038
subi. info.
dummy less -0.091 0.191 -0.013 0.213 -0.120 0.194 -0.043 0.208
less*Ihd-hal 0.005 0.016 -0.001 0.019 0.036* 0.015 0.037* 0.018
dummy more -0.126 0.364 -0.258 0.350 -0.486 0.307 -0.209 0.284
more* hd-hal -0.010 0.026 0.027 0.021 0.015 0.022 0.027 0.018
note: ha gives actual hours and ha.sq/100 gives actual hours squared, divided
by 100. The  reference group  for single, lone parent  and other are  the
married. The dummy other gives the remaining group of single individuals, for
instance children older than 16 living with their parents.  Child<6y is a
dummy for having a child younger than 6 years. Unemployment  is  the
unemployment ratio of the county. Parameters marked with * are significantly
different from zero at a five percent significance level.
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Table 2.B.2: ordinary least squares for adjustment of working hours
Parameter Estimates (P.E.) and corresponding Standard Errors (S.E.)
MEN WOMEN
1987 1988 1987 1988
Variable P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E.
intercept 20.015 4.278 14.123 3.684 11.060 3.440 3.451 3.044
-iob char.
#jobs>1 -0.921 1.148 0.187 0.988 2.522* 1.049 1.280 0.883
not.salaried  -3.953* 1.082 -3.657* 0.951 -3.092* 0.742 -0.978 0.719
government -0.589 0.308 -1.198* 0.264 0.949 0.634 0.231 0.457
ha -0.317* 0.132 -0.467* 0.121 -0.095 0.053 -0.085 0.045
ha.sq/100 -0.028 0.139 0.191 0.134 -0.216* 0.089 -0.165* 0.076
ind. char.
age 0.026 0.130 0.292* 0.125 -0.194 0.153 0.081 0.132
age.sq/100 -0.082 0.166 -0.360* 0.157 0.142 0.202 -0.126 0.173
ed.level.2 0.592 0.475 0.211 0.434 -0.065 0.600 -0.349 0.514
ed.level.3 0.744 0.400 -0.176 0.354 0.161 0.579 0.321 0.493
ed.level.4 0.323 0.493 -0.673 0.460 1.709* 0.711 0.302 0.639
ed.level.5 2.072* 0.784 -0.521 0.726 1.572 1.313 2.687* 1.230
family char.
single 0.350 0.622 0.668 0.605 1.457* 0.716 3.002* 0.665
lone.parent -0.903 0.637 -0.205 0.486 2.028* 0.620 1.308* 0.543
other -2.736 1.917 -2.689 2.243 2.303* 1.149 -0.962 0.947
#children 0.240 0.177 0.065 0.148 -0.231 0.280 -0.060 0.250
child<6y -0.006 0.392 0.293 0.332 -2.382* 0.679 -1.716* 0.603
region
north -0.194 0.483 -0.182 0.512 -0.427 0.833 0.271 0.731
east 0.159 0.372 -0.558 0.327 -0.615 0.542 -0.624 0.445
south -0.042 0.341 0.179 0.370 -0.141 0.475 -0.138 0.482
unemployment -0.159* 0.079 -0.007 0.107 -0.093 0.125 -0.132 0.146
subi. info.
dummy less 0.684 0.608 1.128 0.530 0.352 0.844 0.545 0.729
less* hd-ha -0.074 0.068 -0.102 0.066 -0.041 0.071 -0.101 0.064
dummy more -0.061 1.019 -1.322 1.041 -0.847 1.214 -3.074* 1.185
more*!hd-hal 0.081 0.108 0.234 0.126 0.230* 0.095 0.568* 0.088
note: ha gives actual hours and ha.sq/100 gives actual hours squared, divided
by 100. The  reference  group  for single, lone parent and other are the
married. The dummy other gives the remaining group of single individuals, for
instance children older than 16 living with their parents.  Child<6y is a
dummy for having a child younger than 6 years. Unemployment  is  the
unemployment ratio of the county. Parameters marked with * are significantly
different from zero at a five percent significance level.
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Table 2.B.3: probit for changing job
Parameter Estimates (P.E.) and corresponding Standard Errors (S.E.)
MEN WOMEN
1987 1988 1987 1988
Variable P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E.
intercept 0.116 0.801 0.922 0.740 2.134 1.053 1.894 0.894
iob char.
#jobs>1 -0.095 0.241 -0.318 0.186 -0.542* 0.260 -0.430* 0.218
not.salaried 0.804* 0.275 0.040 0.180 0.311 0.288 0.471 0.275
government -0.479* 0.120 -0.560* 0.105 -0.607* 0.237 -0.148 0.137
ha -0.021 0.014 -0.001 0.013 -0.011 0.018 -0.022 0.014
ha.sq/100 0.014 0.018 -0.006 0.015 0.006 0.033 0.025 0.025
ind. char.
age -0.067 0.036 -0.086* 0.034 -0.126* 0.054 -0.123* 0.042
age.sq/100 0.042 0.047 0.056 0.045 0.095 0.079 0.108 0.059
ed.level.2 0.075 0.120 -0.083 0.112 -0.368* 0.176 0.112 0.151
ed.level.3 -0.180 0.116 -0.057 0.102 -0.072 0.163 0.271 0.146
ed.level.4 -0.126 0.154 -0.122 0.146 0.232 0.199 0.340 0.187
ed.level.5 0.042 0.200 0.263 0.169 0.293 0.395 0.499 0.353
family char.
single -0.074 0.152 -0.095 0.144 0.109 0.178 0.103 0.165
lone.parent 0.064 0.165 -0.155 0.162 0.131 0.182 0.180 0.151
other -0.137 0.556 0.431 0.576 0.737* 0.334 0.283 0.272
#children 0.054 0.050 0.101* 0.044 0.025 0.093 0.157* 0.075
child<6 -0.143 0.112 -0.161 0.104 0.035 0.205 -0.313 0.174
region
north 0.021 0.161 -0.452* 0.166 -0.183 0.258 -0.119 0.209
east -0.097 0.115 -0.130 0.096 -0.235 0.164 -0.114 0.127
south -0.013 0.098 -0.084 0.108 -0.099 0.135 -0.166 0.138
unemployment 0.018 0.025 0.056 0.033 -0.006 0.037 -0.041 0.042
subl. info.
dummy less -0.009 0.141 0.023 0.134 -0.053 0.262 0.254 0.218
less*Ihd-hal 0.018 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.023 -0.020 0.023
dummy more -0.185 0.281 -0.352 0.308 -0.228 0.317 -0.287 0.331
more*Ihd-hal 0.029 0.020 0.043 0.024 0.037 0.023 0.046* 0.022
note: ha gives actual hours and ha.sq/100 gives actual hours squared, divided
by 100. The reference  group  for single, lone parent and other are the
married. The dummy other gives the remaining group of single individuals, for
instance children older than 16 living with their parents.  Child<6y is a
dummy for having a child younger than 6 years. Unemployment  is  the
unemployment ratio of the county. Parameters marked with * are significantly
different from zero at a five percent significance level.
Chapter 3
Hours Constraints
within and between Jobs
3.1 Introduction
A great deal of the literature on labour supply is based on the assumption that workers can
freely and without cost choose their working hours, taking their wage as given. There are,
however, both strong theoretical arguments and empirical evidence showing that hours cannot
be freely varied within jobs, and that workers are restricted in their choice. In a theoretical
study, Deardorff and Stafford (1976) show that in the case of cooperating production factors,
such as capital and labour, differences in desired working hours of the factors lead to
payment of premiums to both factors and lead to the establishment of a workday that departs
from the standard labour supply model. Oswald and Walker (1993) formulate a labour
contract model in which working hours and wages are determined as the result of an efficient
bargain between unions and employers. Also in this model the working hours deviate from
those in the standard labour supply model.
Many empirical studies confirm that workers are constrained in their labour supply.
Oswald and Walker (1993) find on the basis of the UK Family Expenditure Survey
differences in behaviour between unionized and non-unionized workers that are in line with
their efficient bargaining model. Biddle (1988) and Ball (1990) use the US Panel Study of
Income Dynamics and conclude that restrictions on working hours are important, as their
dynamic model for labour supply is rejected for the full sample of workers, but accepted for
the sample of unrestricted workers only. They identify the unrestricted workers on the basis
of subjective questions on whether individuals experience restrictions on their working hours.
It is, however, unclear whether the individuals consider restrictions in their primary jobs
only, or also consider job mobility and second jobs.
More evidence on restrictions on working hours can be found in the empirical
literature on labour supply, which tries to incorporate the restrictions explicitly. Early studies
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which incorporate restrictions on labour supply are the articles by Moffitt (1982) and Ham
(1982). They both extend the traditional tobit type model for working hours by introducing
censoring due to under- or overemployment. Moffitt identifies the probability of being
overemployed by using exclusion restrictions. Using regional demand data for this purpose,
Arellano and Meghir (1990) test and accept this model in favour of the traditional tobit type
model on the basis of the UK Family Expenditure Survey. Another strategy is followed by
Ham (1982) and O'Leary (1991), who identify over- and underemployment on the basis of
the subjective information in the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics, see the previous
paragraph. Ham (1982) concludes that incorporation of underemployment is a significant
improvement of the standard tobit type model.
The next generation of models that incorporate restrictions on working hours includes
Tummers and Woittiez (1991) and Dickens and Lundberg (1993). They extend the structural
labour supply model with job offers concerning hours of work. These models characterize
hours restrictions by the probability of a job offer with certain working hours. The model is
identified on the basis of the actual working hours only. Tummers and Woittiez find on the
basis of the Dutch Labour Mobility Survey a lack of part-time jobs for women, while
Dickens and Lundberg find on the basis of the Denver Income Maintenance Experiment a
lack of overtime jobs for men. As the extended tobit type models, these models do not
explicitly consider different jobs: restrictions are linked to individuals, not to jobs.
Both of the types of models described above formulate the constraints on working
hours in a general way. Neither is able to distinguish between the different ingredients
needed for the existence of hours constraints in the labour market. First, there have to exist
restrictions on working hours within jobs. But this does not necessarily imply that the
individuals are not on their labour supply curve, as they might change to another job with
working hours equal to their preferred working hours. So the second ingredient for the
existence of hours restrictions are mobility costs. This might be the case, particularly, when
the preferred working week of the individuals deviates from the standard full-time job.
These two ingredients for the existence of hours constraints in the labour market are
studied by Altonji and Paxson (1986, 1992). They look at the adjustment of working hours
over time, and distinguish between those individuals who stay in their jobs, and those who
change jobs. Based on the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they conclude that working
hours of married women are two to four times more variable across jobs than within jobs. In
their second article, they take the possible endogeneity of job mobility into account, but this
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does not change their main finding: hours vary significantly more  in the case of job mobility.
This chapter will analyse constraints on working hours within and between jobs on
the basis of the Dutch Socio Economic Panel (SEP). An advantage of this panel is that it
contains information on both actual and desired working hours for the same individuals over
three consecutive years. By the term 'desired hours' I mean the answer to a subjective
question on how many hours an individual wants to work. I will combine the dynamic
analysis of Altonji and Paxson (1992) with the use of this subjective information. I model the
changes in working hours over time, and relate them to changes in the desired working
hours. The desired hours give me the opportunity to analyse directly the effect of
preferences. I allow for the fact that the desired hours may not only reflect preferences, but
that they also may be affected by the working hours of the current job. The questions I want
to answer are: How flexible are working hours within a job? And to what extent is job
mobility a way to adjust working hours?
Following Altonji and Paxson, the analysis will be restricted to women. There are two
reasons for this. First, there is more cross-section variation in working hours for women than
for men. Chapter 2 shows  that  for the years   1987  and 1988 employed  men  work, on average,
41 hours per week with a standard deviation of 10, while employed women have a working
week   of, on average, 27 hours   with a standard deviation   of   13. An explanation   is   that
relatively many women work part-time in the Netherlands. The second reason for restricting
the analysis to women is that I will use labour supply variables as instruments for the desired
working hours. Several studies show that the labour supply behaviour of women is more
sensitive to this kind of variables than is the labour supply behaviour of men. Following
Altonji and Paxson (1992), I restrict the analysis to employed women. The analysis will be
conditional on the fact that the woman does not stop working.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
subjective questions on the desired working hours and describes the data. As there are
different ways to incorporate the subjective data, Section 3.3 presents various econometric
models. Section 3.4 presents the results, and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
The  data are drawn  from the October waves  of the years   1987,   1988  and   1989  of the Dutch
Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), collected by Statistics Netherlands. As I will look at changes
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over  time,  I  merge the years   1987  and   1988  to one sample,  and  I  merge the years   1988  and
1989 to one sample.
The questions on actual and desired hours of work, which the individuals answered in
the October waves  of  1987,  1988  and  1989,  are as follows:
Ia        How many hours per week do you work in your job, or jobs?
- Do not include travelling time to and from your work.
- Include overtime only if it is paid.
Ib     Are you satisfied with this number of working hours, or would you prefer to work
more or fewer hours per week? Possible answers:
1) I am satisfied with the number of working hours.
2) I prefer to ••'ork Tore
3) I prefer to work less.
Ic    If, in the previous question, you were not satisfied with your number of working
hours, how many hours would you like then to work?
The answers to questions Ia to Ic by individual i in year t are denoted by ha,„ sit, and hd „
respectively. Actual hours hait and desired hours hd , are measured as hours per week. I
define satisfaction sit as follows: 420 if individual i is satisfied with the number of working
hours in period t (answer   1),  sit=-1   if the individual wants   to  work less (answer  3)   and
Sit + 1 if the individual wants to work more (answer 2). Respondents only answer question Ic
if they are not satisfied with the actual number of working hours reported under Ia. I assume
that, for respondents who report to be satisfied with their number of working hours (st,=0),
desired hours equal actual hours, i.e., hd;,=hait. Thus the 'observed' desired hours hdi, are
given by:
hdit = I[sit=0]hait + I[sit#0]hd;t (3.1)
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Table 3.1: sample statistics (women employed at time t-1 and t)
t=1988 t=1989
Stayers Movers Stayers Movers
(1157 obs.) (115 obs.) (1264 obs.) (155 obs.)
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
individ. (t-1)
age 34.38 10.33 25.89 7.85 34.65 10.65 27.18 8.52
married 0.72 -.- 0.48 -.- 0.72 -.- 0.55         -.-
child<6yrs 0.13 -.- 0.13 -.- 0.13 -.- 0.10    -.-
#children 0.70 1.00 0.47 0.91 0.70 0.99 0.54 0.96
oth.inc. 30.56 53.68 29.90 48.03 31.59 55.22 26.53 48.38
spouse (t-1)
employed 0.92 -.- 0.96 -.- 0.92 -.- 0.94         -.-
work hours 38.51 14.70 37.45 12.71 38.48 14.89 38.53 12.02
income 543.79 279.22 509.20 223.27 552.72 304.11 540.65 286.85
hours (t-1)




26.63 13.27 27.26 13.29 26.95 13.30 27.10 13.75
hdit 1 <hait- i 0.19 -.- 0.17 -.- 0.20 -.- 0.18         -.-
hdi,-t=hai,- 0.72 -.- 0.66 -.- 0.73 -.- 0.68         -.-
hdit. ,>llil,t. i 0.09 -.- 0.17 -.- 0.07 -.- 0.14    -.-
hours (t)
desired hd, 25.50 11.69 31.37 10.89 25.82 11.84 29.57 11.20
actual hait 26.73 13.25 31.50 12.88 26.94 13.14 30.45 12.10
hgsh4 0.20 -.- 0.17 -.- 0.20 -.- 0.19         -.-
hd,t=hait 0.73 -.- 0.72 -.- 0.73 -.- 0.74         -.-
hdi,>hait 0.07 -.- 0.10 -.- 0.07 -.- 0.07         -.-
changes
Ahai,<0 0.23 -.- 0.29 -.- 0.23 -.- 0.25         -.-
Aha,t=O 0.54 -.- 0.21 -.- 0.54 -.- 0.26         -.-
AhaiPO 0.22 -.- 0.50 -.- 0.23 -.- 0.49         -.-
Note: the stayers are the women who stay in the same job, while the movers are the women who change jobs. The
variable 'married' is a dummy for being married (or cohabiting), child<6yrs is a dummy for having a child younger
than 6 years old, #children gives the number of children and oth.inc. gives net other income in Dfl. per week. The
variables under the heading spouse are only defined for married women. They give the characteristics of the spouse,
like a dummy for being employed and the working hours per week. The variable Aha„=ha,t-ha,t.1 gives the change in
the working hours over time.
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Here I[A] is the indicator function, with value 1 if A is true and 0 if it is false. In the
previous chapter I used the same dataset and showed that the 'observed' desired hours of
women have a predictive value for the actual working hours of the next year.
Like Altonji and Paxson (1992), the analysis will be conditional on the fact that the
woman   does  not stop working.   For  the  year 1987 about   11   percent  of the working women
did  not  work  the  next year, while  for  the  year  1988 this figure is about 9 percent. Table  3.1
shows the sample statistics for the women who work both years. As I will study the
differences in adjustment of working hours for individuals who stay in their job (stayers) and
individuals who change job (movers), I give the sample statistics by job mobility. The
movers turn out to be younger, on average. This relates to their lower probability of being
married and their fewer number of children (on average). Other income mainly exists of child
allowances. Of the married women, we observe the spouse's employment status, actual
working hours and (total) income.
The timing will be as follows: time t-1 refers to the first year of two consecutive
...                      . lilI.. . ......  r-
Ii".... ":hi#11  ale  illeigCU Ull  dil  illU V UU   RCVvt.  OU  LilliC  l- i  tall  LIC  CilliCl   170/  Ul   1 100.   11111C
t  refers  to the second  year,  and  can be either   1988  or   1989.  At  time  t-1, the average actual
hours are longer than the average desired hours, except for the movers. For the stayers, the
differences between the average actual and desired hours are significant, whereas for the
movers  they  are  not.'  Thus the stayers, on average,  want  to work significantly fewer hours  at
both time t- 1 and t. This is confirmed by the fact that at time t-1 about 20 percent of the
stayers want to work fewer hours, while about 8 percent want to work more. For the movers,
these groups are more similar in size. The fact that about 30 percent of the working women
are not satisfied with their working hours suggests that constraints on working hours exist.
At time t-1, the desired working hours are significantly larger for the movers than for
the stayers, while in the actual hours there is no significant difference.2 But at time t both
the actual and desired hours are significantly larger for the movers. Comparing the averages
over time shows that for the stayers there is no significant change in the actual and desired
hours. For the movers, there is a significant increase in both. A similar result is found if the
changes in actual working hours, Aha,t=hai,-hai, t, are considered.  For the majority of the
Note that for the actual and desired hours the differences in the means and the standard deviations are of
the same size (in absolute terms). The main difference is in the number of observations. leading to different
conclusions for stayers and movers.
2 For this test I assume that the variances of the working hours are equal for stayers and movers.
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stayers this is equal to zero, while for the movers relatively more changes occur. The average
of the changes in working hours shows that the working hours are stable over time for the
stayers, but for the movers there is a substantial increase. This indicates that at time t-1 the
movers want to work more, and that they indeed increase their working hours. But it appears
that at time t they work more than they wanted at time t- 1.
3.3 Econometric Models
The goal of this chapter is to get measures for the degree of adjustment in working hours
within and between jobs. This will be done by relating changes in working hours to preferred
changes and job mobility. This section formulates a unifying model of labour supply and job
mobility. As there will be different proxies for the preferred changes, there will be different
econometric models.
Define Qi, as job mobility, which equals 1 if individual i changes job from time t-l to
t, and 0 otherwise. Define Lit as the 'true' desired hours of individual i at time t. This will
not necessarily be equal to the 'observed' desired hours hdit, as will be discussed below.
Define ALit=Li-Lit.1 as the first difference in the preferred working hours. The unifying model
I consider, is given by:
Ahait   = DiALit + Eit' (3.2)
Bit       = Bo(1-Qi,) + 13'Qi, (3.3)
The parameters (Bo,13 1) represent the degree of adjustment in the working hours for the
individuals staying in the same job (1 it=110) and for the individuals changing jobs (Bit=Bl). If
restrictions on working hours within jobs exist, Bo should be small. The error term Eit. gives
the unexplained part of the change in the working hours.
The unifying model given by equations (3.2) and (3.3) is not yet an empirical model,
as the preferred change AL„ is not observed. In the subsections I develop the model for
different choices to approximate the preferred change. The first proxy I consider, will be
based on changes in labour supply variables, such as the number of children. A disadvantage
of this choice is that I will not get a direct single measure for the degree of adjustment in the
working hours, as the different labour supply variables might affect the 'true' desired hours
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Li, differently. As I observe the desired hours hd,t. I am also able to construct direct proxies
for the preferred change in the working hours. The second proxy I consider, will be the
change in the 'observed' desired hours hdit-hdi,-1, and the third proxy will be the 'true'
preferred change hdit-hait i·
Using the change in the labour supply variables
The idea to approximate the preferred change in the working hours by the change in the
labour supply variables originates from Altonji and Paxson (1992). They incorporate this in
the model by the formulation of a reduced form labour supply model. Define Xi, as a vector
of labour supply variables related to individual i at time t. Then the reduced form labour
supply model is given by:
Li,     = Xitl + Eit (3.4)
4      =6+ e (3.5)
The components of the parameter vector 6i give the individual sensitivity of the 'true' desired
hours Lit to the labour supply variables Xit· By equation (3.5) I allow for random preferences.
Combining equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) gives:
Ahait    = B,AX,t6 + Eit' + BAE,t'- + BAX,&,6 (3.6)
= a,AXit + 4
with 04,=04(1-Qi,)+a,Q·  04,=Bi,6 and Eit=Eit'+Bi,AE,tL+B,Axi,Eiblt'
From the parameters (ao, ai), the parameters (13*DI) are not identified. Equation (3.6) is the
empirical model Altonji and Paxson (1992) consider. As their goal is to test whether the
degree of adjustment is the same for stayers and movers, they assume at=$04 and test for
Ho:   0=1   versus  Ht:   0>1: They first assume  that the error terms  Eit»,  AE;,L  and  E,8  have  mean
Altonji and Paxson actually define a=04+a111/Qi, and test Ho: w=O versus HI: PO·
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zero and are independent of (AX,t,Qi,). They estimate equation (3.6) by a nonlinear estimation
procedure. They do this on the basis of the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Their
vector of labour supply variables includes information On the number and age of the children,
other income and the spouse's disability and unemployment. For married women their
findings indicate a parameter estimate for $ of about 3, which is significantly different from
1 at a five percent significance level. One interpretation is that hours constraints exist within
jobs. They put, however, forward an alternative explanation: 6„ the individual sensitivity to
the labour supply variables X might be correlated with the probability to change job. This
It'
induces correlation between job mobility Qi, and the error term 8,6. Altonji and Paxson (1992)
also formulate a model which takes this endogeneity into account. They do this by modelling
the probability of changing job, using employer tenure and the change of state of residence
as instruments. However, the correction for the endogeneity hardly affects the estimate and
significance level of the parameter $
Using the change in the 'observed' desired hours
For the second choice to approximate the preferred change in the working hours, I use the
'observed' desired hours in a way that is compatible to the previous model. But instead of
the change in the labour supply variables, I will now use the change in the 'observed' desired
hours. To relate the 'observed' desired hours hdit to the 'true' desired hours Lit, I make the
following assumption:
hdit    = ALit + (1-X)hai, + Eitd (3.7)
The idea is that an individual's response to the subjective question on her optimal number of
working hours could be affected by her current number of working hours. If X= 1, then the
'observed' desired hours are completely determined by the 'true' desired hours. But if
091<1, then the 'observed' desired hours are affected by the current number of working
hours. The way the 'observed' desired working hours question is constructed, can cause such
a dependence. For individuals who are satisfied with their working hours, the 'observed'
desired hours are by definition equal to the actual hours (see Section 3.2). Combining
equations (3.2), (3.3) and (3.7) yields the following:
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Ahai,    = Dit/0,Ahdit + A/0.,El'. - Bit/eitzle"d (3.8)
- a„Ahdit + 4,
with ait=04(1-Qi,)+a,Q,t, (Xi'=13,/0* 4,-1-(1-X)(1-1}i,) and 4,=Ajei,Ei,».13,/0;,AE;,d
Again the parameters ([10,4) are not identified. Since I assume that the parameter X does not
vary with job mobility, I can test whether the degree of adjustment is the same for stayers
and   movers by testing   Ho:    ao=at. The parameter 04,=B,/0, contains the variable   Qi,    in   the
denominator. As conditioning on job mobility Qi, holds that the parameter ao=Bjeo only
occurs in the estimation problem for the stayers, and the parameter at=13,/et in the estimation
problem for the movers, the reduced form model can be estimated separately for the stayers
and movers by a linear estimation method.
In the model of the previous subsection, the possible endogeneity of job mobility Qi,
had to be taken into account, as it could be correlated with the error term E,8. For the present
model, this problem does not arise, as the error term E;8 does not appear in the model. Still,
job mobility Qi: is a choice variable for the individual. Typically, one would expect job
mobility Qi, to depend on the change in the desired hours Ahdit, as an individual who has a
large change in the preferred hours could be more likely to change jobs.4 This induces
correlation between the righthand side variables Ahdi, and Qi„ present in 0,t, of equation (3.8).
But this is generally no problem for estimation. Therefore I see no compelling reason why Qi,
would be correlated with the error term.
For the current model, the endogeneity caused by the correlation between the change
in the 'observed' desired hours Ahdit and the error terms E„' and AE,td seems more important.
Notice that under the assumption bel, equations  (3.2)  and  (3.7)  are a simultaneous equations
system possibly causing correlation between Ahdit and Eit. Under the assumption that the
error terms 4' and AE,id are independent of (AX. Qn), I can estimate equation (3.8) separately1/'
for stayers and movers by the method of Instrumental Variables, using the changes in the
labour supply variables as instruments. The parameter k is not identified, but still I can test
whether X= 1. The 'observed' desired hours are exogenous if and only if k==1 and V(AE.,d)=0
I test for the exogeneity of the 'observed' desired hours by comparing the IV and OLS
4
Euwals et al. (1997) show that the 'observed' desired hours have a predictive value for changing job.
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estimators, as suggested by, for instance, Godfrey (1988). Under the assumption A.=1, the
parameters (ilo, ,) are identified. Only in that case I get a direct single measure on the degree
of adjustment. Under the assumption OIX<1. the parameters ao and a, are strictly larger than
the parameters  0 and  3„ respectively. So in that case the estimates for 04, and at will be
'overestimates' for the degree of adjustment.
Using the 'true' preferred change
A problem with the two previous models is that a change in the actual working hours is
directly related to a change in the preferred working hours. But, if an individual is not on the
labour supply curve at time t-1, a change in the preferred working hours can make an
individual better off at time t in the current job with unchanged working hours. Thus, instead
of looking at the change in 'observed' desired hours, it seems better to look at the adjustment
an individual really wants to make. Therefore I replace equation (3.2) by:
Ahait   = Pit(Lit-hait.1) + Eit (3.2')
I refer to this model as the 'true' preferred change. The parameter B„ is defined the same
way as in equation (3.3). To eliminate the 'true' desired hours Lit, I use equation (3.7). This
gives the following model:
Ahai,         =   B,/01,(hdit-hai,- t)   +   A/0,&,t' -Bit/0.,Ei,d (3.9)
= ai,(hdit-hait.1) + 4,
with  04,=ao( 1 -Qi,)+a,Qit,  ai,=11/0,t,  0;,=1-(1-1)(1-13„)  and  4,=A/0„Ei,»-13,/0„End
The identification problem and estimation procedure remain the same as for the model of the
previous subsection. In the model of this subsection the 'observed' desired hours hd„ are
endogenous. Natural instruments   are the labour supply variables   X„   and Xg Under   the
assumption that the error terms 4' and €„d are independent of the past, I can also use the
lagged actual hours hai,-1 and the lagged 'observed' desired hours hd„.1 as instruments. I will
use the overidentifying restrictions test to check whether these instruments are valid.
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Table 3.2: changes in the labour supply variables
Mean t-1988 t=1989
(Standard
StayersDeviation) Stayers Movers Movers
individual
single_married 0.025 0.026 0.021 0.058
married_single 0.009 0.017 0.007 0.013
childO_child6 0.020 0.026 0.021 0.013
child6_childO 0.020 0.052 0.021 0.006
child_plus 0.045 0.035 0.036 0.026
child_minus 0.048 0.043 0.068 0.039
dif_other_inc -0.342 -8.048 -1.979 -0.840
(48.459) (35.602) (49.533) (58.600)
spouse
dif_work_hours -0.128 1.235 -0.249 0.342
(5.273) (6.632) (5.135) (3.899)
diLincome 18.491 31.953 20.162 14.359
(202.694) (135.870) (177.976) (104.086)
Note: the variables refer to changes over time, for instance, married_single is a dummy for being married at year t-1
and being single at year t. ChildO_child6 is a dummy for having no child younger than six years at year t-1 and
having a child younger than six years at year t. Child_plus is a dummy for an increase in the number of children.
Dif_other_income gives the first difference over time of other income. The variables under spouse are only defined
for women who are married in both years, and give the difference in the working hours and income of the spouse.
3.4 Results
This section presents the results for the three different specifications of the unifying model,
given by equations (3.2) and (3.3). The first specification uses the change in the labour
supply variables (see equation (3.6)). The second specification is based on the change in the
'observed' desired hours (see equation (3.8)). This model is in some way similar to the first
specification, as both are based on the change in the preferred working hours. The final
specification is based on the 'true' preferred change (see equation (3.9)).
Using the change in the labour supply variables
As for the first model, in which the structural parameters are not identified, the idea is to test
whether the degree of adjustment of working hours within and between   jobs is equal.    I
assume that the error terms are independent of the change in the labour supply variables AX,t
and job mobility Qit. Altonji and Paxson (1992) argue that job mobility Qi, might be
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endogenous, and take this into account in their empirical analysis. For instruments they use
employer tenure and the change of state of residence. As I do not observe this kind of
instrument, I will not take the endogeneity of job mobility Qi, into account. Notice that
Altonji and Paxson hardly find any difference by taking the endogeneity into account.
For the change in the labour supply variables, I use individual characteristics such as
marital status, number of children and other (non-labour) income. For married women
characteristics of the spouse, such as working hours and income, are also used. Table 3.2
shows the changes of these variables over time. For the individual characteristics, such as
marital status and number of children, there are only a few changes in the sample within a
year. But as I have many of these variables, they still might explain a reasonable part of the
changes in working hours. Only the change in other income and the characteristics of the
spouse are continuous variables. The characteristics of the spouse are nonzero only for
women who are married in both years. So, for instance, in the case of marriage the effect of
a change in income will be absorbed by the dummies on changes in marital status.
Compared to Altonji and Paxson (1992), my sample also includes unmarried women.
Furthermore, I have less detailed information on the children, and different information on
the spouse. Altonji and Paxson additionally correct for age, education and race. In Dutch
labour market studies correction fur race is not very common. In the analysis I also tried
higher order terms for age and dummies for education, but they were insignificant. Altonji
and Paxson do not correct for the lagged actual working hours, because they might be
endogenous. But on the other side, jobs with many working hours exhibit a large probability
to have a decrease in working hours (and vice versa for jobs with few working hours). So
correction for the lagged actual working hours might make a difference. In Chapter 2 I
showed that the actual working hours have a significantly negative impact on the change in
the working hours. This chapter will carry out the analysis both excluding and including the
lagged actual working hours.
As I impose a,=$04, the model is nonlinear in the parameters. Equation (3.6) will be
estimated by a two-stage method. The first stage is Ordinary Least Squares applied to the
model without imposing at=00(o, and the second stage is Asymptotic Least-Squares imposing
the restriction with the optimal weighting matrix (see, for instance, Kodde et al. (1990)).
Table 3.3 shows the results for the model including the actual working hours. For both years,
homoskedasticity is strongly rejected in the first stage by White's test on homoskedasticity
(White, 1980). Therefore, I Use the Eicker-White covariance matrix for the second stage.
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Table 3.3: estimation results for choice of changes in labour supply variables
Parameter estimates (standard errors)
Test statistics (degrees of freedom)
t=1988 t=1989
constant 0.183 (0.629) -0.877 (0.646)
job mobility Qi, 4.341' (1.181) 3.556' (0.592)
age 0.002 (0.017) 0.028 (0.018)
individual
single_married 0.287 (0.880) 0.495 (1.059)
married_single 0.643 (1.428) 0.054 (1.886)
childO_child6 -4.051' (1.928) -8.758' (1.815)
child6_childO -0.220 (0.902) 1.409 (1.287)
child_plus -3.091' (1.025) -0.653 (1.363)
child_minus 0.990 (0.665) 0.831 (0.730)
dif_other_inc -0.0049 (0.0034) -0.0114' (0.0035)
SDouse
dif_work_hours 0.0350 (0.0426) -0.0122 (0.0348)
diLincome -0.0001 (0.0009) -0.0012 (0.0010)
0 2.520' (1.188) 1.395' (0.437)
tests
HOMT 162.53' (78) 83.93 (73)
PEst=PEm, 1.64                (1)                    0.82               (1)
PES:=PEw 10.49 (13) 10.49 (13)
ORT(ai=*ao) 8.36              (8)                16.96'            (8)
Note: the first variables are conditioning variables. The tests follow a %2-distribution. HOMT refers to White's test on
homoskedasticity. In case of rejection. the second stage uses the Eicker-White covariance matrix. PE„=PE- tests for
Ho: $=1. PEKK=PE  tests for the equality of the parameters for the two years. ORT(a,=¢ao) tests for Overidentifying
Restrictions. Parameters and test statistics marked with * are significant at a five percent level.
Of the conditioning variables, only the dummy for changing job Qi, is significant.
Changing job gives an increase of the working hours of about four hours per week. Of the
changes in the labour supply variables, only the dummies for children are significant for both
years. The effect of children looks different for the two years, but one has to take into
account that the dummy for the change from not having a child younger than six years to
having such a child is strongly correlated with the dummy for an extra child in the family.
Adding these two effects gives a similar result for the two samples. For t=1989 other income
is also significant. The parameter of interest is 0, and for both samples it turns out to be
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insignificantly different  from 1. Unfortunately,  the  test on overidentifying restrictions rejects
for t=1989. A comparison to Altonji and Paxson (1992) is not possible, as they do not report
tests on overidentifying restrictions.
Until now I considered the two samples separately. In order to investigate the effect
of combining the two samples, I pool them under the assumptions that the two sample are
independent and that the parameters for the two years are equal to each other. This procedure
yields about the same results as those reported in Table 3.3. The same variables are
significant,  and the estimation result  for $ becomes  1.716  with a standard error  of 0.735.  So
also pooling gives a result for $ which  is not significantly different from  1. The second stage
uses the Eicker-White covariance matrix as homoskedasticity is rejected, and the
overidentifying restrictions test does not reject.
Results with additional correction for the lagged actual working hours are presented in
Table 3.A. 1 of Appendix 3.A. The lagged actual working hours are strongly significant, and
confirm the idea that jobs with many working hours have a larger expected decrease in the
working hours. The results on the labour supply variables stay about the same. An important
difference shows up in the result for the parameter $: for t=1988 it turns out to be
significantly different  from  1. For t=1989 the overidentifying restrictions test rejects. Under
the same assumptions as above, pooling gives a parameter estimate for 4) of 2.556 with a
standard error    of   0.710. The second stage    uses the Eicker-White covariance matrix    as
homoskedasticity is rejected. The overidentifying restrictions test does not reject. Thus
additional correction for the lagged working hours gives a result which is similar to the result
of Altonji and Paxson.
The conclusion is that using a similar model to Altonji and Paxson (1992) yields an
insignificant result for Ho: 0- 1, while they have a significant result of about 3. Remarkable is
that additional correction for the lagged actual hours gives a significant result of about 2.5.
Using the change in the 'observed' desired hours
In some sense the model yielding equation (3.8) is similar to the model yielding equation
(3.6), as the change in the actual hours is modelled as a function of the change in preferred
working hours. For the model of this subsection, the 'observed' desired hours may be
endogenous. Therefore I use the method of Instrumental Variables (IV). Natural instruments
are the changes in the labour supply variables AX,t, see Table 3.2.
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Table 3.4: cross tabulation for the change in the 'observed' desired hours
STAYERS t=1988 t=1989
Ahdit<0 Ahdit=0 Ahd,PO Ahdi,<0 Ahdi,=0 Ahdit>0
&114<0 60.0% 5.8% 12.8% 63.09b 77% 11.6%
Ahai,=0 28.1% 88.0% 23.3% 26.4% 86.5% 18.4%
Aha,>0 11.9% 6.2% 64.1% 10.6% 5.9% 70.0%
# observations 320 517 320 330 614 320
LR test 724.5' (4) 859.6' (4)
MOVERS t=1988 t=1989
Ahdit<0 Ahdi,=0 Ahdi,>0 Ahdit<0 Ahdit=0 Ahd„>0
Aha,t<0 80.7% 11.1% 8.3% 62.2% 15.2% 4.7%
Ah&=0 3.2% 55.6% 6.3% 13.3% 63.0% 9.4%
Aha„>0 16.1% 33.3% 85.49 24.4% 21.8% 83.9%
# observations            31           36           48          45           46          64
LR test 84.2' (4) 95.4' (4)
Note: the LR test is a Likelihood Ratio test on independence of row and column events. Under the null hypothesis of
independence, they follow a )d distribution. Outcomes marked with * are significant at a five percent level.
Before turning    to the analysis, Table 3.4 shows the cross tabulation between    the
changes in the 'observed' desired and actual working hours. It reveals a strong dependence
between the two, for both stayers and movers. For instance, the cell with unchanged actual
and desired hours contains many observations. This can be a consequence of the fact that for
individuals who answer to be satisfied with their working hours, the actual and desired hours
are equal by definition. But it is remarkable that of the individuals whose 'observed' desired
hours decrease (increase), a huge percentage indeed experience a decrease (increase) in their
actual working hours. This effect seems strong, and I consider two possible explanations.
First, there might be a high degree of freedom to choose working hours within a job. But
second, it might also be caused by the fact that the 'observed' desired hours are affected by
the actual hours, leading to endogeneity of the 'observed' desired hours. Or, in terms of
equation (3.7), the parameter X might be small. In that case taking the endogeneity of the
'observed' desired hours into account will be important. By comparing the results for
Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables, I will test for the exogeneity of the
desired hours.
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Table 3.5: estimation results for choice of changes in 'observed' desired hours
Parameter estimates (standard errors)
Test statistics (degrees of freedom)
t=1988 t=1989
STAYERS MOVERS STAYERS MOVERS
OLS
const. 0.20 (0.15) 1.39 (0.88) -0.02 (0.14) 1.99' (0.67)
Ahdit 0.51' (0.05) 0.93' (0.08) 0.58' (0.05) 0.83' (0.07)
HOMT 16.28' (2) 2.24 (2) 16.68' (2) 1.69 (2)
PE,t=PEmi 19.82' (2) 19.82' (2) 8.45' (2) 8.45' (2)
PEa=PE89 2.41 (2) 1.04 (2) 2.41 (2) 1.04 (2)
ly-
const. 0.25 (0.16) 1.43 (1.13) -0.03 (0.23) 2.34' (0.76)
Ahdi, 0.73' (0.11) 0.91' (0.24) 1.5£ (0.22) 0.61* (0.22)
HOMT 45.04 (33) 25.49 (27) 39.57 (33) 21.77 (22)
PE,t=PEmi 0.46 (1) 0.46 (1) 8.93' (1) 8.93 (1)
PE88=PE89 11.42' (2) 0.49 (2) 11.42' (2) 0.49 (2)
PE,Y=PEot, 2.47 (2) 0.04 (2) 9.96' (2) 8.51' (2)
HORT 27.86' (8) 15.05 (8) 5.21 (8) 8.26 (8)
Note: the tests follow a %2-distribution. HOMT refers to White's test on homoskedasticity. In case of rejection, the
standard errors and tests are corrected for heteroskedasticity, PE,t=PErnv is a test on the equality of the parameters for
Ahdi, for movers and stayers. PE„=PE„ and PEi,=PE.t, are tests on both parameters. HORT refers to Hansen's
Overidentifying Restrictions Test. Parameters and test statistics marked with * are significant at a five percent
significance level.
Table 3.5 shows the estimation results. Under the assumption of exogeneity of the
'observed' desired hours, the OLS results show for the stayers an effect of the change in the
'observed' desired hours of 50 to 60 percent of the preferred change. For the movers this is
80 to 95 percent. As I want to test whether the reaction towards changes in 'observed'
desired hours is the same for both movers and stayers, I test for the equality of the
parameters of Ahdit· For both years this difference is significant. For the test on the equality
of the parameter for the two years, I test on both parameters. This test accepts for both
movers and stayers.
For IV, the results are very different for the two years. For t=1988, the adjustment of
the stayers is about 70 percent, but there is no significant difference with the OLS result.
Unfortunately, the overidentifying restrictions test rejects. For the movers the result is not
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significantly different from the OLS result. For t=1989, the result is significantly different
from the OLS result for both the movers and stayers. For the stayers, there seems to be a
kind of overshooting, as the effect of the change in the 'observed' desired hours is
significantly larger  than 100 percent. This result is curious,  as it corresponds  to a value  for  13
which is larger than one, or to a value for k which is negative. As the overidentifying
restrictions test does not reject, the instruments seem valid. Although the results of the two
years differ greatly for both groups, only for the stayers is the hypothesis of equality of the
parameters for the two years rejected.
I also carry out the analysis with correction for the lagged actual working hours (see
Table 3.A.2 of Appendix 3.A). For OLS, the lagged actual hours have a significant negative
impact, and this impact is also significantly different between the stayers and the movers.
The degree of adjustment of the stayers is 50 to 60 percent of the preferred change, and for
the movers this is 65 to 80 percent. The parameter estimates and tests lead to the same
conclusions as for the model without correction for the lagged actual working hours. This
also   holds   for   IV:   for the stayers   of   1988 the overshooting remains.   So the results   seem
insensitive to the correction for the actual working hours.
Overall, the conclusion seems   to   be   that   this   is   not   a good model.   For the stayers   of
t=1989 the degree of adjustment is significantly larger than 100 percent, while of t=1988 this
is significantly smaller  that 100 percent. This implausible result is insensitive   to   the
additional correction for the lagged actual working hours.
Using the 'true' preferred change
For the final model, I look at the 'true' preferred change (see equation (3.9)). As instruments
I use the labour supply variables XR and X,ti Under the assumption that the error terms are
independent of the past, I can also use the lagged actual working hours han-! and the lagged
'observed' desired hours hd it. 1 as instruments. I calculate the IV results for different sets of
instruments
Before turning to the analysis, note that Table 3.6 shows the cross tabulation between
the actual and the 'true' preferred change in the working hours. The dependence seems even
stronger than in the previous subsection. Again, I consider two possible explanations in the
analysis: the free choice of the working hours within jobs, and the endogeneity of the
'observed' desired hours.
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Table 3.6: cross tabulation for the 'true' preferred change
STAYERS t=1988 t=1989
Bit<0 Bi,=0 Bit>0 Bit<0 Bit=0 Bit>0
Ahait<0 58.6% 0.7% 5.3% 58.0% 0.4% 8.5%
Ahai,=0 30.9% 97.8% 15.9% 30.9% 97.7% 11.9%
Aha.>0 10.5%           1.5%         78.9% 11.2% 2.0% 79.6%
# observations 418 455 284 457 513 294
LR test 1111.9' (4) 1211.8' (4)
MOVERS t=1988 t=1989
Bit<0 Bit=O Bi,>0 Bit<0 Bit=0 Bit>0
Ahait<0 81.1% 4.2% 3.7% 71.7% 0.0% 0.0%
Ahai,=0 10.8% 79.2% 1.9% 13.2% 89.2% 1.5%
Ahai,>0 8.1% 16.7% 94.4% 15.1% 10.8% 98.5%
# observations           37           24           54           53           37        65
LR test 135.0' (4) 204.7' (4)
Note: Bit=hdit-hait. 1. The LR test is a Likelihood Ratio test on independence of row and column events. Under the null
hypothesis of independence, they follow a x2 distribution. Outcomes marked with * are significant at a five percent
significance level.
Table 3.7 gives the estimation results   for   OLS   and   IV.   For the latter method   I   use
three sets of instruments: (Xit,Xit.1), (Xit,•hait-1) and (Xul,hd it-1, hai, 1). The assumption
underlying the second and third set of instruments is that with respect to the 'true' preferred
change hdit-ha,t.1, the lagged actual hours hait 1 are exogenous. In that case, the lagged actual
hours are a valid instrument, so that I only need to instrument for the 'observed' desired
hours hdit. The labour supply variables Xit are natural instruments, but it turns out that the
lagged labour supply variables Xit I perform better on the overidentifying restrictions test. As
the estimation results are almost  the  same,  I  report  only the results using  Xi, t.
Under the assumption of exogeneity of the 'observed' desired hours, the OLS results
indicate for the stayers an adjustment of about 55 percent, while the movers have an
adjustment of about 85 percent. The difference in adjustment between movers and stayers is
strongly significant for both years. The equality of the parameters for both years is accepted
for both movers and stayers.
For the first set of instruments, the IV results are not significantly different from the
0LS results. So the hypothesis of exogeneity of the 'observed' desired hours is not rejected.
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The difference in adjustment between movers and stayers remains significant. A problem is
that the overidentifying restrictions test rejects in three out of four cases. Unfortunately, the
regressions of the instruments (Xit,X,t.,) on the residuals does not lead to a clear conclusion
on which instruments lead to overidentification, as for the three significant cases different
instruments turn out to be significant.
For the second set of instruments, the estimation results for the stayers are
significantly different from OLS. A reason might be that the condition A= 1 does not hold.
Under the assumption OIX<1, the parameter a gives an overestimate for the degree of adjust-
ment. But al least I can conclude that the degrees of adjustment for movers and stayers are
significantly different. And as the parameter estimates give overestimates, the adjustment of
the   movers is significantly smaller  than 100 percent.   For   this   set of instruments   the   over-
identifying restrictions test only rejects for the stayers of t=1989. Again the regression of the
instruments on the residuals does not lead to a clear conclusion on which instruments lead to
overidentification. The results of the third set of instruments are not very different from the
results of the second set. The conclusions stay the same, the only difference being that the
test  on the exogeneity rejects more strongly  for the stayers  of  1989.
I also carry out the analysis with additional correction for the lagged actual working
hours (see Table 3.A.3 of Appendix 3.A). For this I assume that the lagged actual working
hours are exogenous, which means that I can also use them as an instrument. So in Table
3.A.3 I only report the results for the second and third set of instruments. The lagged actual
hours turn out to have a moderate impact on the change in the working hours, and only in a
few occasions this impact is significant. The parameter estimate for the 'true' preferred
change turns  out  to be hardly affected  by the additional correction.   So the conclusions  are  not
affected: the degree of adjustment stays significantly smaller for the stayers than for the
movers.  Tor the movers the degree of adjustment stays significantly smaller  than 100 percent.
All specifications of this model lead to the conclusion that the degree of adjustment
of working hours within jobs is at most 55 percent, and always significantly smaller than the
degree of adjustment between jobs. Except for the first set of instruments, which is rejected
by the overidentifying restrictions test, all specifications lead to the conclusion that the
degree of adjustment between jobs is significantly  less  than 100 percent.
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Table 3.7: estimation results for choice of the 'true' preferred change
Parameter estimates (standard errors)
Test statistics (degrees of freedom)
t=1988 t=1989
STAYERS MOVERS STAYERS MOVERS
OLS
const. 0.70* (0.13) 0.79 (0.73) 0.61' (0.12) 1.21' (0.45)
hdrh4-1 0.53' (0.05) 0.84' (0.05) 0.55' (0.04) 0.86' (0.04)
HOMT 18.55' (2) 3.60 (2) 35.11' (2) 4.36 (2)
PEst PEm, 19.22' (1) 19.22' (1) 30.03' (1) 30.03' (1)
PE88=PE89 0.41' (2) 0.52 (2) 0.41 (2) 0.52 (2)
IV(1 1
const. 0.65' (0.16) 0.75 (0.85) 0.63' (0.14) 1.34 (0.50)
hdit-hait- t 0.49' (0.07) 0.85' (0.12) 0.56' (0.06) 0.82' (0.10)
HOMT 71.82 (85) 44.11 (68) 80.10 (85) 45.03 (71)
PE,t=PEm. 6.72' (1) 6.72' (1) 4.97' (1) 4.97' (1)
PE =PE89 0.01 (2) 0.30 (2) 0.01 (2) 0.30 (2)
PE =PEw, 5.84 (2) 0.04 (2) 0.39 (2) 1.00 (2)
HdRT 24.59' (11) 27.84' (11) 40.13' (11) 15.13 (11)
IV(2)
const. 0.55' (0.14) 0.97 (0.74) 0.48' (0.12) 1.18' (0.45)
hdit-hait-1 0.40* (0.03) 0.80* (0.06) 0.43' (0.05) 0.87' (0.06)
HOMT 53.51 (40) 40.95 (39) 72.29' (40) 24.41 (39)
PEs,=PEmi 35.56' (1) 35.56' (1) 31.74' (1) 31.74' (1)
PE:8=PEw 0.63 (2) 1.20 (2) 0.63 (2) 1.20 (2)
PEi,=PE* 7.20' (2) 0.71 (2) 8.16' (2) 0.00 (2)
HORT 6.50 (7) 6.60 (7) 14.92' (7) 8.27 (7)
IMill
const. 0.50* (0.14) 1.07 (0.74) 0.40* (0.13) 1.21' (0.46)
hdrhai,-i 0.36' (0.03) 0.77' (0.06) 0.36' (0.04) 0.86' (0.05)
HOMT 65.29 (50) 39.88 (49) 98.14' (50) 29.32 (49)
PE,t=PEmi 37.36' (1) 37.36' (1) 60.98' (1) 60.98' (1)
PE88=PE89 0.32 (2) 1.59 (2) 0.32 (2) 1.59 (2)
PE#=PEet, 22.51' (2) 1.80 (2) 29.59' (2) 0.00 (2)
HORT 12.88 (8) 11.30 (8) 27.66' (8) 8.57 (8)
Note:  IV(1)  uses  (X»,X, ,) as instruments.  IV(2)  uses  (X» t,ha„ ,)  and  IV(3)  uses  (X„.,.ha, t.hd« t). The tests follow  a
le-distribution. HOMT refers to White' s   test on homoskedasticity.   In   case of rejection, the standard errors and tests
are corrected for heteroskedasticity. PE,t=PEmv is a test on the equality of the parameters for Ahdit for movers and
stayers. PEM=PER, and PE,v=PE,1, are tests on both parameters. HORT refers to Hansen's Overidentifying Restrictions
Test. Parameters and tests marked * are significant at a five percent significance level.
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3.5 Summary and Conclusions
In the literature on labour supply, several models have been developed to incorporate
constraints on working hours. These models formulate the constraints in a general way, and
they do not distinguish between the different ingredients needed for the existence of hours
constraints in the labour market. Besides the lack of possibilities to adjust working hours
within a job, there also have to be mobility costs. This chapter estimates how flexible
working hours are within jobs, and to what extent job mobility is a way to adjust working
hours. I make this estimation by measuring the effect of changes in preferred working hours
on the realized adjustment of working hours for individuals who stay in their job (stayers)
and individuals who change jobs (movers).
As a proxy for the change in preferred working hours, Altonji and Paxson (1992) use
changes in labour supply variables. On the basis of the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
they find for married women who work in two or more consecutive years, a significantly
larger change in working hours for movers compared to stayers. Repeating this analysis on
the basis of the Dutch Socio Economic Panel for women who work in two consecutive years,
I find no significant difference in the adjustment of working hours between movers and
stayers. Additional correction for the lagged actual working hours gives a significant result,
which is similar to the result of Altonji and Paxson.
The Dutch Socio Economic Panel also contains information on the desired working
hours of the respondents. This information allows me to construct direct proxies for the
preferred changes in working hours. The first idea is to approximate the preferred change in
the working hours by the change in the 'observed' desired working hours. As the 'observed'
desired working hours might be endogenous, I use the method of Instrumental Variables to
estimate the degree of adjustment within and between jobs. This leads, however, to
implausible results, and I conclude that this is not a good model.
The second idea is to look at the effect of the 'real' preferred adjustment, which I
define as the difference between the 'observed' desired working hours and the lagged actual
working hours. Using the method of Instrumental Variables, and trying different sets of
instruments, the overall conclusion is that the degree of adjustment of working hours within
jobs is at most 55 percent, and in any case significantly smaller that the degree of adjustment
between jobs. Most specifications lead to the conclusion that the degree of adjustment
between jobs  is  less  than 100 percent.
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3.A: Estimation results with correction for actual hours
Table 3.A.1: estimation results using the change in the labour supply variables
Parameter estimates (standard errors)
Test statistics (degrees of freedom)
t=1988 t=1989
constant 7.097' (1.195) 5.438' (1.082)
job mobility Qi, 4.414' (1.070) 2.252' (0.750)
actual hours hail- 1 -0.178' (0.021) -0.152' (0.019)
age -0.068' (0.021) -0.033 (0.020)
individual
single_married 0.614 (0.810) 0.816 (1.046)
married_single -0.219 (0.641) -0.232 (1.826)
childO_child6 -2.910 (1.503) -3.975' (1.419)
child6_childO -1.597 (0.914) 6.--)
child_plus -4.010* (0.959) -2.620' (0.716)
child_minus 0.571 (0.644) 0.515 (0.695)
dif_other_inc -0.0037 (0.0035) -0.0093' (0.0043)
spouse
dif_work_hours 0.0175 (0.0367) 0.0065 (0.0441)
dif_income -0.0001 (0.0010) -0.0009 (0.0009)
0 2.862' (0.996) 2.332' (0.598)
tests
HOMT 138.83' (94) 155.30' (90)
PEst=PEm. 3.49             (1)                4.96'           (1)
PEw=PE89 8.57 (13) 8.57 (13)
ORT (at=tao) 6.95             (8)               16.59'           (8)
Note: the first variables are conditioning variables. The tests follow a X2-distribution. HOMT refers to White's test on
homoskedasticity. In case of rejection, the second stage uses the Eicker-White covariance matrix. PE,i=PEn,v tests for
Ho:  0-1. PERRIPER, tests  for the equality  of the parameters  for the two years. ORT(ai=¢ao) tests for Overidentifying
Restrictions. Parameters and test statistics marked with * are significant at a five percent level.
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Table 3.A.2: estimation results using the change in the 'observed' desired hours
Parameter estimates (standard errors)
Test statistics (degrees of freedom)
t=1988 t=1989
STAYERS MOVERS STAYERS MOVERS
OLS
const. 1.85' (0.36) 8.27' (2.50) 2.06' (0.40) 9.24' (1.84)
hait. 1 -0.06' (0.01) -0.24' (0.08) -0.08* (0.02) -0.25' (0.05)
Ahdit 0.49' (0.05) 0.79. (0.10) 0.56' (0.05) 0.67' (0.07)
HOMT 21.38' (5) 4.98 (5) 35.35' (5) 14.92' (5)
PE,t=PEmi 7.20'     (1)     7.20' (1) 1.95      (1)      1.95      (1)
PESS=PEw 2.51 (3) 1.32 (3) 2.51 (3) 1.32 (3)
IY
const. 1.25' (0.46) 2.83 (4.55) 0.06 (0.72) 10.00. (2.62)
ha -0.04' (0.02) -0.08 (0.14) -0.00 (0.03) -0.28' (0.08)it-1
.  . -I      .- --' 1.49
A ... , n - /' \
anait 0.72 (0. i2) 1.10 (U.JL) (V.L'-t) V.JO 'V..2,
HOMT 49.59 (44) 61.73' (44) 50.71 (44) 51.67' (29)
PE,t=PEmi 1.81 (1) 1.81 (1) 7.49' (1) 7.49' (1)
PER:=PE89 11.40' (3) 2.49 (3) 11.40' (3) 2.49         (3)
PE'.=PE.1, 2.40 (3) 20.92' (3) 9.30' (3) 0.11 (3)
HORT 29.27' (8) 16.81' (8) 5.57 (8) 13.36 (8)
Note: the tests follow a X2-distribution. HOMT refers to White's test on homoskedasticity. In case of rejection of
homoskedasticity, the standard errors and tests are corrected for heteroskedasticity. PE.,=PE.. is a test on the equality
of the parameters for Ahdit for movers and stayers. PERR=PER, and PE;.-PE..,. are tests on all the three parameters.
HORT refers to Hansen's Overidentifying Restrictions Test. Parameters and test statistics marked with * are
significant at a five percent significance level.
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Table 3.A.3: estimation results using the 'true' preferred change
Parameter estimates (standard errors)
Test statistics (degrees of freedom)
t=1988 t=1989
STAYERS MOVERS STAYERS MOVERS
OLS
const. -0.84' (0.29) -0.43 (2.24) -0.50' (0.25) 1.53 (0.93)
hait. 1 0.06' (0.01) 0.04 (0.07) 0.04* (0.01) -0.01 (0.03)
hdit-haw 0.58' (0.04) 0.87' (0.07) 0.59' (0.04) 0.86' (0.05)
HOMT 32.15' (5) 4.23 (5) 58.08' (5) 14.91* (5)
PE,=PEm. 12.94' (1) 12.94' (1) 17.78' (1) 17.78' (1)
PESB=PE89 1.47 (3) 0.91 (3) 1.47 (3) 0.91 (3)
 11
const. -0.21 (0.59) 1.58 (2.82) 0.57 (0.53) 1.47 (2.22)
hait- 1 0.03 (0.02) -0.02 (0.09) 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.07)
hdi,-hait. 1 0.48' (0.08) 0.78' (0.10) 0.42' (0.09) 0.86' (0.12)
HOMT 54.08 (40) 39.73 (39) 72.10' (40) 24.69 (39)
PE„=PEm. 5.48' (1) 5.49' (1) 8.60' (1) 8.60' (1)
PEi:=PEw 2.07 (3) 0.76 (3) 2.07 (3) 0.76 (3)
PEI,=PE.1, 0.31 (3) 1.63 (3) 2.81 (3) 0.01 (3)
HORT 5.17 (6) 6.45 (6) 14.74' (6) 8.20 (6)
IMi21
const. 0.90 (0.48) 3.04 (2.77) 1.51' (0.49) 1.94 (1.72)
hait- 1 -0.02 (0.02) -0.06 (0.09) -0.04' (0.02) -0.02 (0.05)
hdit-hai'. 1 0.32' (0.05) 0.71' (0.10) 0.27' (0.06) 0.83' (0.09)
HOMT 64.36 (50) 40.58 (49) 94.78' (50) 30.83 (49)
PE,t=PE™, 12.17' (1) 12.17' (1) 26.80' (1) 26.80' (1)
PEa=PEw 1.33 (3) 1.16 (3) 1.33 (3) 1.16 (3)
PIE„=PIE.i, 8.35' (3) 4.82 (3) 22.49' (3) 0.04 (3)
HORT 11.62 (7) 10.40 (7) 16.88' (7) 8.31 (7)
Note: IV(2) uses (Xi „ha„ 1)   as   instruments,   while  IV(3)   uses  (Xit-I,hd94.,).  The tests follow a X2-distribution.
HOMT refers to White's test on homoskedasticity. In case of rejection of homoskedasticity, the standard errors and
tests are corrected for heteroskedasticity. PE„=PEm. is a test on the equality of the parameters for Ahd. for movers
and stayers. PE,8=PEw, and PEi,=PE"ts are tests on all the three parameters. HORT refers to Hansen's Overidentifying
Restrictions Test. Parameters and test statistics marked with * are significant at a five percent significance level.
There's so many different worlds
so many different suns
and we have just one world
but we live in different ones.
Mark Knopjler
Brothers in Arms (1985)
Chapter 4
Desired and Actual Labour Supply
of Unmarried Men and Women
4.1 Introduction
In the empirical literature on labour supply, it is often assumed that actual hours of work
purely reflect a labour supply decision. To make this consistent with micro-economic theory,
it has to be assumed that individuals can freely and without costs choose their number of
working hours, taking the corresponding wage as given. Actual labour supply would then be
equal to desired labour supply. In practice, however, individuals are restricted in their choice.
Due to, for example, imperfect mobility or incomplete information, they may not be able to
choose their optimal number of working hours. As a consequence, models in which it is
assumed that actual labour supply is determined by preferences only, can be misspecified and
may produce biased estimates of labour supply elasticities.
Blundell et al. (1987) estimate a model in which involuntary unemployment is
explicitly incorporated. In this model, individuals are either involuntary unemployed, or can
freely choose their number of hours worked. The standard model is strongly rejected against
this double hurdle model. Dickens and Lundberg (1993) and Tummers and Woittiez (1991)
compare predicted hours distributions of a standard model with the actual hours distributions
and observe a poor fit. They claim that restrictions are important for actual labour supply. In
both articles, the fit is improved by modelling job offers with specific number of working
hours. However, no structural explanation for the job offers or restrictions is given. In these
three articles, information on the actual number of working hours is used, but not on desired
hours, search behaviour, or restrictions.
Information on desired labour supply can be combined with information on actual
hours to identify hours restrictions. See, for example, Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990). They
allow for three labour market states: non-participation, part-time work and full-time work. By
comparing desired and actual states of individuals, they identify the probabilities of full-time
10                                               Chapter 4
and part-time job offers. They conclude that restrictions have a significant effect and that the
standard model leads to an upward bias in the wage elasticity.
In this paper, we present a structural neoclassical model of labour supply and use
information on both desired and actual labour supply to disentangle the effects of preferences
and restrictions. Compared to Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990), the information we use is more
detailed: it is known how many hours each individual would like to work and how many
hours he or she actually works. An important assumption in the analysis is that individuals'
answers to the desired hours question only reflect preferences and are not affected by the
restrictions.
This assumption makes the model recursive: information on desired labour supply is
used to estimate preferences, i.e. a direct utility function in terms of leisure and income.
Desired hours are those for which utility is maximized, given the budget constraint. The
construction of the budget set incorporates the main features of the Dutch tax and social
security system. Instead of working with the complete budget curve, we use a finite subset of
it, following the discrete choice approach of Van Soest (1995).
Apart from desired hours, the result of the interaction between demand and supply is
observed: actual labour supply. Confronting this with desired labour supply makes it possible
to analyse restrictions. We model these restrictions conditional on demographic, educational
and regional factors, and productivity. The latter is of special interest because the Dutch
minimum wage legislation and minimum wages in collective bargaining agreements (CAO-s)
may lead to productivity thresholds: those with productivity below their threshold may less
easily find a job because they are too expensive for the firms. The effect is that they have a
larger probability of involuntary unemployment than those with productivity above the
threshold (see Meyer and Wise, 1983, for example)
Our models can be used for policy simulations. In contrast to the more traditional
models based on actual labour supply, it is possible to disentangle the effects on preferred
and actual employment. Policy measures concerning taxes and benefits will directly affect
desired hours. Confronting the changed desired hours with the hours restrictions then leads to
effects on employment and on actual hours worked. In contrast, policies with respect to
labour costs or minimum wages affect the restrictions directly. The effect on employment is
more difficult to analyse because it requires an assumption on the extent to which changing
minimum wages affects actual wages and therefore also desired hours.
Actual and Desired Labour Supply of Unmarried Men and Women              11
Most studies in this field focus on married or cohabiting females or couples,
particularly in the Netherlands (see Grift and Siegers, 1992, for a recent overview of Dutch
studies). In this paper we focus on unmarried (and non-cohabiting) individuals, who can be
seen as single decision makers. We distinguish six groups: single men and women, single
mothers and fathers living with one or more children. and other men and women, mainly
children living with their parent(s). If the results are to be used in a simulation model of the
complete labour market, they can be combined with existing results for married couples.'
Section 4.2 describes the data, drawn from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel 1988.
Section 4.3 handles the model of preferences and Section 4.4 explains the way in which the
restrictions are modelled. Section 4.5 gives simulations of the complete model. Section 4.6
concludes and compares the results with those based upon actual hours only.
4.2 Data
The data are drawn from the October 1988 wave of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP),
collected by Statistics Netherlands. We are interested in potential labour market participants,
so   we   select the individuals older  than    15 and younger   than 65 years. We exclude those
attending full-time education, people in military service, disabled persons, and the early
retired.2 The sample consists of 662 males and 806 females. 81.7 percent of all males and
62.9 percent of all females have a paid job. Sample statistics are presented in Table 4.1. The
sample consists of 275 single living males, 357 single females, 20 lone fathers, 195 lone
mothers, and 367 male and 254 female other household members, mainly children living with
their parents. The last group is largest for men, which explains the relatively young average
age for males.
 In MIMIC, the most important general equilibrium model used for policy analysis in the Netherlands.
labour supply of female spouses is endogenous, while labour supply of male spouses and singles is kept
exogenous (see Gelauff and Graafland, 1994). Endogenizing labour supply of the latter two categories is currently
being considered.
2 The sample selection is based upon survey questions on each person's most important occupation, job
search behaviour, and receipts of various types of benefits. Approximately 43.1 percent of all males and 31.8
percent of all females in the age group 16-64 of unmarried (and non-cohabiting) individuals are removed from the
sample.
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Table 4.1: sample statistics
Variable Men Women
gross hourly wage (Dfl) 19.97 (492) 17.94 (468)
actual working hours (ha) 32.28 (656) 21.30 (803)
desired working hours (hd) 35.98 (648) 23.53 (798)
single 0.42 (662) 0.44 (806)
lone parent 0.03 (662) 0.24 (806)
other household member 0.55 (662) 0.32 (806)
age 28.80 (662) 35.09 (806)
education level 1 (primary school) 0.27 (662) 0.29 (806)
education level 2 (lower vocational) 0.29 (662) 0.27 (806)
education level 3 (intermediate) 0.30 (662) 0.31 (806)
education level 4 (higher vocational) 0.10 (662) 0.10 (806)
education level 5 (university) 0.04 (662) 0.03 (806)
note: numbers of observations in parentheses
To distinguish preferences from restrictions, we use information on actual and desired
labour supply. For individuals with a paid job we use the 'actual working hours' ha and the
'desired working hours' hd, as they are described in Chapters 2 and 3. Note that in this
chapter the individual and time index are suppressed. For individuals without a paid job the
'actual working hours' ha are equal to zero. These individuals are asked if they are searching
for a job. Using some information on their search intensity, we categorized them as voluntary
or involuntary unemployed. For the voluntary unemployed, the 'desired working hours' hd
are equal to zero. The involuntary unemployed answer how many hours per week they expect
to work in a new job, and next how many they would like to work. We only use the latter:
Suppose that you could choose freely your number of working hours in the new job.
How many hours per week would you then like to work?
Using the answers to this question, we construct the 'desired working hours' hd for the
respondents who are involuntary unemployed.
Actual hours worked per week include regular overtime only if overtime is paid for.
For 0.9 percent of all males and 0.4 percent of all females, actual hours could not be
computed, due to missing or implausible information. Gross hourly wage rates are computed
from net weekly or monthly earnings and actual hours worked, using the inverse of the
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Dutch tax system.  For 2.1 percent of males  and 1.0 percent of females, desired hours could
not be computed due to missing or implausible information on the relevant questions. Figure
4.1 shows the distribution of desired working hours per week. The majority of men prefers a
full-time job (usually 38 or 40 hours per week). Only 3.1 percent of the men prefer not to
work, while 25.4 percent of all women in the sample prefer not to work. In particular, 66
percent of lone mothers do not want a paid job. Our definition of desired hours neglects the
fact that people without a job may not search any more because they have given up hope to
find a job, i.e. the discouraged worker effect (see Blundell et al., 1987).
Figure 4.1: desired hours distribution
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In Section 4.4, we will identify labour market restrictions using differences between
actual and desired hours of work. A first impression of these can be obtained from Table 4.2.
This table shows that there is substantial correlation between desired and actual working
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hours: most of the individuals are in the diagonal cells, implying that their actual and desired
hours are similar. For men as well as women there is a concentration at the full-time working
week (40 hours) for desired as well as actual hours. For women, the group of nonparticipants
is almost as large, as was also clear from Figure 4.1.
The restrictions revealed by this table work mainly in two ways. First, some
individuals without work are looking for work. This is the case for 60 percent of men
without work. (Note that the disabled and retired and those in full-time education are
excluded from the sample.) Most of them want a full-time job. Of the women without a paid
job, only 20 percent is searching. About half of the women looking for a job prefer a part-
time job. The second type of restriction is that many of those with a full-time job want to
work fewer hours per week. The most obvious restriction seems to be on part-time jobs for
about 32 hours per week; most of the individuals who want such a job do not have one.
Table 4.2: desired and actual labour supply
Desired hours
Actual
0  8  16 24 32 40 48 56 Total
hours
men
0      46       3       1       7       7     49       0       0    113
8 0 4 0 1 0 2 0 0 7
16       0      0      2      1      0      3      0      0     6
24       0      0      0     12      2      5      1      0     20
32       0       0       1       0     31      15       0      0     47
40       0       1      0      3 32 329       8       1    374
48       0      0      0      1      4      8 34 0     47
56            0           0           0          0 0 1 2 _30 _33
Total 46 8 4 25 76 412 45 31 642
women
0     237       6       3      12       8      31       0      0    297
8       0     17      1       1       1      6      0      0     26
16        1      0     14      2      4      7      0      0     28
24        0       1       1      35       5       8       0      0     50
32       0      0      0      1     58      8      0      0     67
40       0      0      1      8     44    246      0      0    299
48       0      0      0      0      4      5      9      0     18
56       0      0      0      0      1      5      0      5     11- - - - - -
Total 238      24     20     59 125 316      9      5    796
Explanation: desired hours, actual hours  per week:  0: 0-3,  8:  4-11;  16:  12-19:  24:  20-27;  32:  28-35,40:  3643,48:
44-51; 56: >= 52. Individuals whose actual or desired hours are not observed are not included in the table.
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4.3 Preferences
The preferences of individuals are estimated using information on desired labour supply. It is
assumed that desired labour supply represents preferences only, and is not influenced by
restrictions in the labour market. The individuals weigh income against leisure and choose
desired working hours such that their utility is maximized.
Direct utility is specified as a function of the individual's leisure (2) and net income
(y). The utility function is chosen to be quadratic in logarithms:
U(v) = v'Av + b'v where v = (log y,log 2)' (4.1)
A is a symmetric 2x2 matrix with entries Au (ij=1,2) and b=(b:,b2): We allow for preference
variation across individuals through the parameter b2, through the observed individual
characteristics x and a random preferences disturbance term Em:
b2 =  x'B + Erp (4.2)
Em is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and independent of explanatory
variables and other error terms in the model (see below). As the choice problem is a triad off
between leisure and income, randomizing b2 is sufficient to get preference variation.
We assume that utility is maximized under a budget constraint: to each number of
working hours corresponds a certain net income. To calculate this we make the additional
assumption that the before tax hourly wage rate (w) does not vary with hours worked. Thus
w and Q determine gross labour income, from which net income is computed by applying the
(exogenously given) tax and social security system. We denote net income as the function
y=y(e,w,x), where x includes individual characteristics relevant for taxes and social benefits.
To determine this function, the Dutch tax and social security system is modelled. The tax
system  in   1988 had eleven brackets, with marginal rates  from  0  to 70 percent.  Due  to  lack  of
information on deductibles, health insurance premiums, etc., some approximations were
necessary.3
  For computational convenience we approximate the piecewise linear tax system by a log quadratic function
in gross income, taking the tax free allowance into account. The approximation is very good, for both men and
women the R-squared is about .995.
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More difficulties arise with the social security system. The only features we take into
account are child benefits ('Kinderbijslag') and Income Support ('Bijstand'). The amounts of
child benefits are given in the SEP. Income Support is provided when family income falls
below the social minimum level. These benefits are usually means tested. We do not take
this into account in our static framework, because in the long run, assets of non-workers will
usually fall to zero. Features of the social security system which we do not take into account
are the Unemployment Insurance (NWW), Inability Insurance (WAO) and Early Retirement
Scheme (VUT). The Unemployment Insurance gives a wage related benefit for a period
depending on past employment. As also this cannot be incorporated in our static model, we
neglect this benefit scheme. Another argument is that this benefit is not relevant for the
choice not to work, because the worker has to loose the job involuntarily to be eligible. Both
the Inability Insurance and the Early Retirement Scheme are assumed to be irrelevant for
individuals who are active in the labour market. As explained in the previous section,
disabled and retired people are excluded from the sample a priori.
In the standard continuous model (see, e.g., Hausman, 1985), the individual solves the
following problem:
Max U(y,Q) s.t. y=y(e,w,x), FSTE (4.3)
where TE is the time endowment. This can be solved using Lagrange techniques. The
complexity of the solution strongly depends on the nature of the tax and benefits rules, i.e.
the form of the budget curve. Our approach is to replace the budget curve by a finite number
of its points. The individual's problem can be rewritten as:
Max U(y.F) S.t.  (y,2)€ CS(W,X) (4.4)
where the choice set CS(w,x) is given by
CS(w,x) = {(y,TE-h); he {O,IL,...,(m-1)IL}, y=y(TE-h,w,x)}
in which we define h=TE-2, the number of working hours per week. We only consider
multiples of a fixed interval length IL for the working hours. The choice set contains m
points. This implies that observed hours are rounded to a multiple of IL and censored at
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(m-1)IL. The choice  set is denoted by {(yo,Fo)9.--(ym-l,em-I)   ·
Random error terms are added to the utilities of all choice opportunities in the same
way as in the multinomial logit model:
uj = U(yj,Fj) + 5 (j=0,...,m-1) (4.5)
We assume that the random errors Ej are iid type I extreme value distributed, and independent
of explanatory variables and other errors in the model. The 4 can be interpreted as
unobserved alternative specific utility components or errors in perception of the alternatives'
utilities. They cannot be interpreted as random preferences due to unobserved family
characteristics. Random preferences have already been incorporated in equation (4.2). The
individual chooses j for which uj is largest. The probability that j is chosen is given by:
Pr[  ujkuk  for  all  k]=  exp{ U(yj,4)}/{Ek=0....m-1 exp{U(Yk,ek)}} (4.6)
For all nonworkers and for about 8.5 percent of workers, the wage is unobserved. The
best way to handle this problem would be to estimate a full model consisting of labour
supply and wages. This is computationally burdensome, however. Therefore we estimate the
wage equation separately, together with a reduced form selection equation to account for the
fact that those with observed wages are not a random sample. The wage equation can be
written as:
log w = f(x,R,0) + E" (4.7)
where x are the observed individual characteristics, R some reference (minimum) wage and
ew is normally distributed with mean zero, independent of x and other errors in the structural
model. See Appendix 4.A for details. In the labour supply model estimates of this equation
are used to replace unobserved wages by predictions. Because the prediction errors are often
substantial, we take these errors explicitly into account in estimation by integrating out the
prediction error in the maximum likelihood procedure (see below).
The model described so far appears to underpredict nonparticipation and to over-
predict the number of part-time jobs involving a few hours per week. An explanation might
be (unobserved) fixed costs of working. Because we work with the direct utility function,
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these can be incorporated in a natural way: fixed costs (FC) have to be subtracted from the
net income y for the strictly positive working hours. So instead of U(YJ'Qj) this gives us
U(yj-FC,Qj) for j-1,..,m-1. A slightly alternative specification, which is somewhat more
convenient to work with, is to introduce fixed revenues FR of not working instead of fixed
costs of working. This means that U(yo,4) is replaced by U(yo+FR,20). We specify the fixed
revenues as follows.
FR = x'6 + f (4.8)
Here £fr is normally distributed with mean zero and independent of the explanatory variables
and of the other error terms in the model. If utility increases with income, positive fixed
revenues increase the utility of not working, thereby increasing the probability of
nonparticipation. The fixed revenues are fully incorporated in the structural model. Thus an
increase in wages, for example, will lead to an increase in participation, because U(Yj,ej) will
increase for j>0, while utility of not working remains unchanged. Effects of wage, tax, or
benefits changes on participation are thus taken into account in the simulations. This is an
important advantage compared to the model conditional upon participation.4
The standard model, without random preferences or fixed costs, can be estimated by
maximum likelihood. For observed wages, the likelihood contribution follows from (4.6). For
unobserved wages, the wage has to be integrated out using (4.7). As we also use random
preferences and fixed costs, two additional error terms have to be integrated out. To avoid
higher dimensional numerical integration, we approximate the integral by a simulated mean.
For each individual we take M drawings from the distribution of the error terms, and
compute the average of the M likelihood values conditional on the drawn errors. This method
is a special case of smooth simulated maximum likelihood. Provided that M tends to infinity
at a fast enough rate with the number of observations, this method is asymptotically
equivalent to maximum likelihood, see Gourieroux and Monfort (1993).
The probabilities in (4.6) are always well defined and positive, which is not changed
by integrating out the conditional probabilities. Therefore, statistical coherency of the model
is automatically guaranteed. In contrast to the continuous model, imposing Slutsky conditions
(quasiconcavity of the direct utility function) is not necessary (see for instance Van Soest et
4 The fixed costs are a novelty compared to Van Soest (1995). There. the lack of part-time jobs is accounted
for by adding disutilities to part-time jobs. The fixed costs approach has more structure and is less ad hoc.
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al., 1993). Ex post, it can be checked whether the utility function is quasiconcave. If it is not,
this does not affect the economic interpretation of the model, which does not rely on
concavity. On the other hand, however, it could also happen that the estimated utility
function is not increasing with net income. In that case, the model is still coherent in a
statistical sense, but its economic interpretation would be lost. To prevent this from
happening we add a penalty to the loglikelihood for observations at which the utility of a
corresponding interior point of the budget set is higher than the utility of the point on the
edge of the budget set.5
Results
Since desired and actual working hours per week are measured as discrete variables and vary
from 0 to about 70, a natural choice for the interval length and number of points would be
IL=1 and m=71. To limit the computational burden however, we choose IL=8 and m=8.
Furthermore we use TE=112 and M=10. At the end of this section will present a sensitivity
analysis with respect to the choices made. In Table 4.3 we present the results for our basic
model. The parameter for the variance of the random preferences converged to zero, so we
set it equal to zero. The appreciation of leisure time depends on individual characteristics via
the parameter b (see equation (4.2)). A positive value means a positive correlation between
the characteristic and the appreciation for leisure, and a negative influence on labour supply.
Many parameter estimates are, however, difficult to interpret due to interactions. For
instance, the single parent dummy and the number of children are strongly interrelated. We
observe that there are some significant differences between males and females. Ceteris
paribus, labour supply of males has a maximum at age 51. For females, the maximum is
found at age 21.
5 If no penalty is used, the coefficients of log y and log2y are estimated very inaccurately and utility
decreases with income for some observations. The penalty function we use is:
penalty(i) = log *( a 1 (U(Yi,4)-U(0.5yi.#,))) (a>0). j=0,..,m
with 0 the standard normal distribution function. a is a smoothness parameter; the larger a, the less important the
penalty. We used a=2 in our final specification (see discussion under sensitivity analysis).
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education level -0.06 0.02
single -0.17 0.14










note:  h is hours worked  per  week,  y  is net income  in  Dfl  per week, #children is number of children younger  than  18
and living at home, child<6 is dummy for children younger than 6.
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Table 4.4: Simulations of desired participation and desired hours of work
Group Sample Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3
Basis Wage +10% Inc.Sup. -10%
men
1 367 95.1% 37.8 94.9% 37.7 95.9% 38.2 95.8% 38.3
2 275 90.5% 34.9 90.3% 35.0 92.2% 35.6 91.9% 35.7
3 20 95.0% 31.6 94.4% 31.5 95.4% 32.0 95.3% 32.2
women
1 254 93.3% 34.6 92.8% 34.3 93.9% 34.9 93.8% 35.1
2 357 70.9% 24.1 70.3% 24.1 72.6% 24.8 72.6% 25.0
3 195 42.6% 10.7 43.0% 11.9 45.8% 12.8 45.5% 12.9
note:  group 1 reference group, mainly children living with their parents; group 2: singles, group 3: single parents.
Simulation 1: model  with the actual wages and benefits; simulation 2: wages increased  by 10%; simulation 3: Income
Support reduced by 10%. First entry: desired participation rate (in %); second entry: average value of desired
working hours per week.
Fixed revenues of not working are significant and positive for almost all individuals.
This means that small numbers of working hours are often inferior to not working. The fixed
revenues are significantly different between males and females. They increase with age.
Fixed revenues may not only reflect purely financial costs of working. For example, the
negative effect of education level may be due to a discouraged worker effect or larger search
costs of those with low education, for whom the probability of involuntary unemployment is
larger than for others.
By differentiating with respect to income it can be shown that in the relevant part of
the domain utility is an increasing function of net income. On the other hand, for 23 percent
of males and 40 percent of females, utility is decreasing in leisure. This appears to happen
for individuals who supply no or only few hours of labour, and is due to the introduction of
the fixed revenues in the model. It does not harm the economic interpretation of the model.
Simulations
The sample is divided in three groups for both men and women: singles (2), single parents
(3) and the remaining group (1), mainly children living with their parents. The first
simulation in Table 4.4 serves to compare the results of the model with the sample data. The
model appears to reproduce the average numbers of desired hours and the participation rates
quite well. This is mainly due to the introduction of fixed revenues. The table does not show
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that the model is not capable of predicting the spikes in the hours distribution at 40 hours per
week, particularly for men. It underpredicts the number of men who want to work 40 hours a
week, and overpredicts the numbers in the two adjacent hours categories.
In the second simulation, all before tax wage rates are increased by 10 percent.
Comparing the results with those of the first simulation, we find that the effect on
participation for males is modest. Because a vast majority of the males already supplied
labour before the wage increase, a large effect could not be expected anyhow. The same
holds for the group of female children living with their parents. Larger effects are found for
the groups of single females and single mothers. For all groups, average desired working
hours increase, implying that the positive substitution effect of the wage increase dominates
the negative income effect. The estimated own wage elasticity for lone mothers is about 0.81
(including effects on participation), for single women it is about 0.32. For the other groups,
the elasticities are smaller.
In the third simulation, the Income Support is lowered  by 10 percent. The effect  on
participation is slightly smaller  than  for  the 10 percent wage increase, while the effect  on
average desired working hours is slightly larger than that of a wage increase.
Sensitivity analysis
As the base case we used IL=8, m=8, TE=112, M=10 and a=2. The choice of IL, m and M
is a trade off between accuracy of the model and computational burden. The question is how
sensitive the results are to this choice. We therefore reestimated the model with the same
auxiliary parameter values but one. As alternative choices we try IL=10, m=4, TE=98, M=20
and a=2,3,4,5,10 and =. Almost all models capture participation rates and average hours
worked to a similarly satisfactory extent: It turns out that the wage and income support
elasticities for IL=10, m=4, TE=98 and M=20 are of the same order as those for the base
case. So the main results are not affected by the choice of these parameters. The choice of a
is more problematic. The preferred value would be a=-, which means no penalty. For this a,
utility is decreasing in income for about five percent of the men. a=2 appears to be the
highest a for which the model performs well in terms of capturing participation and labour
6 The model tries to fit the discrete measure for the hours worked. As this measure is censored at 56 hours
per week in the base case, the average value is too low for the average working hours. The model with IL=10
performs better in this respect.
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supply in the data. The choice of a has some effect on the elasticities. For instance, for a=5
the elasticities are on average 30 percent larger than in the base case, but for a==, they are
smaller than for a=2.
4.4 Restrictions
Restrictions in the labour market are caused by an imperfect fit of labour demand and supply.
We do not observe labour demand directly, so we cannot estimate a complete structural
model. By confronting desired labour supply with actual labour supply however, we are able
to identify those who face restrictions among the individuals supplying labour. In this section
we model, for each individual and each number of working hours h considered (h=0,8,..,56),
the probability P(h) that the individual has the opportunity to work this number of hours.7
Thus the probability that someone is restricted and cannot work h hours is equal to  1 -P(h).  If
all probabilities P(h) are equal to one, then there are no restrictions. The probabilities P(h)
can depend on the individual's productivity, the reference (minimum) wage, other individual
characteristics, and on h itself. We specify P(h) as follows.
P(h) = \111(h) 114(x,F,R) (4.9)
Here V   is a function with possible values between 0 and  1. We work with multiples of four
hours per week and assume 91(81)=3, j=l,.,7, with 'rj parameters to be estimated.
The individual characteristics x, productivity F and the reference (minimum) wage R
influence the probabilities P(h) through the function 92· A consequence of the multiplicative
specification of P(h) is that these variables influence the probabilities of different numbers of
hours in the same way. We work with the following 92
F,(x,F,R) = 0(x'13+6gg-R)) (4.10)
The reference wage R reflects the market minimum for an individual of a certain age and
education level. It may be influenced by the legal minimum wage and the minimum wages of
7 Following job search theory, it would be natural to see each job offer as a combination of hours and
earnings. We retain the assumption in Section 3 that each individual has a unique gross wage rate. Therefore job
offers are completely characterized by working hours.
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collective bargaining agreements (CAO-s). The idea is that individuals with an expected
productivity lower than this reference wage have a smaller probability to find a job and a
larger probability of involuntary unemployment, because they are relatively expensive for the
firms. This is modelled by the term g(F-R), which indicates whether productivity is smaller
than the reference wage or not. It equals 1 if productivity is smaller than 95 percent of the
reference   wage,   0   if the productivity is larger   than 105 percent   of the reference   wage   and
decreases continuously    from   0    to     1 if productivity rises    from    95    to 105 percent   of   the
reference wage.8 We expect that 6<0. A problem is to find a reasonable way to determine
the reference wage. Our procedure is explained in appendix 4.A. There we also explain how
we construct F, unobserved productivity, as a function of the reference wage and potential
hourly earnings.
Besides the separate probabilities of jobs with different numbers of hours, we also
need to model the relation between the different job opportunities. We allow them to be
dependent by assuming a two stage process for the restrictions similar to the double hurdle
model of Blundell et al. (1987). First, the individual characteristics determine if a person has
entry to the labour market or not (probability determined by the function /1,2 · Second, given
that the individual has entry, the possibilities to choose certain numbers of hours are
determined independently from the individual characteristics and from each other (the
function Wi). Thus, for example, the probability that both 24 and 40 hours are in the
individual's choice set CS, is given by:
P( {24,40}cCS ) = 91(24)91(40)92(x,F,R) (4.11)
The probability that a person can choose none of the numbers of hours (and is involuntary
unemployed) is given by:
P( CS={0} ) =1- 92(x,F,R) + 92(x,F,R) nj=L.,7 [ 1-Wi (Bj)1 (4.12)
To estimate the parameters B, 6, and 'ct,...,r7, we combine the information on actual and
desired working hours. We estimate the parameters with ML, conditional on desired labour
supply. The restrictions determine how actual working hours come about, given desired
8 g(F.R) is similar to a dummy with value one if F<R and 0 otherwise.
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working hours. For example, if a person's desired and actual working hours are both equal to
40, then the likelihood contribution is simply P(40): we know that the individual was able to
choose to work 40 hours per week. If a person is not working and also doesn't want to work,
then there is no contribution to the likelihood. This person is not participating on the labour
market, so we don't know if he or she would be restricted.
More problematic is the case of an individual whose actual hours are different from
desired hours. Take, for example, someone who works 40 hours and would like to work 24
hours. It is clear that such a person does not have the opportunity to work 24 hours, and is
able to choose 40 hours. It is not clear, however, which other opportunities he or she may
have. For example, he or she would probably also prefer to work 32 hours instead of 40
hours: The fact that he or she works 40 hours then reflects that the option of working 32
hours is not available. In principle, the model described in section 3, i.e. the budget set and
the preferences of the individual, completely describes the ranking of all the alternatives. The
largest utility in the choice set of an individual gives the actual working hours (ha):
ha=hj   if  j  = arg Inaxk (y(10.1(1,)*CS  U(Yk, k   + 4 (4.13)
A problem is that the alternative specific errors €j in (4.5) are unobserved. Computation of
the likelihood in a way consistent with the model of the previous section would require the
computation of the probability that, for example, 32 hours is preferred to 40 hours, given that
desired hours are equal to 24. To avoid the computational problems involved with this, we
do not rely on the model in Section 4.3 and make an ad hoc assumption instead: we assume
that all possible numbers of hours which are closer to the desired number of hours (hd) than
the actual number of hours (ha), would be preferred to ha. This implies that individuals
choose actual hours ha as follows, conditional on desired hours hd:
ha=hj if j = arg mink:(y (k).1(k)* CS 1 hk-hd I (4.14)
The fact that actual hours are 40 while desired hours are 24 then 'reveals' that 32 hours is
not in the individual's choice set. In this example, not only the restriction on 24 hours, but
9 A simple graph shows that this is certainly the case if utility is quasi-concave and the budget set is linear
between 24 and 40 hours. If, however, the budget set is non-convex or if preferences are not quasi-concave, 40
hours may be more attractive than 32 hours, even though 24 hours is optimal.
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also  restrictions  on   16  and 32 hours are therefore binding. Furthermore, we assume  that,   i f
the individual desires to work 24 hours but can only choose between 8 and 40 hours, these
two alternatives are chosen with equal probability. This implies that the likelihood
contribution in the example is given by
P(ha=401hd=24)={'/2+14(1-lit;(8)}(1-1111(16))(1-\111(24))(1-Wz(32))11'1(40)92(x,F,R)   (4.15)




log age -0.70 0.19
education level 0.15 0.05
female 0.18 0.12
region north -0.64 0.18
region east -0.40 0.16
region south -0.55 0.15
g(prod/ref.wage) -1.00 0.22
hours restrictions
8 hours 0.63 0.09
16 hours 0.47 0.06
24 hours 0.45 0.04
32 hours 0.42 0.03
40 hours 0.88 0.01
48 hours 0.51 0.05
56 hours 0.62 0.07
Results
Table 4.5 shows the estimates of equations   (4.9)   and   (4.10). We include a dummy   for  sex
(FEMALE:   1   i f female,  0   i f male) which is insignificant."  Thus, at least  for this group  of
unmarried individuals, access to jobs does not seem to be different between sexes. Education
level has a significant positive effect on the probability of finding a job. Age has a
significant negative effect. Individuals living in the western part of the Netherlands have a
higher probability of a job offer than others. The effect of crossing the reference wage has
10 We also tried interaction terms of sex with other variables, but these turned out to be insignificant.
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the expected sign: when productivity falls below the reference wage, the probability of
involuntary unemployment increases significantly.
The second part of Table 4.5 gives the estimates of the parameters Tj, j=L..,7. As
could be expected from Table 4.3, part-time and over-time jobs are more difficult to find
than full-time jobs. The large parameter value for 'rf shows that persons who prefer a full-
time job, are usually either able to obtain such a job, or involuntarily unemployed. This
explains why it rarely happens that a person who prefers a full-time job, actually has a part-
time job. The opposite happens much more frequently.
Table 4.6: Simulations of actual participation and actual hours of work
Group Sample Simulation 1 Simulation 2
Basis Ref. Wage -10%
men
1 357 85.7% 34.2 85.5% 34.0 86.4% 34.3
2 271 79.0% 31.4 80.9% 31.5 81.6% 31.7
3             20 80.0% 26.4 75.2% 26.0 76.0% 26.3
women
1 253 84.2% 30.5 85.5% 32.2 86.5% 32.6
2 353 64.3% 22.9 63.8% 22.4 64.5% 22.7
3 192 33.9% 8.6 33.1% 9.5 34.2% 9.7
note:  group t: reference group, mainly children living with their parents; group 2: singles; group  3: Ione parents.
Simulation I: model  with the actual wages and benefits; in simulation 2, reference wages are reduced  by  10%.  The
first entry is the participation rate (in %), the second is average desired working hours per week.
Simulations
The sample is divided in the same groups as in the previous section: singles (2), lone parents
(3) and the remaining group (1). The first simulation in Table 4.6 serves to compare the
results of the model with the sample. The model predicts the participation rates for the
different groups reasonably well, especially if it is taken into account that this model does
not contain dummies for the three groups as explanatory variables.
In the second simulation, all reference wages are decreased  by 10 percent. This should
have a strictly positive effect on actual participation, because we assume here that
productivity and wages remain the same. If reference wages are reduced, fewer people will
have productivity below the reference wage. For most groups, the employment rate increases
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by about one percent. An exception is the group of lone mothers whose employment rate
would change by 1.1 percent-point, i.e. 3.3 percent.
Note that in this simulation it is assumed that potential wages remain the same. If a
decrease of the reference wage would cause a decrease in wages, the sign of the total effect
becomes unclear, since supply and demand effects work in opposite directions. We take this
into account in the next section.
4.5 Simulations
In this section we combine the labour supply model and the model of the restrictions to
create a complete model for actual employment and hours worked. We do this by applying
the restrictions to the output of the labour supply model. The complete model is convenient
to analyse policy measures which have an effect on both the supply and demand side of the
labour market. Table 4.7 shows some simulation results. The sample is divided into the same
groups as before. The first simulation is the reference case; it uses actual wages and benefits.
In  simulation 2, Income Support is reduced  by 10 percent. In Section  4.3, we showed
that this has a substantial impact on desired participation. We now find that reducing Income
Support also leads to a substantial increase in the actual employment rate. There are two
effects responsible for this. The obvious effect is that some individuals who preferred not to
work, decide to participate in the new situation. The other effect of lowering the Income
Support is that some individuals who wanted to work part-time and decided not to work
because they were restricted in the sense that they could not find a part-time job, now decide
to accept a full-time job.
In contrast to the simulation with the model of restrictions, the effect of a decrease of
the reference wages is not obvious. This policy can pull down wages. For example, we could
assume   that a decrease   of the reference   wage   by 10 percent   will   lead   to   a   fall   in all actual
gross wage rates by 2 percent (see appendix 4.A for a motivation). The labour supply model
showed that wages have an impact on desired participation. The negative labour supply effect
can compensate the positive employment effect through a lower probability of being
restricted. Simulation 3 shows that the positive effect still dominates, except for the lone
mothers. The total effect of this policy on participation is small compared to the
corresponding simulation in Section 4.4. This is specially the case for single females and
single mothers, who have a relatively large wage elasticity of participation.
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Table 4.7: Simulations of actual participation and actual hours of work
Group Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4
Basis Inc.Sup.-10% Ref.wage -10% Both policies
men
1 367 85.6% 34.0 86.4% 34.6 86.2% 34.3 87.1% 34.8
2 275 81.6% 31.8 83.0% 32.4 81.9% 32.0 83.3% 32.6
3           20 75.6% 26.1 76.3% 26.6 76. 1% 26.3 76.9% 26.8
women
1 254 85.3% 31.9 86.2% 32.6 86.1% 32.2 87.0% 32.9
2 357 64.2% 22.5 66.2% 23.3 64.3% 22.6 66.4% 23.4
3 195 37.4% 10.8 39.7% 11.7 37.5% 10.7 39.8% 11.7
note:  group 1: reference group, mainly children  living with their parents; group 2: singles; group 3: lone parents.
Simulation 1: actual wages and benefits; simulation 2: Income Support reduced   by 10%; simulation 3: reference
wages reduced by 10%; simulation 4: combination of the two policies in simulations 2 and 3. The first entry is the
participation rate (in %), the second is average desired working hours per week.
Comparing the fall of the Income Support in simulation 2 with the fall of the
reference wage in simulation 3, the effect on both actual participation and average realized
working hours is strictly larger for the former policy. The Income Support level in the
Netherlands is directly connected to the minimum wages. For instance, the social assistance
level for a single person is 70 percent of net income earned at the minimum wage. Therefore
a decrease of the reference wage, which is related to the minimum wage, should also imply a
decrease of the Income Support level. Simulation 4 shows the result of such a policy. The
results show that the model is more or less additive with respect to these policies.
4.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we have estimated labour supply preferences and hours restrictions for singles,
lone parents, and children living with their parents, by combining information on actual and
desired hours of work. We have used static models, estimated with cross-section data. A
crucial assumption is that desired hours in the data are not affected by hours restrictions. This
allows separate estimation of the labour supply model. A novelty compared to Van Soest
(1995) is that it allows for fixed costs of working. The model is fully structural, and fits in
the extensive literature on neoclassical static labour supply models. The submodel explaining
the restrictions takes preferences and desired hours as given, and uses deviations between
actual and desired hours to identify the restrictions. This part of the model has ad hoc
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features that could be removed in future work. In particular, the link with the preferences
model is strongly inspired by computational convenience.
In spite of the shortcomings, the results suggest that using information on desired as
well as actual hours is a useful way to attack the traditional identification problem in labour
supply models with restrictions. Estimated preferences make sense and yield females' wage
elasticities of desired labour supply that are in line with findings in the literature based on
actual hours. The elasticity estimates appear to be robust with respect to the choice of most
auxiliary parameters that determine the specification of the model. And although evidence on
demand restrictions is indirect - no information on firms is available - our conclusions about
hours restrictions also seem to make sense. In particular, we find empirical evidence that
(implicit or explicit) wage thresholds might be a reason for involuntary unemployment.
The natural question comes up whether using desired instead of actual working hours
makes a difference. For that purpose, we estimated the model of Section 4.3 using actual
hours instead of desired hours. Table 4.8 compares the elasticities of participation rates and
average hours worked for the alternative model (no hours restrictions) with those of our base
model in Section 4.3, combined with the model in Section 4.4. The results are based upon
calculations similar to those underlying Table 4.4 for the alternative model, and upon Table
4.7  for  the base model. While the differences for females are quite small,  they are substantial
for males. For all groups, the model with restrictions taken into account (third and fourth
column) gives smaller elasticities    than the alternative
' standard' model (first and second
column). This corresponds completely to the finding of Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990).
Table 4.8: Elasticities for labour supply (hours per week)
without restrictions with restrictions
actual hours only actual and desired hours
wage inc.support wage inc.support
nnen
extra cat. 0.30 -0.33 0.12 -0.15
single 0.36 -0.38 0.15 -0.18
lone parent 0.42 -0.21 0.15 -0.20
women
extra cat. 0.36 -0.39 0.18 -0.21
single 0.43 -0.49 0.30 -0.37
lone parent 0.88 -0.90 0.81 -0.86
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Appendix 4.A: Wage Formation
This appendix deals with gross hourly wage rates, productivity, and reference wages. The
main goal is to obtain predicted wage rates when the wage rate is unobserved. These
predictions are needed in the models of Section 3 and 4.
We assume that the gross wage is the Pareto optimal result of a Nash bargaining
process in which the productivity of the worker is the threat point of the employer and the
reference wage the threat point of the worker. Therefore the gross wage rate will be a
weighted average of productivity and reference wage. Define F as the logarithm of
productivity, R as the logarithm of the minimum or reference wage (see below), W as the
logarithm of the gross wage. We specify the following equations:
F = x'13 + El (4.A. 1)
W = b1F + (1-bl)R    if PR
W = b  + ( 1-b2)R    if F<R
Here x is a vector of individual characteristics, like, for instance, education level dummies
and age. If b=1 then wage and productivity are equal to each other. In principle the
parameter b can be estimated. This leads to inaccurate estimates because of multicollinearity,
however, due to a lack of variation in R independent of x. We therefore do not estimate b,
but assume b=0.8. To take account of possible selectivity bias, we add a "participation"
equation, in reduced form:
E' = z'a + Ep (4.A.2)
The individual works with observed wage rate if and only if E'>0.
Here z is the vector of variables which influence actual participation. We assume that the
distribution of Ei is standard normal, independent of x and z, and allowed to be correlated
with EF. Together with the wage equation, this yields a model similar to the Heckman (1979)
selection model. We estimate it using Maximum Likelihood.
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We have to specify the reference wage. A possible choice would be the official
national minimum wage given by law. We will not choose this, because in collective
bargaining agreements of many industries, the lowest wages are substantially higher than the
national minimum wage. A better choice would be to use the lowest wages of the collective
bargains, but unfortunately these     are not available     in the Socio-Economic Panel.     To
overcome this problem, we measure the reference wages  as the smoothed 10%-quantiles  of
the wage distribution in certain education and age groups. Here we use the full working
subsample of the SEP, including married men and women. The average reference wage is
about 60 percent of the average gross wage rate. Reference wages increase with age and
education level, but not as much as average wage rates.
Estimation results of equations (4.A. 1) and (4.A.2) are presented in Table 4.A. 1. For
men, the selection has no significant effect. For women it is, somewhat surprisingly,
significantly negative. This result was also found by Melenberg and Van Soest (1993) for
married women in the SEP.
We are mainly interested in productivity and the gross wage. In equation (4.A. 1) we
included some cross products and a third degree polynomial in log age, to make the model
flexible. These terms are significant. For men there is no significant difference between the
two lowest education levels, while for women this is the case for the three lowest education
levels. In general, the wage pattern is as expected: wages increase with education and age.
The age pattern is steepest for young people and for the higher educated.
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Table 4.A.1: Wages and Participation
Parameter estimates (standard errors)
Men Women
sigma = 0.44 (0.00) sigma = 0.45 (0.01)
rho = -0.11 (0.24) rho = -0.33 (0.07)
participation productivity participation productivity
constant 138.64(39.34) -76.06(11.81) 99.01(34.91) -109.18 (17.01)
Family ch.
single person -0.91 (0.12) 0.49  (0.10)
lone parent -0.82 (0.39) -0.12 (0.09)
extra category -0.69 (0.15) 0.31 (0.14)
# child < 18 0.01 (0.05) -0.24 (0.03)
dummy child<6 -0.13 (0.14) -0.84 (0.07)
Human capital
ed.level 2 0.13 (0.11)  -0.05 (0.03) 0.11 (0.06) -0.03 (0.04)
ed.level 3 0.97 (0.94) -0.58 (0.28) 1.37 (0.65) 0.15  (0.32)
ed.level 4 -0.05 (2.19)  -2.95 (0.34) 0.63 (1.18) -1.62 (0.57)
ed.level 5 -0.16 (2.23)  -2.70 (0.35) 0.79 (1.20) -1.26  (0.58)
log age -121.86(33.89) 62.57(10.12) -90.06(29.75) 92.20 (14.73)
log2 age 36.04 (9.69) -16.43 (2.87) 27.57 (8.41) -25.18 (4.23)
log3 age -3.54 (0.92) 1.44 (0.27) -2.82 (0.79) 2.29 (0.40)
ed.1.3: log age -0.13 (0.26) 0.19 (0.08) -0.25 (0.18) -0.02 (0.09)
ed.1.4,5: log age 0.25 (0.59) 0.92 (0.09) 0.01 (0.33) 0.52 (0.16)
Region
region north -0.37 (0.16)  -0.16 (0.04) -0.19 (0.09) -0.10 (0.05)
region east -0.22 (0.11)  -0.14 (0.02) -0.12 (0.06) -0.09 (0.03)
region south -0.10  (0.12)    -0.07 (0.03) -0.17 (0.06) -0.11 (0.03)
unemployment 0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01)
note: The reference group of the household dummies is the group head or partner. The extra category are the persons
who are not head, partner of the head, single or single person. The reference group of education is education level 1.
Of the regions it is region west.
Love shows that God has a sense of humor.
Joe Jackson
Laughter and Lust (1991)
Chapter 5
Wages in the First Job after
Apprenticeship: Movers versus Stayers
5.1 Introduction
In recent years the German Apprenticeship System (GAS) has found considerable interest.
Various papers have described the system and highlighted its advantages, and have compared
it with training opportunities in the US and UK. See Winkelmann (1997) for a recent
example. The most notable feature of the GAS is that it combines on the job training in
private firms with formal, state provided education. It introduces young labour market
participants to the various practical aspects of their chosen occupation and, at the same time,
provides theoretical knowledge in a number of related subjects. More than 60 percent of a
cohort go through this system, which can largely account for the high skill standard and
productivity of the German labour force.'
There are attempts to incorporate some features of the GAS in the educational
systems of other countries. In this context, the question arises why the GAS would be a
sustainable equilibrium, supported by firms as well as workers. The general view is that,
particularly in large firms, apprenticeship training provides general skills rather than firm
specific skills (see Winkelmann (1996), for example). This explains why young people are
willing to accept wages during their training period which are much lower than what they
could obtain as unskilled workers. On the other hand, it has been argued that the cost of the
training programme may exceed the gain from the low wage costs (Franz and Soskice
(1995)). This raises the question why employers are willing to bear these costs.
Several recent studies have addressed these issues. In particular, the last question is
investigated by analyzing what happens after the apprenticeship: do the apprentices stay with
the training firm or not, and what are the wage differentials between movers and stayers?
1 For a detailed description of the GAS, see Hamilton (1990) or Soskice (1994).
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Soskice (1994) argues that the costs for training apprentices are most relevant in large firms,
which require specific settings for training purposes. While small firms are relatively flexible
and employ apprentices productively, large firms in Germany are usually long-run oriented
and require high quality workers with general as well as firm specific skills. They operate
internal labour markets to satisfy their demand for skilled workers. The apprentices are
trained in both general and firm specific skills. Firms benefit from low apprentice wages
when training workers in specific skills. Still, it may be cheaper for firms to poach trained
workers from other firms, instead of providing own training programmes. According to
Soskice, this does not happen because the compressed and highly regulated wage structures
in Germany limit the possibilities for firms to attract good apprentices from other firms,
reducing the pay off to job search for graduated apprentices. Soskice concludes that the long
run benefit of training workers overcompensates the cost also for large firms.
Another explanation why companies gain from training workers in general skills is
based on the hypothesis that many young workers face mobility costs. Workers with a strong
preference for not leaving the training firm, are willing to accept wages after the training
period which are lower than what they could earn in other firms. Firms are willing to train as
long as the overall cost incurred during the training period is lower than the rent they can
extract by underpaying the workers with a distaste for moving after training. An implication
of this explanation is that movers receive higher wages than similar stayers. This is the
explanation put forward by Harhoff and Kane (1997) for their empirical finding that those
who leave a training firm in the industrial sector within one year after finishing training
receive 6.6 percent higher wages than those who stay. These results are based on a
cross-sectional data set. Similar evidence for an earnings advantage of movers is provided by
Werwatz (1996). Winkelmann (1994) uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and
also finds a wage advantage of movers.
An alternative explanation for the sustainability of the GAS is provided by Franz and
Soskice (1995) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1996). They use an asymmetric information
framework as in Gibbons and Katz (1991) to explain why firms train workers, and pay them
during the training period. Franz and Soskice present a stylized model with two types of
workers, and combine asymmetric information with the idea that firm specific skills are
taught more efficiently to apprentices than to workers hired from outside. Acemoglu and
Pischke present a model with a continuum of heterogeneous workers and training
possibilities. The training firm knows more about the ability of its own trainees than other
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firms. Employers train workers to increase the gain from this information gap (the
monopsony rent). After the training period, the firm dismisses all workers below a certain
(endogenously determined) ability level. Thus without voluntary quits, all movers would  be
of lower quality than the stayers. The training firm offers the workers that it wants to keep a
wage below their marginal product, but exceeding the offer of outside firms. The outside
firms are assumed to operate competitively and offer wages which equal the expected
marginal product of workers. The monopsony rent after training explains why during
training, workers can get wages which exceed their marginal product (in contrast to the
human capital model). The implication of this theory for the wage differentials is opposite to
that of mobility costs: stayers should receive higher wages than movers. Furthermore,
individuals who are separated from their firm for exogenous reasons such as military quitters
should receive higher wages than laid off workers (since the former are drawn from the
overall distribution), but lower wages than stayers (since movers and stayers are drawn from
the truncated distributions). Using the same data as Harhoff and Kane (1997) and Werwatz
(1996), Acemoglu and Pischke (1996) find some evidence in favour of their theory. In
particular, they find that military quitters earn more than movers, while differentials between
stayers and instantaneous (immediate) movers are insignificant.
The different theories in the literature explaining why firms train workers have
different empirical implications. A crucial empirical element is the wage differential between
movers and stayers in the period after graduation. The evidence provided so far seems to be
contradictory. The few empirical studies are based on two data sets. Harhoff and Kane
(1997), Acemoglu and Pischke (1996), and Werwatz (1996) use two cross-sections from the
German Qualification and Career Survey, conducted   in    1979   and    1985/86.   This   data   set
reports earnings at the survey date, which are used to analyse wage differentials immediately
after graduation by controlling for experience. Winkelmann (1994) uses the German
Socio-Economic Panel. This panel allows to observe wages at the end of the training period,
but the small number of observations does not allow for very detailed analyses. In this paper,
we use a new longitudinal data set which avoids the shortcomings of the data sets used so
far. The data is a one percent sample from the German Social Security Statistics. It covers
the period between     1975    and    1990. We shall focus on young    men who finish their
apprenticeship during this period. We have about 6,500 observations on wages of
post-apprentices shortly after graduation. About 60 percent of these are still working at their
training firm, the others moved to another firm immediately or shortly after graduation. We
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focus on the wage differentials in the first years of the first job between those who stay at
their training firm (stayers) and those who move after graduation (movers). Our aim is to use
this new and rich data set to analyse the empirical relevance of the theories discussed above.
We consider wage differentials, but also wage dispersion, and the determinants of whether
someone stays or moves upon graduation.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces a
switching regression model incorporating mobility costs and asymmetric information, and
analyse the empirical predictions according to these theories. Section 5.3 describes the data
and the variables used in the analysis. Section 5.4 tests the empirical implications of the
models of Section 5.2. We focus on the wage differentials in the first year of the first job
after graduation. We control for individual and training firm characteristics and interact the
mover-stayer differential with firm size. We also include employing firm characteristics, we
correct for self-selection of movers and stayers, and we allow for firm specific fixed effects.
Moreover, we present a specification which corrects for attrition due to job changes shortly
after the end of apprenticeship. This specification is also used to analyse wages in later years.
We also look at wage dispersion and analyse whether the worker is hired as a skilled or
unskilled worker. Section 5.5 summarizes our findings and concludes.
5.2 Asymmetric Information and Mobility Costs
In this section we sketch a model with asymmetric information and mobility costs. We focus
on the empirical implications for wage differentials between movers and stayers and for
selection between movers and stayers. We will consider the asymmetric-information-only and
mobility-costs-only models as extreme cases. This section will be the basis for the empirical
tests of the relevance of the various theories in Section 5.4. We will derive a switching
regression model, and study the implications of the various theories for observables and
correlations between unobservables in this model. Apprenticeship programmes in large firms
mainly provide workers with general skills, rather than firm specific skills (see Winkelmann
(1996), for example). We do not explicitly incorporate firm specific skills in our models:
2 According to Franz and Soskice (1995), firms may find it cheaper to teach firm specific skills to
apprentices during apprenticeship than to workers hired from outside. Since the firm specific skills will only lead
to a marginal wage premium, however, we cannot test this empirically.
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Productivity
According to the theory of asymmetric information, firms use the apprenticeship training to
acquire information about the ability of the apprentices. Thus part of the ability of a
graduating apprentice is observed by the training firm only and not by outside firms. This
part of the worker's ability is denoted by a'. We can then decompose the graduated
apprentice's productivity TE as
1[ = x'[1 + ao + a» (5.1)
Here x is a vector containing the observed conditioning variables. It includes a constant term
and observed individual characteristics such as age and pre-apprenticeship education, and
includes the characteristics of the apprenticeship firm. It does not include (post-
apprenticeship) job level or characteristics of the firm of the first job after apprenticeship,3
which will depend on the mover-stayer decision. The vector D is the corresponding vector of
parameters. The term a° includes the part of ability observed by the apprenticeship firm as
well as outside firms, but not captured in the observed variables x. For example, a° may
depend on the qualifications mentioned on the apprenticeship certificate. For the firms, the
distinction between x'I} and a° is not important. For the econometric model, however, it is:
while x is observed by the econometrician, a° is not. It will be included in the error terms,
therefore. We assume that a° and au are residual parts of ability, in the sense that
E(a°Ix) = E(aulx) = E(a° a'Ix) = 0 (5.2)
Outside wage offers
The structure and timing of the model are similar to those in Gibbons and Katz (1991), for
example. First, the training firm decides whether to make an offer or not. If an offer is made,
the worker decides whether he accepts it or not. If no offer is made or the offer is rejected,
the worker enters the outside market. We only look at the wage in the first job, and abstract
from the duration of this job. In a competitive labour market with free entry of firms, the
3 In the remainder we refer to this as the employing firm. For stayers, this is the same as the training firm.
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wage offered by outside firms will be equal to the expected marginal productivity of the
worker. This assumption is typically   used   in   this   type of theoretical model:  If a worker  did
not quit for observed exogenous reasons (for example, the military quitters in Acemoglu and
Pischke (1996)), outside firms do not know whether he left the training firm voluntarily or
involuntarily. Let the dummy variable d denote whether the worker leaves the apprenticeship
firm (d=1) or not (d=0). Then the wage offer of an outside firm is given by
w.=x'13 +a°+ a (5.3)
with a' = E(a'Ix,d=l)
Here a' is the outside firms' expectation of the unobserved ability part. It can depend on the
observed variables x through the selection rule which determines the dummy for leaving d.5
If, on the other hand, a worker quits for observed exogenous reason, a' is replaced by
E(au)=0. As will be discussed below, the training firm typically hires the more able workers.
This implies that the outside firms' expectation a' is typically negative (see below). Those
who quit for exogenous reasons thus will earn more than other movers.
Training firm offer
The key argument of the asymmetric information theory is that the training firm can offer
wages below marginal productivity to high ability apprentices. The difference is a
monopsony rent 51>0 due to the firm's private information. Thus the wage w, offered by the
training firm is given by
w,=TE- 61 =x'I -11 + ao +au (5.4)
4 To reconcile it with the claim that free market setting is hampered by the highly regulated institutional
nature of the labour market, it can be noted that wages vary with job level. and that firms can compete by
offering jobs of different levels. This will be discussed in the remainder.
5 The economic model does not incorporate the variation in wages due to the matching process. In the
empirical model, we can allow this in an ad hoc manner by adding an idiosyncratic error term E,n to equation
(5.3). This will not change the rest of the model since the worker does not know 4 when he has to choose
whether or not accept an offer of the training firm. In Section 5.4, we will show the empirical relevance of adding
Em for explaining wage dispersion.
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The size of the monopsony premium p is an outcome of the firm's optimization problem.
The firm has to weigh the gains of lower wage costs against the cost of the higher
probability that the offer will be rejected. In the stylized model of Franz and Soskice (1995),
the firm offers a wage to a homogeneous group of good workers ('non-lemons'). Workers
accept the offer if ws>w. and if there are no exogenous reasons for quitting. Thus the
optimal training firm's wage offer exceeds the outside offer by a 'marginal premium' only,
so that, approximately, 51=a"-a'. In Acemoglu and Pischke (1996), the probability that a
worker accepts the training firm's offer is a continuous increasing function of w,. In their
base model, all workers with productivity above some threshold level get the same wage
offer w,. The wage offer w, is the internal solution of the first order condition maximizing
the expected profit. We therefore assume that the acceptance probability is an increasing
function of wrww say A(w,-wJ• Assuming that the wage offer has to be uniform, the
training firm will offer a wage w, to those with productivity TC>W„ where w, solves
Max f.(,) (tr-ws)A(w,-wm)f(Ic)dic (5.5)
where f(70 is the density of lt. The assumption that the training firm offers a uniform wage is
extreme. The institutions on the German labour market prevent wage offers to vary freely
with productivity. Still, some heterogeneity is plausible, since higher ability workers will get
the higher level jobs. Thus it can be expected that the training firm wage offer w, increases
with the unobserved ability a'' with slope between zero and one. Accordingly, the same will
hold for the monopsony rent 11=1[-w, Moreover, it seems natural that the training firm wage
offer w, can vary with x' D+a° in the same way as outside wage offer wm• so that p and wm-ws
do not depend on the common knowledge part of productivity.
Mobility costs offer an alternative explanation for a positive monopsony rent p.
Mobility costs can be seen as a disutility of moving. Workers with large mobility costs will
accept a wage offer of their training firm, even if this is somewhat below what they could
get in the outside market. If the training firm realizes this, it will incorporate this in its
optimisation problem (5.5) via the acceptance probability A. It may then be optimal to offer
a lower wage than the outside firms, i.e. a wage below the expected marginal productivity.6
By offering an apprenticeship, the training firm invests in making itself more attractive to the
6 For example, if A is a step function which is 0 and 1 depending on whether or not wm-w, exceeds mobility
costs MC or not, the optimal wage offer w, will marginally exceed wm-MC.
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worker than other firms which offer the same wage. The revenues of the investment accrue
in the form of lower wages.
Selection between Movers and Stayers
The selection process determines who leaves the training firm immediately upon graduation
(movers) and who accepts a job at the training firm upon graduation (stayers). Our data do
not distinguish movers who are laid off (i.e., did not get an offer) from movers who quit
voluntarily (i.e., rejected the offer). This makes our situation similar to that of Acemoglu and
Pischke (1996) and different from that of Gibbons and Katz (1991). The training firm will
offer a job to those with 51=TI-Ws>0 Since the monopsony rent p will typically increase with
the unobserved ability au, the probability that the training firm offers a job increases with the
unobserved ability a'. The probability that the worker accepts the training firm's offer
decreases with the mover-stayer wage differential wm-ws=a'+51-a". As explained above, this
differential will be negatively correlated or uncorrelated with the unobserved ability a",
depending on whether the training firm wage offer ws is allowed to vary with the unobserved
ability a" or not.
Thus both the training firm's decision on making the offer and the individual's
decision on accepting it, will lead to a positive relation between the probability of staying at
the training firm (d=0) and the unobserved ability a'. The acceptance probability may also be
affected by considerations other than wages. Gibbons and Katz (1991) and Franz and Soskice
(1995) incorporate a fixed probability that the worker always leaves, no matter what the
wage offer is. Acemoglu and Pischke (1996) include a positive disutility of staying, which
can be compensated by a high wage offer. Mobility costs, on the other hand, lead to a
disutility of moving instead of staying. Combining wage and non-wage considerations, we
can model the mover-stayer decision as follows.
d'  =x'y + Jau + 86 (5.6)
d  =    0        if d'20 (Stayer)
1         if d'<0 (Mover)
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with x'y a reduced form approximation of the systematic part of the wage differential (which
varies with the observed variables x through a' and Fl), combined with the utility of moving
due to other than wage considerations, such as the negative of the mobility costs. We expect
that 6<0. A negative 6 implies that not being hired by the apprenticeship firm is a negative
signal on the unobserved ability a' to the outside firms: a'=E(a Ix,d=1)<0. The error term 4
is uncorrelated with the other variables except possibly for the monopsony rent p. If p
contains the monopsony rent due to mobility costs, and if the training firm observes mobility
costs and can vary its wage offer with the error term Ed, then the correlation between p and
Ed will be negative.
Empirical implications
What are the empirical implications of all this? First, consider the mover-stayer wage
differential estimated  by OLS: E(wmlx,d=l)-E(w,Ix,d=0), which can easily be obtained  from
the data without the need for a complete empirical model. It consists of the negative term
E(aulx,d=l)-E(a"Ix,d=0) plus the monopsony premium p. In the model of Franz and Soskice
(1995), the two almost cancel, and the differential is marginally negative. In the specification
of Acemoglu and Pischke (1996), the monopsony rent p is typically smaller, and the
differential is always negative and larger. They assume that the disutility of staying is non-
negative, not allowing for mobility costs. If, due to mobility costs, staying is more attractive
than moving to a job paying the same wage, the monopsony premium can increase, and the
differential can become positive. Thus the differential will be negative if asymmetry is
important, but can become positive if mobility costs dominate. For those who quit due to
exogenous reasons, the asymmetric information theory predicts larger wages than for other
movers (a'<0). In the mobility-costs-only model, there is no reason for any such difference.
Equations (5.3), (5.4) and (5.6) are a special case of a witching regression model,
with correlation between the errors in the selection equation and the two wage equations.
What does theory predict about the signs of these correlations, and the corresponding
differences between E(wmlx,d=1) and E(wmlx) and between E(w,Ix.d=0) and E(w,Ix)? With
6<0, the unobserved ability a. leads to a non-positive correlation between the error terms
6a'+4 in (5.6) and a°+a'-Fi in (5.4). In this case E(w,Ix) will be smaller than E(w,Ix,d=1). On
the other hand, if the training firm is able to vary the wage offer with mobility costs, p can
be negatively correlated with 4, and the covariance between the errors in (5.6) and (5.4) may
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be positive. Thus asymmetric information and mobility costs lead to correlations of opposite
signs. There is no reason to expect that the error term in (5.3), the observed ability a°, will be
correlated with the error in (5.6), so E(wmlx,d=0) will be equal to E(wm|x).
The model also has implications for wage dispersion. Variation in the unobserved
ability a' may lead to variation in wages of stayers but not for movers. Thus wage dispersion
for stayers could be expected to be larger than for movers. This can easily be dominated,
however, by the variation in movers' wages due to matching V(em); see footnote 5.
Finally, we consider the role of employing firm and job characteristics. Franz and
Soskice (1995) claim that firms with similar technology offering similar jobs cannot use pay
and job conditions to attract workers, due to the bargaining between unions and employer
associations. This implies that wage differentials between very similar jobs cannot exist.
Wage differentials between movers and stayers can still exist if they are accompanied by
differences in type of job. A positive relation between the unobserved ability a' and the
decision to stay then implies that the stayers will have the better jobs, ceteris    paribus.   In
particular, the asymmetric information argument suggests that the job level will be higher for
stayers than for similar movers. In the mobility-costs-only model, there is no reason to expect
such a correlation. Additional controls for job level in the OLS regressions should make the
negative mover-stayer differentials disappear.
5.3 Data and Variables
The dataset we use is a one percent sample of the German Social Security Statistics,
provided by the German Institute for Employment Research. It includes all employees in the
public and private sector. Excluded are the civil servants and the self-employed.7 The data
are combined with firm information, and information from the official unemployment
statistics. It covers the period from January    1,    1975 to December   31,    1990, and contains
information on 427,000 individuals. The longitudinal structure of the data makes it possible
to follow individuals through their career. The data provides information on basic individual
specific characteristics like age and education, and on firm and job characteristics such as
plant size, sector, and occupational group.
7 Civil servants and self-employed are not registered at the German Social Security Statistics, as they have
their own social security arrangements.
Wages in the First Job after Apprenticeship: Movers versus Stayers 105
We select graduated male apprentices born between   1960  and   1966 who obtained  an
officially recognized apprenticeship diploma. For those  born  in  1960, the earliest  year to start
an apprenticeship is 1975, the beginning of the time period covered by the data. To achieve
homogeneity of the sample, we exclude those who had a full-time job before starting the
apprenticeship training. We also exclude individuals in the agricultural sector, since the
mobility and the wage structure in this sector differ substantially from those in other sectors.
Finally, we only include individuals who worked on a full-time basis after apprenticeship
training. This leaves us with a sample of about 10,500 individuals.8
Information on the individuals in the sample is collected at the beginning of each year
(the annual notification). Moreover, information is collected if the Social Security Agency is
notified due to some event, such as a change of employer or an exit out of the labour force9
or into unemployment. A spell is defined as the time period between two notifications.
Average daily wages are reported. These refer to the average wage over the preceding
employment spell. When individuals end their apprenticeship but stay with their training
firm, usually no notification is made. Wage information is then typically updated in early
January of the next year. In this case the date of the end of apprenticeship and the wage
immediately after this are unknown. On the other hand, for individuals who leave the training
firm immediately after graduation, a notification is made at the time of the move.
Movers and Stayers
We focus on the distinction between individuals who have their first job after apprenticeship
at their training firm (stayers), and individuals whose first after apprenticeship job is
elsewhere (movers). To be precise, all information on firms refers to plants rather than
companies. Those who move to another plant of the same company cannot be distinguished
from those who move to another company. Both stayers and movers may take up a job after
training immediately, or may first experience an out-of-labour-force or unemployment spell.
8  There   is a considerable increase  in the number of observations   from   1960  to   1966  (see  Table  5.1).  One
reason is that for several occupations the apprenticeship program was officially recognized between 1975 and
1990. Another reason   is   that   for the years   1975   and   1976 all individuals with birthdays ending   2   to   5   were
erroneously deleted from the original data.
' The data do not distinguish out-of-labour-force from self-employment or employment as a civil servant.
What we call out-of-labour-force spells in the remainder, can thus be self-employment or civil servant spells.
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Table 5.1: number of observations on graduated apprentices
year first entry next year
of
STAYERS MOVERS STAY MOVE(1) MOVE(2)birth
1960 884 336 587 199 141
1961 960 338 644 193 146
1962 954 421 621 231 150
1963 1038 478 644 247 154
1964 1066 541 674 288 141
1965 1120 548 694 278 155
1966 1207 629 728 285 167
total 7229 3291 4592 1721 1054
Note: the left panel refers to the observed starting time of the first job, while the right panel refers to the timing of
the observation Of the wage at January  15 of the year after the observed starting time.
The left hand panel of Table 5.1 shows the numbers of movers and stayers in the data
by year of birth. About 69 percent of the apprentices in the sample have their first job at the
training firm. To construct comparable wages of movers and stayers, we use information on
individuals who are employed some time after the end of their apprenticeship. The right hand
panel of Table 5.1 relates to January in the first year after the start of the first job as an
employee. Of the 3291 instantaneous movers, 1721 (52.3 percent) then still work for the firm
to which they moved initially (MOVE(1)). The others have moved to another firm or are no
longer observed. Of the 7229 initial stayers, 4592 (63.5 percent) still work for the same firm
(STAY). Of the remaining stayers, 1054 are observed in their second job. These movers
stayed initially but moved after a short while (0 - 12 months). We denote them by MOVE(2).
The  remaining 1583 stayers are either already in their third  job,  or not observed. The latter
means that they left the training firm in the (calendar) year in which their apprenticeship
ended, and have not been employed (except possibly as a civil servant) from then to 1991.
Some examples on the distinction between the three groups are given in Appendix 5.A.
A strict definition of first job after apprenticeship implies that the group MOVE(2)
should be discarded in the analysis, since these people are in their second job. It is possible,
however, that for people who stay at the training firm for a short period only, this short term
job is more an extended apprenticeship than a serious job. In that case the group MOVE(2)
could be considered   as a group of (non-instantaneous) movers in their first   ' real' job after
apprenticeship. We shall present some statistics and estimates with this group included as a
separate group, to investigate which of the two views is most reasonable.
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Table 5.2: sample statistics
STAY MOVE(1) MOVE(2)
# observations (4592) (1721) (1054)
individual characteristics
year of birth 63.13 63.28 63.08
age end apprenticeship 20.03 20.25 20.06
age at first job 21.06 21.80 22.12
married 2.9% 5.9% 6.5%
not German 2.1% 3.0% 2.2%
abitur 6.2% 5.2% 3.8%
after apprenticeship
unemployment 1.2% 41.6% 2.3%
out-of-labour force 2.7% 23.8% 2.7%
together 3.5% 57.5% 4.6%
duration in months
unemployment 7.9 8.6 5.4
out-of-labour force 9.3 15.1 10.9
together 10.0 12.4 9.1
In the sequel we shall use the terms movers and stayers based upon the right hand panel of
Table 5.1, distinguishing between instantaneous and later movers (MOVE(1) and MOVE(2)).
Table 5.2 shows some sample statistics   for the three groups. Movers and stayers have almost
the same average age at the end of apprenticeship, but not in the first January of their
post-apprenticeship job. This is because movers more often have a nonemployment spell, so
that the first January of the job is often not the first January after finishing the
apprenticeship. About 96.6 percent of the stayers start immediately in their first job,
compared to only 42.5 percent of the instantaneous movers. Many instantaneous movers first
have an unemployment or out-of-labour-force spell, and the average duration of such a spell
is longer than for the other two groups. Stayers are less likely to be married and more likely
to have a high general education level (Abitur).
Table 5.3 presents information on mobility between firm, occupation and industry.
10
We  distinguish 276 occupations, of which   158   have an officially recognized apprenticeship
training program. We distinguish 94 industries. About 60 percent of the movers change
I0 Occupations will be classified according to the three digit classification of Berufe der Bundesanstalt fur
Arbeit, edition 1988.
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industry, while 49 percent change occupation. About two thirds of those who change industry
change occupation as well. Occupational mobility among stayers is much lower: 90 percent
remain in the occupation they were trained for. Among all movers and stayers, 23 percent
changed occupation   and 19 percent changed industry. To illustrate the relation between
mobility and job level, Table 5.3 also distinguishes between skilled workers (Facharbeiter)
and other workers. 59.3 percent of the stayers are skilled workers, compared to 46.2 percent
of the instantaneous movers (MOVE(1)) and 43.9 percent of the later movers (MOVE(2)).
This suggests that training firms tend to hire their best trainees and give them the best jobs.
It should be realized, however, that the definition of a skilled worker strongly varies across
sectors. In the empirical analysis, we will use dummies for separate occupational and
industry groups on a one digit level. See Appendix 5.B for the classifications.
Table 5.3: job position
Skilled worker STAY MOVE(1) MOVE(2)
Unskilled worker
Total sarne sarne other sarne other
industry industry industry industry industry
2506 325 211 195 115
same occupation 1561 223 155 137        86
4067 548 366 332 201
216         56        199          50       102
other occupation 308 133 411          83       284
524 189 610 133 386
Table 5.4: characteristics by industry of training firm
#obs. age >50 MOVE MOVE Skilled
empl.         (1) (2) worker
1.primary,mining 180 19.96 32.2% 40.0% 12.8% 67.2%
2:raw material 593 19.94 63.7% 16.7% 13.0% 65.9%
3:investment 1196 20.31 69.1% 18.7% 13.5% 61.5%
4:user goods 1220 19.60 28.2% 22.4% 13.7% 75.1%
5:construction 1340 19.49 29.6% 14.3% 16.5% 83.4%
6:bank,insurance 708 21.21 65.8% 19.2% 8.5% 3.0%
7:trade,transport 1339 20.35 47.1% 26.2% 18.0% 18.0%
8:services 658           20.25          51.4%        45.6%         13.5%          55.3%
total 7239 20.09 47.5% 22.8% 14.4% 54.0%
Note: age refers to the age at the end of the apprenticeship training, >50 employees refers to the training firm.
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Table 5.4 presents some descriptive statistics by sector. Plant size varies strongly
across industries, with large plants over-represented in the heavy manufacturing industries
Craw materials, investment). The mover-stayer ratio also varies. For example, there are few
movers in the construction sector, but very many in the services sector. Almost all post-
apprentices in the construction sector are skilled workers, in contrast to those in banking and
insurance or trade and transport. This is due to a sector specific definition of skilled worker.
The nature of apprenticeships varies with firm size. We do not observe firm size, but
use plant size as a proxy. Retention rates by plant size of the training firm are presented in
Table 5.5. The retention rate increases with size of the plant. This is in line with evidence
provided by Harhoff and Kane (1997) and Buechtemann (1989), and is consistent with the
notion that large firms operate internal labour markets for their own skilled work force. For
movers, there is a clear positive correlation between the size of firms during training and
after training, a result which has also been found by Winkelmann (1996). For example, 62.6
percent of instantaneous movers trained at small firms (less than 50 employees) have their
first job at a small firm, versus 42.7 percent of those trained at large firms.
Table 5.5: Retention rates by size of training firm
Size
Training
Firm STAY MOVE(1) MOVE(2) #obs. perc.
Unknown 33.1% 56.7% 10.2% 127 1.7%
1-9 54.4% 28.9% 16.6% 1721 23.4%
10-19 59.2% 23.3% 17.5% 959 13.0%
20-49 62.2% 21.2% 16.6% 1120 15.2%
50-99 61.4% 20.5% 18.2% 704 9.6%
100-499 66.8% 21.6% 11.6% 1387 18.8%
500-999 68.1% 22.1% 9.9% 467 6.3%
21000 76.1% 16.4% 7.5% 882 12.0%
total 62.3% 23.4% 14.3% 7367 100.0%
The left hand panel of Table 5.6 illustrates in more detail the difference between
movers and stayers in terms of out-of-labour-force spells immediately after apprenticeship.
Most of these spells are fairly short. There   is  some  peak   at 15 months, which probably
relates to military service. The movers with out-of-labour-force spells longer than two years
will usually have gone to university or other full-time schooling. The right hand panel of the
table refers to temporary-out-of-job spells. Many stayers experience such a spell, which
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typically  lasts  up  to 12 months.  This will often concern workers  who  go into (compulsory)
military service  and can return to their job afterwards."
Table 5.6: nonemployment durations
out-of-labourforce temporary-out-of-job
(at first entry) (at year 5)
months STAY MOVE(1) MOVE(2) STAY MOVE(1) MOVE(2)
0 4467 1312 1026 696 207 129
1-5            63         185          16         41           9          6
6-11          18         36          3         16          1          5
12            4         5          1        582        78        28
13                       1                  3                 0                  1                  0                 1
14            1          9         0         6          1         0
15           18        51          3         7         0         1
16             3         13          0          1          0         0
17-24               13               32                3                7                 1                0
225           4 00-*Ii-              0-                -_75                2
total 4592 1721 1054 1357 297 170
Wages after Graduation
We do not observe the exact date at which stayers finished their apprenticeship. We
therefore look at the wage which is reported for the spell which starts with the annual
notification in the first January of the first job (see examples in Appendix 5.A). To make
wages of movers and stayers comparable, we follow the same procedure for movers.
The numbers of stayers and movers and the average wages for the first year after
graduation are presented in Table 5.7. The numbers are smaller than in Table 5.1, since no
wage is observed for those  who are temporary-out-of-job. All wages are measured  in   1976-
German marks. The wages are positively correlated with the size of the training firm. This
again illustrates that the nature of apprenticeship training and jobs after apprenticeship varies
with firm size. Since size of the training firm and size of the firm after training are strongly
correlated, this also implies a positive correlation between wages and size of the employing
firm (see, for example, Idson and Feaster (1990)).
  The maximum temporary-out-of-job duration registered  in  the  data is usually twelve months.  If  the
duration is longer (mainly because of military service), the remaining time period is registered as an out-of-
labour-force spell.
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Table 5.7: mean wages in the first year
average wages in 1976-German Marks  per day
Size STAY MOVE(1) MOVE(2)
Training
Firm #obs. mean st.dev #obs. mean st.dev #obs. mean st.dev
1-9 840 48.96 12.77 477 52.46 16.87 274 55.95 14.38
10-19 495 51.61 13.76 212 50.81 14.62 159 55.07 14.68
20-49 578 53.26 12.53 226 53.05 16.20 177 56.49 16.40
50-99 354 54.89 13.61 135 54.60 16.69 119 58.65 12.65
100-499 773 57.40 14.29 284 56.63 17.05 158 60.35 17.07
500-999 272 60.43 13.07 98 58.63 15.50       45 62.27 20.00
21000  578 67.59 13.24 136 64.87 20.13 32 66.58 18.88
total 3890 55.72 14.64 1568 54.62 17.13 994 57.88 15.89
Table 5.8: mean wages in the first job
average wages in 1976-German Marks per day
STAY MOVE(1) MOVE(2)
#obs nnean st.dev #obs mean st.dev #obs mean st.dev
small
year 1 1913 50.95 13.13 915 52.22 16.22 610 55.88 15.05
year 2 1079 56.44 13.04 458 59.32 16.06 321 62.14 14.84
year 3 811 59.77 12.82 310 63.04 16.70 238 65.58 15.34
year 4 662 62.77 12.75 220 66.04 16.84 161 69.22 17.89
year 5 493 63.79 12.66 153 68.31 16.99 107 72.93 18.56
large
year 1 1977 60.35 14.54 653 57.97 17.80 384 61.06 16.69
year 2 1383 65.83 14.37 346 66.22 18.02 215 68.16 19.17
year 3 1186 69.44 14.25 253 70.26 17.41 134 74.75 18.98
year 4 1043 72.88 14.56 189 74.05 18.57 93 77.46 19.86
year 5 851 76.57 14.88 135 76.51 18.46 61 78.00 16.99
Note: The upper panel refers to apprentices trained at a firm with less than 50 employees, while the lower panel
refers to apprentices trained at a firm with at least 50 employees.
Table 5.8 presents numbers of observations and average wages for the first five years
of the first job, for those who do not change job. The strong fall of the numbers of
observations over the years reflects the large mobility for the graduated apprentices,
particularly for movers. Almost 48 percent of the instantaneous movers leave their first
post-apprenticeship job during the first full calender year, versus 37 percent of the stayers.
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These 'attrition rates' fall to 30 percent for movers and 21 percent for stayers in the fourth
year. This fall can be due to heterogeneity as well as duration dependence.
For the apprentices trained at firms with less than 50 employees, both groups of
movers earn significantly more than the stayers for all years. For the apprentices trained at
larger firms, the average wage of the instantaneous movers is lower than that of stayers in
the first year. In the later years the wage difference is insignificant. For the later movers -
who spend a short time working for their training firm after finishing apprenticeship - wages
tend to be higher than for stayers and instantaneous movers. Wage dispersion among the
instantaneous movers is substantially larger than among stayers. This difference remains
stable over the first five years in the first job and holds for those trained at large as well as
small firms.
To get more insight in the distribution of wages of movers and stayers, we estimated
the densities using kernels, using the sample of Table 5.8.12 Figure 5.1 shows the estimated
log wage densities for the three groups, for workers trained in small plants (less than 50
employees, Figure  5.1 a) and large plants (at least 50 employees, Figure  5.1 b) separately.  The
distributions for movers as well as stayers are unimodal. The stayers' distributions are
skewed to the left, particularly for the small firm trainees. As expected from Table 5.3, the
dispersion is larger for movers than for stayers. The shape of the distributions hardly changes
over the years, but dispersion decreases.
5.4 Empirical Results
We use the data described in the previous section to test the empirical validity of the model
in Section 5.2. The empirical implications discussed there concern wage differentials
according to OLS-estimates, estimates of a switching regression model in which the
mover-stayer decision is endogenous, wage dispersion,   and job level.   We will discuss these
issues in four separate subsections, focusing on the first year of the first job. In the last
subsection we address the issue of attrition and also consider wages in later years.
I2
See, for example, Haerdle and Linton (1994). We used the Gaussian Kernel and chose the bandwidth by
Silverman's rule of thumb (Silverman (1986)).
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Table 5.9: wage regressions, OLS, all firms
training firm employing firm
characteristics characteristics
(6451 observations) (6371 observations)
(years 1978-1990) (years 1978-1990)
P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E.
Base Case
MOVE(1) 0.006 0.009 0.019. 0.010
MOVE(2) 0.045- 0.010 0.057" 0.010
Interaction
M(1)_1 0.060- 0.019 0.000 0.021
M(1)_10 0.021 0.024 0.016 0.025
M(1)_20 0.001 0.019 0.023 0.020
M(1)_50 0.021 0.024 0.047' 0.026
M(1)_100 -0.018 0.019 0.007 0.020
M(1)_500 -0.050' 0.028 0.040 0.029
M(1)_1000 -0.072- 0.023 0.044' 0.024
M(2)_1 0.118- 0.019 0.061- 0.019
M(2)_10 0.082- 0.022 0.057- 0.023
M(2)_20 0.013 0.024 0.043* 0.024
M(2)_50 0.039' 0.023 0.066- 0.023
M(2)_100 0.018 0.022 0.040* 0.022
M(2)_500 -0.034 0.053 0.064 0.058
M(2)_1000 -0.071' 0.041 0.080.. 0.039
Note: we correct for month, year, age. nationality and abitur at the moment of observation of the wage, see Table
5.C. 1 of Appendix 5.C. In the left panel we correct for occupation, sector of industry and firm size of the training
firm, while in the right panel we correct for these of the employing firm (and not of the training firm). M(1)_1 is the
group MOVE(1) trained  at firm  with  1  to  9 employees.  M(2)_10  is the group MOVE(2) trained  at  firm  with   10  to  19
employees, etcetera. Standard Errors (S.E.) are Eicker-White standard errors. Parameter Estimates (P.E.) marked with
* and ** are significant at 10 and 5 percent significance level, respectively.
0LS estimates
In the OLS regressions, we first control for individual characteristics as well as for
characteristics of the type of apprenticeship and the training firm. In Section 5.2 we
concluded that the mover-stayer differential should be positive if mobility costs dominate,
and negative  if the asymmetric information argument is important. Results for the base
specification, without interaction terms, are presented in Table 5.C. 1 in Appendix 5.C. The
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included characteristics are marital status, age and age squared at the end of apprenticeship, a
dummy for foreign nationality, and a dummy for high general education level (Abimr). We
include quarterly dummies for spells which end during the year, to take account of seasonal
extra payments such as Christmas money. These additional payments are included in the
wage   measure   from 1984 onwards,   and we therefore also include interactions of quarterly
dummies  with a dummy with value   1   after   1984. Year dummies are included to account  for
macro-economic effects. Dummies for the size of the apprenticeship firm are included, since
the nature of the apprenticeship in small firms is different from that in large firms. We also
included dummies for the sector and the occupational group during apprenticeship.
According to the year dummies, real wages did not change much until 1985 (ceteris
paribus), but increased substantially thereafter. Dummies for the sectors of industry show
significant differences, with the construction sector paying quite well. Plant size dummies are
significant and confirm that wages increase monotonically with size of the training firm.
Results on wage differentials are presented in Table 5.9.13 We allow for separate
wage differentials for the two groups of movers compared to the stayers. The differential for
the instantaneous movers (MOVE(1)) is positive but insignificant. On the other hand, the
later movers (MOVE(2)) earn significantly more than both the stayers and the instantaneous
movers. This can imply that this group has also benefited from the post-apprenticeship
experience at the training firm. It can also be explained by the fact that this group consists of
high ability workers: unlike the instantaneous movers, they got an offer from the training
firm, and this is observed by the outside firms. The theory of asymmetric information
predicts that their wages are higher than those of other movers. In any case, this shows that
the short job at the training firm after graduation is more than an extended apprenticeship.
In Table 5.9 we also present the estimated wage differentials when we allow for
interactions with size of the training firm, controlling for the same variables as above. For
both groups of movers, the mover-stayer differential decreases almost monotonically with
firm size. For the instantaneous movers, it changes from significantly positive  for the
smallest training firms, to significantly negative for the largest firms. For the later movers,
the pattern is similar, and the differential between the two groups of movers hardly varies
with firm size. Thus the asymmetric information argument could be relevant for apprentices
at large firms, but less so for those at small firms. This is also suggested by Acemoglu and
13 Throughout, we use the Eicker-White standard errors, allowing for heteroskedasticity of unknown form.
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Pischke (1996), who restrict their empirical analysis to the large firms. For apprentices at
small firms, the mobility costs argument may dominate.
These results seem in contrast with those of Harhoff and Kane (1997, Table 3). They
estimated cross-section wage differentials of workers who left their training firm at different
points in their career. They find positive and significant differentials for those who moved
immediately or within one year, with larger differentials for industrial (large) than for crafts
(small) firms. All their estimates turn small and insignificant when they control for additional
schooling after apprenticeship. It is hard to compare their results directly to ours, since they
work with wages of workers at very different stages in their career, while we use a
homogeneous sample of workers in the first year of the first job after apprenticeship.
The final columns of Table 5.9 give the estimated differentials when characteristics of
the job after apprenticeship are included (job level and employing firm characteristics
including plant size), instead of the training firm characteristics. The negative differentials
between instantaneous movers and stayers for the large training firms vanish. This differential
turns positive for every size of the training firm, though insignificant at the 5 percent level.
This finding corresponds to the prediction that, due to institutional constraints, wage
differentials between similar jobs are unlikely. Additional regressions show that this result is
mainly due to including plant size of the employing firm. Wages are positively correlated to
this. Although training firm size and employing firm size are strongly correlated, it is still the
case that many trainees at large firms will more often move to a smaller firm, while few
move to an even larger firm. The earnings loss associated with the move to a smaller firm
explains the earnings differential with similar workers who stay at the large firm. This
explains why the differential in the first column of the table is negative for large firms and
positive for small firms. Moreover, movers from large training firms are worse off than
similar stayers in the sense that they less often get a position as a skilled worker, which also
partly explains why they tend to get a lower wage.
A more general way to correct for employing firm characteristics is to include firm
specific effects which are allowed to be correlated with the regressors, including the mover-
stayer dummy. Firm specific effects should not play a role if the labour market is
competitive and are not incorporated in the model of Section 5.2. They can be incorporated
by including a dummy for each firm.14 In our sample 326 firms are represented more than
14 This is the usual fixed effects estimator in panel data models. See, e.g., Baltagi (1995, Chapter 2).
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once, employing 915 workers in the first year after their apprenticeship. 178 of these are
instantaneous movers, 98 initially stay but move before January. The results controlling for
firm specific effects are based upon this sample of 915 workers. To save space, we do not
present the results in detail. An F-test on the firm specific effects shows that they are jointly
significant. The differentials between instantaneous movers and stayers change substantially
compared to Table    5.9. As expected however, the precision    of the estimates decreases
enormously, particularly for the smaller training firm sizes. All differentials are insignificant
at the 5 percent level. For the largest training firms, the number of observations is reasonably
large. For this group in particular, the estimate becomes negligibly small. This suggests that
the negative differential for the largest firms in the left hand panel of Table 5.9 is due to the
fact that those who leave a large training firm end up at a relatively unproductive firm. They
do not earn less than comparable workers who were trained there. This is in line with the
results in the Table 5.9, since the relatively unproductive firm will often be smaller than the
training firm. Size of the employing plant is captured in the firm specific effect.
The results in Table 5.9 are based upon a sample including the trainees in the
construction sector. Apprenticeships in this sector are different from those in other sectors,
since construction is the only sector in which the apprenticeship programme is not voluntarily
financed by the firms (Acemoglu and Pischke (1996)). Deleting the construction sector from
the sample, however, hardly affects the results. Size, magnitude, and significance levels
remain very much the same. Another sensitivity check concerns the out-of-labour-force
spells. Additional controls for whether such a spell was present and for the duration of such a
spell, did not alter the estimates of the wage differentials. Interactions of the mover-stayer
dummies with these controls will be discussed below. Similarly, controls for unemployment
spells were insignificant and did not affect the wage differentials.
To obtain results comparable to those of Acemoglu and Pischke (1996), we now focus
on the sample of workers trained at a large firm (at least 50 employees), excluding the
workers trained in the construction sector. Results are summarized in Table 5.10. We find a
significantly negative differential for instantaneous movers of 2.9 percent. This corresponds
to the asymmetric information argument that stayers have, on average, larger unobserved
ability than movers. The differential disappears when employing firm characteristics and job
level are controlled for, as in Table 5.9. For the later movers - who have initially accepted a
job offer at their training firm - the wage differential with the stayers is zero, and the
differential with the instantaneous movers is positive. This is also in line with the asymmetric
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information argument: the negative signal that the training firm has not offered a job upon
graduation, applies to the instantaneous movers but not to the later movers. If employing firm
characteristics are also controlled for, the later movers earn significantly more than the other
groups. They are freed from the monopsony rent of the stayers, and do not carry the negative
ability signal of the instantaneous movers.
Table 5.10: wage regressions, OLS, large training firms (250 employees)
training firm employing firm
characteristics characteristics
(2659 observations) (2639 observations)
(years 1978-1990) (years 1978-1990)
P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E.
Base Case
MOVE(1) -0.029- 0.012 0.008 0.014
MOVE(2) -0.006 0.016 0.036- 0.015
Interaction
M(1)_0 -0.030- 0.012 0.008 0.015
M(1)_1 -0.091 0.056 -0.061 0.054
M(1)_6 0.096 0.110 0.200' 0.112
M(1)_14 -0.209** 0.096 -0.156' 0.091
M(1)_17 0.062 0.063 0.079 0.059
M(2)_0 -0.006 0.016 0.033- 0.016
M(2)_1 -0.092- 0.039 0.056 0.094
M(2)_6 0.210 0.237 0.179 0.182
M(2)_14                  - -                                               - -                     - -
M(2)_17 0.180- 0.051 0.343" 0.051
Note: we correct for month, year, age, nationality and abitur at the moment of observation of the wage, see previous
table. In the left panel we correct for occupation, sector of industry and firm size of the training firm, while in the
right panel we correct for these of the employing firm. M(1)_0 is group MOVE(1) with an out-of-labour-force
duration of 0 months, M(2)_1 is group MOVE(2) with an out-of-labourforce duration of 1 to 5 months, etcetera.
M(2)_14 does not contain observations. Standard Errors (S.E.) are Eicker-White standard errors. Parameter Estimates
(P.E.) marked with * and ** are significant at 10 and 5 percent significance level, respectively.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1996) emphasize the difference between military quitters and
other movers. In our data, military quitters are included as movers with an out-of-labour-
force spell. Whether or not someone is a military quitter is related to the duration of this
spell. Table 5.10 therefore also presents wage differentials interacted with length-of-spell
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dummies. The findings are remarkable: the mover-stayer differential varies substantially with
the length of the spell. For instantaneous movers with no out-of-labour-force spell, the
differential with the stayers is significantly negative. This is also the case for those with a       I
spell  of  14  to 17 months, the group which will contain most military quitters. Their negative
differential is quite large, much larger than for the movers who start their job immediately.
This is not in line with the asymmetric information theory or with Acemoglu and Pischke
(1996), who find a positive differential between military quitters and other movers. For both
groups of movers, the differential for those with a very long out-of-labour-force spell is
positive, and for the later movers this is significant. This probably concerns people who
attended additional full-time schooling after their apprenticeship graduation.
Endogenous Switching Regression Results
The model in Section 5.2 is an endogenous switching regression model. We estimated several
specifications of this. First, we discuss the results concerning the mover-stayer selection
equation, and then control for endogeneity of this decision in the wage equations. We focus
on stayers and instantaneous movers, and discard the group of later movers (MOVE(2)).
The decision to leave the training firm upon graduation or not is described by
equation (5.6). To identify the wage equation non-parametrically, we need some variable in
Di which is excluded from the wage equation. We use information on the number of firm
closures per industry in the respective year, on a two digit industry level. We expect that a
higher percentage of firm closures in the industry will lead to a higher probability of a firm
separation, and thus to a higher probability of moving. We also use marital status at the end
of apprenticeship. Apart from these instruments, we include the individual and training firm
characteristics that are also in the wage equation. Since the firm closure rate is available
from   1980   only, the analysis is limited   to a sample for apprentices who graduated since
1980. This limits the number of observations to 4514 (so with MOVE(2) excluded, and small
as well as large training firms included).
We should admit that these exclusion restrictions are open to criticism. Appropriate
exclusion restrictions are hard to find in this type of model, as is also admitted by, for
example, Gibbons and Katz (1991). They do not impose exclusion restrictions and identify
their selection model on the basis of functional form restrictions. We will check the
sensitivity of our results with respect to the exclusion restrictions.
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We assume that the error term in (5.6) is standard normal and independent of the
regressors. Results for the probit selection equation are presented in Appendix 5.C (Table
5.C.2). We consider trainees at small as well as large plants.15 There are significant
differences between occupational groups and sectors of the economy. For example, a worker
in the services sector has a larger probability of moving than in the banking and insurance
sector (the reference group), ceteris paribus. Much more pronounced, however, are the
effects of age at the end of apprenticeship and of pre-apprenticeship general training. Older
graduates have a larger probability of moving. Graduates with high general education level
have a larger probability of staying than others. We find a significant and monotonically
negative impact of training firm size on the probability to move. This is in line with the idea
that large firms operate internal labour markets and train apprentices to fulfil their own
demand for skilled labour. The firm closure ratio in the industry has the unexpected positive
Sign and is not significant. Being married at the end of apprenticeship has a significantly
negative impact. This supports the mobility cost argument: married apprentices may have
larger costs of mobility.
We considered various specifications of the complete model in Section 5.2. We focus
on the specification in which the restriction is imposed that the slope coefficients in the wage
equations (5.3) and (5.4) are equal for the two regimes (movers and stayers), except for the
plant size dummies. This corresponds   to the specifications in Table   5.9.16 The endogeneity
problem in the wage equation arises if the error term in (5.6) is correlated with the error term
in the wage equation. According to the model in Section 5.2, the correlation is different for
movers and stayers. For stayers, asymmetric information implies a positive correlation, while
mobility costs imply a negative correlation. For movers however, a zero correlation can be
expected. We therefore allow for different correlations for the two groups. Assuming
trivariate normality of the error terms, both correlations can be accounted for by including
separate Heckman correction terms for movers and stayers. This is a straightforward
modification of the two stage method for the selection model in Heckman (1976).
15 For the subsample of trainees trained at large firms, most results are similar but less accurate - the sample
then contains only 1848 observations.
I6 ML estimates of the more flexible standard switching model - with separate equations for movers' and
stayers' wages; see Maddala (1983) - lead to similar conclusions.
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Table 5.11: wage regressions, correction for selection, all firms, MOVE(2) excluded
2154 obs. P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E. P.E. S.E.
yrs 82-90
1 th  order
correction                                                                                                                              1
M(1)_1 0.058- 0.021 0.017 0.031 -0.078 0.079
M(1)_10 -0.029 0.026 -0.006 0.034 -0.025 0.082
M(1)_20 0.009 0.020 -0.025 0.029 -0.123 0.080
M(1)_50 0.043' 0.024 0.010 0.032 -0.088 0.081
M(1)_100 -0.018 0.020 -0.049 0.030 -0.149' 0.080
M(1)_500 -0.034 0.029 -0.064' 0.034 -0.163- 0.081
M(1)_1000 -0.053- 0.024 -0.077- 0.028 -0.182- 0.084




M(1)_l 0.058- 0.021 0.022 0.055 -0.453 0.299
M(1)_10 -0.029 0.026 -0.003 0.057 -0.478 0.298
M(11_20 0.009 0.020 -0.022 0.053 -0.494 0.298
M(1)_50 0.043' 0.024 0.012 0.054 -0.465 0.299
M(1)_100 -0.018 0.020 -0.048 0.053 -0.519' 0.297
M(1)_500 -0.034 0.029 -0.063 0.056 -0.537' 0.301
M(1)_1000 -0.053- 0.024 -0.079 0.050 -0.547' 0.299
stayers 27.56" (4) 40.20" (4)
movers 8.00' (4)
Note: for additional variables and definitions, see previous tables. 1mbd,=4)(Di'6)/(14(Di'6)) and
Imbd,=0(Di' 6)/(I)(Di'6), in which Di'6 follows  from the probit for leaving the training firm. Standard Errors  (S.E.)  are
Eicker-White standard errors,   the   fact   that   6 is estimated   in   the   fi rst round   is not taken into account. Parameter
Estimates (P.E.) marked with * and ** are significant at 10 and 5 percent significance level, respectively. The high
order correction includes  the   lambda' s  until the fourth power,  and the corresponding  P.E.   are  the %2-test statistics   for
joint significance, which have 4 degrees of freedom.
The main results are presented in Table 5.11. The mover-stayer dummy is interacted
with the size of the apprenticeship firm. The left hand column contains the estimates without
correcting for endogeneity. Although the sample is smaller - the early years and the group of
later movers are removed - the results are similar to those in Table 5.9. The mover-stayer
differential varies from significantly positive for the smallest firms to significantly negative
for the largest firms. In the middle column, a correction term for stayers only is added. The
significantly negative differential for large firms remains, the differentials for smaller firms
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become small and insignificant. In the third column we have added two separate correction
terms for movers and stayers. All mover-stayer differentials are now negative. For the small
firms, they are insignificant, but they are significant for larger firms, and much larger in
absolute magnitude than without correction.
This is not in line with the theory of asymmetric information which predicts that the
negative differential for large firms should vanish once unobserved heterogeneity is
controlled for. Moreover, asymmetric information would predict a nonnegative correlation
between the error terms in selection equation and stayers' wage equation, but the sign of the
correction term implies the opposite (insignificant in column 2, significant in column 3). The
correction term for the movers, on the other hand, is insignificant, as theory predicts.
The result on the correction terms is in line with the mobility cost theory: if training
firms underpay workers with large costs of mobility, this leads to a positive correlation
between the errors in moving decision and wage equation for stayers. On the other hand,
mobility costs lead to smaller wages for stayers, but we find that, ceteris paribus, stayers
earn more than movers. Thus our empirical evidence supports neither of the two theories.
The results presented above may be due to the choice of exclusion restrictions and the
model specification. We have checked the sensitivity of the wage differential estimates. If
one common correction term for movers and stayers is included, the wage differentials are
Similar to those in column  1. The correction  term is insignificant.  If the firm closure  rate  is
included in the wage equation, it becomes significantly negative, but this hardly changes the
wage differential estimates. A similar result is found if marital status is also included.
To allow for potential nonnormality of the errors in the wage equation, we have also
included higher order terms of Heckman's lambda, following Newey (1988).17 In this way,
any correction term which is a smooth function of x'y can be approximated. In the bottom
panel of Table 5.11, we present the results for the case that terms up to order four are
included. If we include the correction term for stayers only, the results do not change much
compared to the standard Heckman case. If we also include the correction for movers (which
is unnecessary according to theory), we get inaccurate and implausible results, reflecting the
limited quality of our exclusion restrictions. At the 5 percent level, the correction terms
remain jointly significant for stayers and not for movers. Polynomials with different degrees
lead to similar conclusions.
17 In this version, we have not adjusted the standard errors for the estimation error in Heckman's lambda.
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Table 5.12: wage dispersion
6451 obs.



















Note: the dependent variable is the logarithm of the squared residual of the wage equation considered in the left
panel of Table 5.9. We correct for month, year, age, nationality and abitur at the moment of observation of the wage.
For occupation, sector of industry and firm size we correct at the end of the training. M(1)_1 is the group MOVE(1)
trained  at   firm   with   1   to 9 employees,  M(2)_10  is the group MOVE(1)  trained  at   firm  with   10  to 19 employees,
etcetera. Parameter Estimates (P.E.) marked  with  *   and  ** are significant   at   10  and 5 percent significance level,
respectively.
Wage Dispersion
Asymmetric information and mobility costs cannot explain that wage dispersion among
movers is larger than among stayers. In the model in Section 5.2, we therefore already
introduced a match specific error term E. for movers. In Section 5.3 we saw that in the raw
data, wage dispersion among movers is larger than among stayers (Table 5.8 and Figure 5.1).
Here we look at this in more detail for wages in the first year. In particular, we check
whether the difference in dispersion persist when individual and training firm characteristics
are controlled for. Formally, let u denote the error term in the wage equation, and assume
that    V(u)    =   6 exp(z'a) (exponential heteroskedasticity), where z includes individual    and
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training firm characteristics (see Table   5.C. 1)   and   the two dummies for instantaneous   and
later movers. We computed the OLS residuals E of the regression in the first column of Table
5.9. We then regressed In(£2) on z. This leads to consistent estimates of the parameter a.
Table 5.12 shows the results. Wage dispersion in typical primary industry jobs, white collar
occupations, and in service sector jobs is larger than in the banking sector. The variance
increases with age, and is larger for non-Germans than for Germans. It is significantly larger
for those trained at the smallest firms than for others. Even after controlling for differentials
in the mean and variance due to the other characteristics, the difference between stayers and
movers remains. The variance for instantaneous movers is almost 50 percent larger than for
stayers. For the later movers, the difference with the stayers is about 30 percent. Both
numbers are significant. These differences are in the same order of magnitude as the raw
data. The difference in dispersion between movers and stayers is not explained by the
individual or training firm characteristics. This suggests that the matching process is quite
important. The movers end up in very different jobs, while jobs offered by training firms are
more homogeneous. Neither of the two theories allow for this.
Job Level
The theory of asymmetric information implies that stayers have higher ability than movers
with similar observed characteristics. This leads to the prediction that stayers will get a job
of a higher level than similar movers. Our information on job level in the data is limited: the
only  distinction is skilled versus unskilled.  Table 5.3 showed that stayers more often  get  a
job as a skilled worker than movers. To investigate whether this is Still the case if other
characteristics are controlled for, we estimated a probit model for the binary variable skilled
(0) versus unskilled  (1):8 As expected,  both the sector  of the apprenticeship  and the sector
of the employing firm are significant. The latter corresponds to the fact that the distinction
between skilled and unskilled is sector specific. Occupational group dummies concerning the
type of apprenticeship are also strongly significant. The same holds for training firm size.
Apprentices at firms with less than 10 employees are more likely to get a position as skilled
worker than others. This is probably because they more often find a job in the crafts sector,
in which many employees are registered as skilled workers.
18 The results are presented in Table 5.C.3 in Appendix 5.C.
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Movers have a smaller probability to become skilled workers than stayers. ceteris
paribus. This effect is strongly significant and holds for instantaneous movers (MOVE(1)) as           I
well as later movers (MOVE(2)). Interacting with training firm size shows that this effect is
significant for all groups except the largest (2 1000 employees). For the larger firms, the
effect is smaller than for the small training firms. An explanation could be that asymmetric
information is more important in small than in large firms, but this seems to go against the
common opinion in the literature and the conclusions based upon the first year wage
differentials in Table 5.9. An alternative interpretation is that in small firms, the apprentices
also learn firm specific skills which are essential to become skilled workers. These specific
skills are lost when they move to another firm. In large firms, the apprenticeship program is
more formalized and oriented towards learning general skills.
Attrition and Wages in Later Years
Many stayers and movers have already left their first job before January (see Table 5.1)
Thus sample attrition is substantial already if we consider wages in the first year. This
problem becomes even more serious if we analyse wages in later years (see Table 5.8). This
mobility may lead to attrition bias, if leaving the first job is correlated with potential
earnings. To take account of this, we specify the following equation explaining whether or
not the individual retains his job (bit.>0) in year t (t=1,2,3....) or not (bit'<0) (we ignore the
group MOVE(2)):
bit' = Bi'6, + ui, (5.7)
The probability P(bit. > 0) can be interpreted as a survival probability. It is modeled as a
function of observed individual and training firm characteristics and the mover dummy,
contained in the vector Bi.
We use the same specification of the wage equation as before. The wage now refers
to year t in the first job (t=l,2,3,.) There could be a positive correlation between the error
term in the wage equation and u,t, leading to an attrition bias. For example, people with
higher potential wage may have a smaller tendency to leave their job. Alternatively, those
with high (unobserved) ability might also have better opportunities in the outside market, and
may therefore have a larger probability to quit. To identify the attrition bias non-
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parametrically we include variables in B, which are not in x,. As in the equation for the
mover-stayer decision, we use the number of firms which close down per industry. Due to
lack of appropriate instruments, we do not allow for endogeneity of the initial mover-stayer
decision here.w We assume   that the error terms are independent   of the regressors   and
bivariate normal (with the variance of uit normalized to unity) and use the standard two step
estimator of Heckman (1976).
We focus on the first, second and third year. Results for later years are inaccurate,
due to the falling number of observations. We present the estimation results of equation (5.7)
in Appendix 5.C, Table 5.C.4. Mobility decreases significantly with firm size. Movers from
larger firms are significantly more mobile than stayers, while there are no significant
differences between movers and stayers for the smaller firms.m We find the expected
positive relation between mobility and the industry specific closure ratio, and it is significant
for years 2 and 3.
The wage differentials correcting and not correcting for potential attrition bias are
presented in Table 5.13. The correction term for attrition bias is always negative. It is
significant  at  the 5 percent level  in the second and third  year,  and  at  the 10 percent level  in
the first year. Including the correction for attrition increases the overall mover-stayer wage
differential (without interaction terms) substantially. It becomes significantly positive in all
three years. Including interaction terms with training firm size shows that this is due to the
large firms. The correction term hardly affects the estimated wage differentials for the
smaller firms. The negative differential  for the large firms  in  year 1, however, disappears.  In
years 2 and 3, including the correction term changes the mover-stayer differential from close
to zero to substantially positive, and significant for various firm size categories.
The explanation of these findings is unobserved heterogeneity among the movers. A
large group of high wage movers from large training firms tend to stay in their first job for a
short period only. The movers whose wage is measured therefore have a low wage, on
average. Not accounting for this attrition effect leads to downward biased estimates of the
wages of movers. This is an alternative explanation for the negative mover-stayer differential
for large firms according to the OLS results for the first year.
19 In principle, endogeneity of d, can de accounted for by adding correction terms to the regression. This
requires various instruments to identify both effects simultaneously.
20 We include training firm size variables. If employing firm size is included, the results are similar.
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Table 5.13: wage regressions, correction for attrition, all firms
Base case first order higher order
correction correction




M(1)_l 0.056- 0.020 0.064- 0.020 0.065" 0.020
M(1)_10 0.025 0.026 0.014 0.026 0.012 0.026
M(1)_20 0.007 0.020 0.009 0.020 0.010 0.020
M(1)_50 0.047' 0.025 0.062" 0.026 0.064- 0.026
M(1)_100 -0.014 0.020 0.009 0.024 0.012 0.024
M(1)_500 -0.037 0.029 -0.007 0.033 -0.004 0.033
M(1)_1000 -0.053- 0.023 -0.018 0.029 -0.014 0.030




M(1)_l O,091" 0.024 0,097- 0.024 0.096- 0.024
M(1)_10 0.049' 0.028 0.066- 0.028 0.065- 0.028
M(1)_20 0.019 0.026 0.066- 0.029 0.06f' 0.030
M(1)_50 0.095- 0.033 0.179- 0.040 0.174- 0.040
M(1)_100 0.008 0.024 0.080- 0.033 0.077- 0.035
M(1)_500 0.006 0.028 0.073- 0.033 0.073- 0.035
M(1)_1000 -0.007 0.028 0.058' 0.032 0.062' 0.035




M(1)_1 0.084- 0.027 0,093- 0.027 0.092- 0.027
M(1)_10 -0.031 0.040 -0.016 0.041 -0.019 0.041
M(1)_20 0.079- 0.028 0.109- 0.030 0.106- 0.030
M(1)_50 0.076- 0.038 0.123- 0.043 0.121- 0.042
M(1)_100 0.038' 0.021 0.091" 0.031 0.077" 0.031
M(1)_500 0.044 0.029 0.114" 0.044 0.093- 0.044




Note: we correct for month, year, age, nationality and abitur at the moment of observation of the wage. M(1)_1 is the
group MOVE(1) trained at firm with 1 to 9 employees, M(2)_10 is the group MOVE(1) trained at firm with 10 to 19
employees, etcetera. Standard Errors (S.E.) are Eicker-White standard errors, the fact that lambda is estimated in the
first round is not taken into account. Parameter Estimates (P.E.) marked with * and ** are significant at 10 and 5
percent significance level, respectively. The high order correction includes the lambda's until the fourth power. and
the corresponding P.E. are the %2-test statistics for joint significance, which have 4 degrees of freedom.
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We have checked the robustness of these results for some specification choices.
Including a higher order polynomial of the correction term to allow for nonnormal error
terms, does not change the conclusions. Estimates and standard errors are similar to those
correcting for attrition in the standard way. The higher order terms are insignificant.
The sector specific firm closure ratio is the main instrument in the attrition equation
which is excluded from the wage equation in the base specification. If, however, the closure
ratio is included as a regressor in the wage equation, the attrition correction term becomes
insignificant, but the closure ratio itself is significantly negative. An explanation might be
that in industries with many firm closures, unions accept lower wages. For the wage
differentials between movers and stayers trained at small firms, including the closure ratio in
the wage equations makes little difference. For those trained at large firms however, the
estimates are close to those without correcting for attrition bias, though the standard errors
are larger. For the first year the estimates of the wage differentials for the two largest firm
size categories are -4.3 percent and -4.4 percent, with standard errors 3.2 percent and 2.9
percent, respectively.
5.5 Summary and Conclusions
We have sketched a model incorporating asymmetric information and mobility costs and
analysed its implications for wages and job position of movers and stayers after apprentice-
ship graduation. The findings of our empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. The
raw wage differential between instantaneous movers and stayers in the first year of the first
job after apprenticeship is positive for small firm trainees and negative for large firm
trainees. This differential remains if individual and training firm characteristics are controlled
for. Controlling also for employing firm characteristics, and particularly the size of the
employing firm, reduces the differentials and turns them insignificant. In the second and third
year of the first job, the positive differential for the small firm trainees pertains, but the
negative differential for the large firm trainees disappears.
Estimating the full switching regression model suggested by theory does not lead to
unambiguous support of either asymmetric information or mobility costs. Selection effects are
important for stayers and not for movers, as both theoretical arguments suggest. The sign of
the selection effect for stayers is in line with the mobility costs argument, and not with
asymmetric information. The mover-stayer wage differentials, however, all become negative
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and are significant for the large firms. This is neither in line with asymmetric information,
nor with mobility costs.
Wage dispersion is larger among movers than among stayers. This finding persists if
individual and apprenticeship firm characteristics are controlled for. Neither of the two
theories can explain this. It seems due to the matching process which reflects the im-
perfection of the outside labour market. This leads to additional variation in movers' wages.
Stayers are significantly more often employed as skilled workers than movers. This is          4
apparent from the raw data (Table 5.3), but a probit analysis shows that it remains valid if
individual characteristics and plant size, industry and occupational group effects are
controlled for. This supports the asymmetric information argument which implies that
training firms pick out their best workers - and give them the skilled jobs. A closer look,
however, reveals that the effect is mainly valid for those trained at the smaller firms. Thus a
better explanation could be that in small firms in the crafts sector, apprenticeship training
also involves learning firm specific skills. These increase the probability of becoming a
skilled worker for stayers.
Many workers leave their first job already after a short period. This leads to attrition
in our sample of observed first year wages. Controlling for the attrition reduces the negative
mover-stayer differential for the workers trained at large firms and makes it insignificant.
Thus an alternative explanation for this differential is that productive movers tend to move
again quite fast.
The existing empirical analysis to support the various theories explaining the rationale
of the apprenticeship system, is partial and limited by the nature of the data. We have used a
new and rich data set allowing us to analyse a relatively homogeneous group in the first job
after their apprenticeship. This enabled us to analyse the empirical implications of the various
theories more completely. The results, however, are mixed. None of the theories receives
unambiguous support. Further research seems necessary, both theoretical and empirical. In
particular, the large dispersion among the wages of movers suggests that the competitive
view of the outside labour market might be very unrealistic. A job search framework in
which the number of outside job offers is limited, therefore seems promising.
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Figure la: wage distributions, small training firms
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Figure lb: wage distributions, large training firms
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Appendix 5.A: Timing of Observation
We present some examples to illustrate how the three groups (stayers, instantaneous movers,
later movers) are defined and how the wage in the first year of the first job is constructed
from the spell information in the data.
Example 1
spell 1: - ??? 85   : apprenticeship at firm A
spell 2:   ??? 85   - Jan 86 : employed at firm A
spell 3:   Jan 86  - Oct 86 : employed at firm A
spell 4:   Oct 86 - : employed at firm B
stayer (STAY); wage refers to Jan 86 - Oct 86
Example 2
spell 1: - ??? 85   : apprenticeship at firm A
spell 2:   ??? 85   - Aug 85 : employed at firm A
spell  3:     Aug 85  - Jan 86 : temporary out of job (at firm A)
spell 4:    Jan 86   - Aug 86 : temporary out of job (at firm A)
spell 5:   Aug 86 - Oct 86  : out of labour force
spell 6:   Nov 86 - Jan 87 : employed at firm A
spell 7:   Jan 87   - Jan 88 : employed at firm A
stayer (STAY), with interruption due to military service; last three months
of service registered as out of labour force spell; no first year wage observed.
Example 3
spell 1: - Oct 85 : apprenticeship at firm A
spell 2:   Oct 85  - Jan 86 : employed at firm B
spell 3:   Jan 86  - Oct 86 : employed at firm B
spell 4:   Oct 86 - : employed at firm C
instantaneous mover (MOVE(1)); wage refers to Jan 86 - Oct 86.
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Example 4
spell 1: - ??? 85   : apprenticeship at firm A
spell 2:   ??? 85   - Oct 85 : employed at firm A
spell 3:  Oct 85  - Jan 86 : employed at firm B
spell 4:   Jan 86  - Jan 87 : employed at firm B
later mover (MOVE(2)); wage refers to Jan 86 - Jan 87.
Example 5
spell 1: - Oct 85 : apprenticeship at firm A
spell 2:   Oct 85  - Jan 86 : unemployed
spell 3:   Jan 86  - Mar 86 : unemployed
spell 4:   Mar 86  - Jan 87 : employed at firm B
spell 5:   Jan 87  - Mar 87 : employed at firm B
spell 6:   Mar 87 - : employed at firm C
instantaneous mover (MOVE(1)); wage refers to Jan 87 - Mar 87.
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Appendix 5.B: Classification of occupation and industry
For many parts of our analysis the classification of occupation and industry is too specific.
We observe 276 occupations and 94 industries, which leaves only a few observations for
certain cells. Therefore we classify them at a one-digit level. For the occupations we use the
classification of the Berufe der Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, edition  1988.
Occupation Code
1: primary,mining 10-99
2: raw material,chemics 100-149,180-249,323
3: technics 250-319,321,322
4: user goods 150-179,330-439
5: construction 441-472,481-514
6: bank,insurance 691-706




1: primary, mining 0-8
2: raw material,chemics 9-11,13,14,17-20,22,40
3: investment goods 21,23,24,26-37
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Appendix 5.C: Estimation Results
Table 5.C.1: Wage regression, first year (OLS, Eicker-White standard errors)
Number of obs =  6451
R-squared =  0.3304
Adj R-squared =  0.3262
Root MSE = .254712
log(wage) Coef. Std. Err.



















oa_whit -.082"    .019




















cons 3.221"    .399
jan =  Dummy for end of observation period in the months
January, February or March. See Section 5.4.
jan84 -  Interaction for dummy jan and dummy for wage observed in or after 1984.
year87 =  Dummy for year of observation 1987 or 1988.
oa_.. =  Dummies for occupation at apprenticeship training firm, see
Appendix 5.B. Reference group is OA_BANK.
ia_.... =  Dummies for industry of apprenticeship training firm, see
Appendix 5.B. Reference group is IA_BANK.
fsa_10 = Dummy for training firm with 10 to 19 employees. Reference group is FSA_1.
age -  Age in year of observation.
age2 =  Age in year of observation squared.
notg -  Dummy for not having the German nationality.
abit =  Dummy for having high general education level (abitur).
Note: Parameters marked with  *  and  "  are  significant  at  10  or  5  percent
significance level.
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Table 5.C.2: Probit for leaving the training firm
Response Variable: MOVEl

































EA80 =  Dummy for ending apprenticeship in 1980 or 1981.
AGEA =  Age at end of apprenticeship.
MARA =  Dummy for being married at end of apprenticeship.
CRATIO = Closure ratio of firms at the industry level.
Note: For definitions of other variables, see previous table.
Parameters marked with * and ** are significant at 10 or 5
percent significance level, respectively.
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Table 5.C.3: Probit for being an unskilled worker
Response Variable: UNSKILLED





















OA WHIT 0.011 0.2384
OA_SERV -1.168" 0.2381
IA_PRIM -0.521' 0.3058






























UNSKIL = Dummy for having job as unskilled worker
Ml_10   =  Interaction MOVEl and FSA_10
M2_10   =  Interaction MOVE2 and FSA_10
Note: For definitions of other variables, see previous tables.
Parameters marked with * and -* are significant at 10 or 5
percent significance level, respectively.
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Table 5.C.4: Probit for still being in first lob
Response Variable: STILL IN FIRST JOB








































Note: For definitions of the variables, see previous tables.
Parameters marked with * and ** are significant at 10 or 5
percent significance level, respectively.
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Summary and Conclusions
6.1 Labour Supply and Labour Market Restrictions
The first part of this thesis, consisting of Chapters 2 to 4, deals with microeconometric
models of labour supply. For empirical implementation I Use the Dutch Socio Economic
Panel (SEP), which contains information on both the actual and desired working hours of the
same individuals in three consecutive years. The desired working hours are constructed from
respondents' answers to the question on how many hours they would like to work, if they
could choose their number of working hours freely. This kind of data is often referred to as
'subjective' data. In this thesis I define subjective data as data which are conceived in the
minds of the respondents, and which can only be provided by the respondents themselves.
In economics, the use of subjective data is not (yet) very common. A frequently used
criticism against the use of these data is that the reliability of the respondents' answers to
subjective questions is unclear. Still, in the case that objective data are not sufficient to
identify an economic model, the method of using subjective data might be a good alternative
to the common method of making additional assumptions. For the latter method it is common
to test the additional assumptions. So to make the method of using subjective data a serious
competitor, the assumptions on the model for the subjective data should also be tested.
Chapter 2 tests the quality of the subjective labour supply data in the Socio Economic Panel.
This serves to motivate the analysis of Chapters 3 and 4. We test whether the subjective data
have any predictive value on future outcomes of labour market behaviour. The idea is that if
the null hypothesis that the subjective labour supply data do not have predictive value is
rejected, then these data must contain some information on the preferences of the individuals.
Cross tabulations of the subjective labour supply data with future labour market outcomes
give strong correlations, in the sense that, for instance, an individual who wants to work
more hours, has a relatively high probability to work more hours the next year. But as this
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might be a result of spurious correlation, controlling for the actual working hours and
additional covariates might be important. To avoid the need of functional or distributional
assumptions, we use nonparametric tests. As these tests are practically infeasible if many
explanatory variables are included, we also use parametric tests. Overall, we find strong
evidence for women that the subjective labour supply data have predictive value. For men the
evidence is mixed: the results vary with the chosen tests and its smoothness parameters.
In the empirical literature on labour supply, several models have been developed to
incorporate constraints on working hours. These models do not address the question to which
extent working hours are constrained within and between jobs. Chapter 3 investigates the
effect of individual changes in the labour supply preferences on actual working hours. By
using the subjective information on the desired working hours the degree of adjustment of
working hours within and between jobs can be identified. The desired hours may not only
reflect preferences, but they are also allowed to be affected by the current working hours.
This potential endogeneity is taken into account by using instrumental variables techniques.
Using a sample of women in the SEP who are employed in two consecutive years, I find that
the degree of adjustment of working hours within jobs is significantly smaller than between
jobs. I also find that job mobility does not lead to a complete adjustment in working hours,
as the realized adjustment is significantly   less  than 100 percent  of the preferred adjustment.
Chapter 4 analyses the desired and actual working hours of unmarried adults. We use
a static discrete structural neoclassical model, explaining the desired working hours from the
gross wage rates, tax and benefit rules, other income, and some background variables. The
model takes account of fixed costs of working, and of prediction errors in wage rates of non-
workers. This means that in this chapter we assume that the desired hours purely reflect
preferences. In the second part of the model, we explain the actual working hours from the
desired working hours and hours restrictions. Deviations between actual and desired working
hours are used to identify equations for involuntary unemployment and the lack of part-time
jobs. The explanatory variables include age, education level, and the difference between
potential earnings and some reference (minimum) wage. For estimation we use a single
cross-section of unmarried men and women. We find larger wage elasticities of desired
working hours for women than for men. Individuals with potential earnings below their
reference wage have a significantly larger probability of involuntary unemployment than
others. And apart from involuntary unemployment, the lack of part-time jobs appears to be
an important source of hours restrictions.
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6.2 The German Apprenticeship System
The second part of this thesis, Chapter 5, contains an empirical study on the German
Apprenticeship System (GAS). The GAS combines on-the-job-training in private firms with
formal, state provided education at a postsecondary level. The general view on the GAS is
that it provides general skills, rather than firm specific skills. According to the literature,
large firms have substantial net costs to provide the apprenticeship training. An intriguing
open puzzle is therefore why large firms invest in the general skills of their apprentices.
Several alternative theories have been proposed to explain this behaviour which is not
predicted by the standard human capital theory. We consider two competing theories, which
have different implications for the wages of the graduated apprentices in their first job.
According to the cost of mobility argument, graduated apprentices who stay with the training
firm (stayers) should earn less than the graduated apprentices who leave the training firm
(movers). On the other hand, the asymmetric information theory predicts that stayers should
earn more than movers. Both theories have received some empirical support in the literature,
based upon wage differentials computed from cross-section data.
In Chapter 5 we use data from the German Social Security records, which cover the
period  from   1975  to   1990.  This  is  a very large  data set including information  on one percent
of all private sector employees in the West-Germany. It enables us to analyse a relatively
homogeneous group of workers at their early stage of their labour market career. We focus
on male apprentices who finish their apprenticeship in this period. About 60 percent in the
sample stay with their training firms, the others move to another firm immediately or shortly
after graduation. We analyse the wage differentials by firm size for the movers and stayers,
controlling for individual and training firm characteristics and self-selection. We also analyse
wage dispersion. Comparing the empirical results with the theoretical predictions, we find
that none of the theories is supported unambiguously. For example, the negative mover-stayer
differential found for large firms supports the asymmetric information theory. But this theory
cannot explain the selection effects and the larger wage dispersion for movers that we find.
Our results suggest that the matching process, which is addressed in neither of the two
theoretical models, plays an important role.
Can' t  predict the future
can't forget the past
feels like any moment
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Als iemand droomt dat hij in het paradijs is
en er wordt hem daar een bloem gegeven
en hij vindt bij het ontwaken een bloem in zijn hand.
Wat dan?
Borges
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Het eerste deel van deze dissertatie, bestaande uit hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 4, gaat over
micro-econometrische modellen van arbeidsaanbod en restricties op gewerkte uren. Voor de
empirische implementatie van deze modellen gebruik ik het Nederlandse Sociaal-Economisch
Panel (SEP), dat informatie bevat over zowel de gerealiseerde als de gewenste arbeidsuren
van dezelfde individuen   in drie opeenvolgende jaren   (1987,    1988   en    1989). De gewenste
arbeidsuren zijn geconstrueerd uit de vraag hoeveel uren de individuen zouden willen
werken, als ze hun arbeidsuren vrij zouden kunnen kiezen. Naar dit soort gegevens wordt
vaak  gerefereerd  met  de term 'subjectieve  data'.  In deze dissertatie definieer ik 'subjectieve
data' als data die alleen kunnen worden gegeven door de individuen zelf, omdat ze slechts in
hun gedachten gevormd worden.
In de economische wetenschap is het toepassen van subjectieve data (nog) niet zo
gebruikelijk. Een veel geuite kritiek is dat de betrouwbaarheid van de antwoorden op
subjectieve vragen onduidelijk is. Maar in het geval dat objectieve data alleen niet voldoende
zijn om een economisch model te identificeren, kunnen subjectieve data een goed hulpmiddel
zijn. De meer gebruikelijke methode om een niet-geYdentificeerd economisch model toch te
identificeren, is om additionele assumpties te maken. Bij deze methode worden de additionele
assumpties vaak voor zover mogelijk getoetst. Om de methode van het gebruik van subjec-
tieve data tot een serieuze concurrent te maken, zouden de assumpties met betrekking tot de
subjectieve data dus ook getoetst moeten worden. Een assumptie die vaak wordt gemaakt met
betrekking tot de gewenste arbeidsuren, is dat ze de individuele preferenties weergeven. In
deze dissertatie wordt deze veronderstelling gemaakt in hoofdstukken 3 en 4. In hoofdstuk 2
toetsen we de voorspellende kracht van de gewenste arbeidsuren voor de gerealiseerde
arbeidsuren van het volgende jaar. Dit dient als onderbouwing voor hoofdstukken 3 en 4.
Immers, als de hypothese dat de gewenste arbeidsuren geen voorspellende kracht hebben
wordt verworpen, dan moeten deze gegevens ten minste enige informatie bevatten omtrent de
individuele preferenties. Kruistabellen van de gewenste arbeidsuren met de arbeidsmarktstatus
van het volgende jaar geven sterke correlaties. Bijvoorbeeld, individuen die meer uren per
week willen werken, hebben een hogere kans om het volgende jaar inderdaad meer te werken
dan individuen die niet meer willen werken. Dit kan echter het gevolg zijn van een schijn-
verband. Daarom is het van belang om te controleren voor additionele variabelen, zoals de
gerealiseerde arbeidsuren. Om veronderstellingen omtrent functionele vormen en verdelingen
te vermijden, gebruiken we in hoofdstuk 2 niet-parametrische toetsen. Omdat bij deze toetsen
Samenvatting
niet veel additionele variabelen kunnen worden opgenomen in het model (vanwege de 'curse-
of-dimensionality'), gebruiken     we ook parametrische toetsen. We vinden overtuigend
empirisch bewijs dat voor vrouwen de subjectieve data van de gewenste arbeidsuren
inderdaad een voorspellende kracht hebben. Voor mannen is de conclusie minder duidelijk;
de resultaten hangen af van welke toets gebruikt wordt.
In de empirische arbeidsaanbodliteratuur zijn verschillende modellen ontwikkeld die
rekening houden met restricties op arbeidsuren. Deze modellen beschrijven echter niet hoe
bindend de restricties op arbeidsuren binnen en tussen banen zijn. Daarom wordt in hoofd-
stuk 3 onderzocht of de gewenste veranderingen in de arbeidsuren effect hebben op de
gerealiseerde arbeidsuren. Door gebruik te maken van de subjectieve data met betrekking tot
de gewenste arbeidsuren, is het mogelijk om de mate van aanpassing van de arbeidsuren
binnen en tussen banen te meten. Daarbij wordt toegelaten dat de gewenste arbeidsuren niet
alleen preferenties reflecteren, maar dat ze ook beYnvloed zouden kunnen zijn door de
gerealiseerde arbeidsuren in de huidige baan. Met deze potentiele endogeniteit van de
gewenste arbeidsuren wordt rekening gehouden door de schattingstechniek van instrumentele
variabelen te gebruiken. Het model wordt geschat op basis van een steekproef van vrouwen
uit het SEP die in twee opeenvolgende jaren werken. De conclusie van het hoofdstuk is dat
de mate van aanpassing van de gerealiseerde arbeidsuren binnen banen significant kleiner is
dan de aanpassing tussen banen. Ook wordt gevonden dat de aanpassing van de gerealiseerde
arbeidsuren significant kleiner  is  dan 100 procent  van de gewenste aanpassing.
In hoofdstuk 4 analyseren we de gewenste en gerealiseerde arbeidsuren van alleen-
staanden. Met behulp van een statisch structureel neoklassiek model verklaren we de
gewenste arbeidsuren uit de bruto loonvoet, de belastingen, de uitkeringen, overig inkomen
en enige individuele karakteristieken. In ons model houden we rekening met de vaste kosten
van werken en de voorspellingsfouten in de lonen van niet-werkenden. Dit betekent dat we in
dit hoofdstuk veronderstellen dat de gewenste arbeidsuren alleen preferenties weergeven. In
het tweede deel van het model verklaren we de gerealiseerde arbeidsuren uit de gewenste
arbeidsuren en de restricties op de arbeidsuren. We gebruiken de verschillen tussen de
gerealiseerde en gewenste arbeidsuren om onvrijwillige werkeloosheid en een eventueel
tekort aan banen van een bepaalde omvang te identificeren. De verklarende variabelen zijn
ondermeer de leeftijd, het opleidingsniveau, en het verschil tussen het potentiale loon en een
referentieloon (het relevante minimumloon). Op basis van een steekproef van alleenstaanden
uit  het   SEP  van 1987 vinden we grotere loonelasticiteiten voor vrouwen  dan voor mannen.
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Individuen met een potentieel loon beneden het referentieloon hebben een grotere kans op
onvrijwillige werkloosheid dan anderen. En behalve de onvrijwillige werkloosheid is het
tekort aan deeltijdbanen een belangrijke bron van restricties op de arbeidsmarkt.
Het tweede deel van deze dissertatie, hoofdstuk 5, gaat over het Duitse leerlingwezen.
Het Duitse leerlingwezen combineert werk en training binnen bedrijven met formele, door de
overheid verzorgde scholing. De algemene opinie met betrekking tot het Duitse leerlingwezen
is dat het voornamelijk voorziet in algemene vaardigheden, en minder in bedrijfsspecifieke
vaardigheden. En volgens de economische literatuur maken grote bedrijven behoorlijk grote
netto kosten om deze training binnen het bedrijf aan te bieden. Dit leidt tot de intrigerende
vraag waarom grote bedrijven investeren in de algemene vaardigheden van de leerlingen in
het leerlingwezen. Dit gedrag van de grote bedrijven is in tegenspraak met de theorie van het
menselijk kapitaal,   en   er zijn verschillende alternatieve theorieen geopperd   om dit gedrag   te
verklaren. In hoofdstuk 5 beschouwen we twee 'concurrerende' theorieen die verschillende
implicaties hebben voor de lonen in de eerste baan van de gediplomeerden van het leerling-
wezen. Volgens de theorie van de kosten van mobiliteit zouden de gediplomeerden die voor
het bedrijf blijven werken waar ze geschoold zijn, minder moeten verdienen dan de degenen
die ergens anders gaan werken. Maar volgens de theorie van asymmetrische informatie
zouden juist degenen die blijven meer moeten verdienen. Beide theorieen hebben in de
literatuur enige empirische ondersteuning gekregen op basis van cross-sectie data.
In hoofdstuk 5 gebruiken we data van het Duitse Instituut voor Sociale Zekerheid
(IAB), die informatie bevatten over 66n procent van alle Duitse werknemers (uitgezonderd
ambtenaren)    over de periode    1975    tot    1990.    Met   deze data kunnen    we een relatief grote
homogene groep van jonge werknemers volgen. We concentreren ons op mannelijke werk-
nemers die in de betreffende periode hun diploma hebben gehaald in het leerlingwezen. In
deze steekproef blijft ongeveer 60 procent werken voor het bedrijf waar ze geschoold zijn.
De anderen vertrekken meteen of kort na het behalen van hun diploma naar een ander
bedrijf. We analyseren de loonverschillen tussen degenen die blijven en degenen die
vertrekken, waarbij we corrigeren voor individuele en bedrijfskarakteristieken, en voor
potentiele zelfselectie. We analyseren ook de spreiding in de lonen. Op basis van onze
empirische analyse vinden we hogere lonen voor degenen die blijven, wat de theorie van
asymmetrische informatie ondersteund. Maar de selectie-effecten en de kleinere spreiding in
de lonen voor degenen die blijven kunnen echter niet verklaard worden met deze theorie.
Geen van beide beschreven theorieen ondervindt dus unanieme ondersteuning.
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